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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNiTY REGIONAL POLICY: 
A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND AND 
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
by 
Gregory John Croxford 
This thesis develops the argument that research on the 
European Community (EC) could be enriched by studies of how 
Community policies are implemented. The processes by which 
EC policies are formulated have been the subject of a great 
deal of research. However, the way in which these policies 
are subsequently put into practice and whether or not their 
objectives are achieved has received very little attention. 
Yet these processes may be highly complex, involving a large 
variety of institutions and actors at Community, national and 
regional levels. The complexity of implementation and of the 
Community's political system offers scope for a significant 
"implementation gap" between policy objectives and outcomes. 
This study is therefore about the implementation of EC 
regional policy. More specifically, it focus*is- on the 
operation in the United Kingdom of two Community Funds with 
regional objectives; namely, the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). 
In particular, the activities of the two Funds in South West 
England are examined. The research also assesses the roles 
in implementation of the European Commission and national 
government departments in the UK. 
The research shows that the UK government is able to 
influence many aspects of the implementation process by means 
of its pivotal role in decision-making and its ability to 
control many financial aspects of the provision of EC grants. 
As a result, the objectives of the ERDF and ESF may be 
overwhelmed by the entirely national objectives of 
government. On the other hand, this study demonstrates 
that the European Commission can exert some control in order 
to pursue the Funds' "Community" objectives. The 
organisations at regional level which actually apply for EC 
grants are also shown to be of importance. Their involvement 
is determined by factors such as government restrictions on 
expenditure, assisted area status, the availability of 
information, local iniciative and the efficiency of 
organisational structurcs. 
The research, which coincided with a period in which EC 
regional policy is being reformed, calls for more explicit 
concern in the future with how the Community's increasingly 
prominent regional development objectives are put into 
practice. Moreover, it asserts that studying how Community 
policies operate can help to shed more light on the nature of 
the EC's political system. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. 
1.1. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES. 
This thesis is about the implementation of European 
Community (EC) regional policy. It examines the processes 
which translate a Community policy into action on the ground 
and the ways in which these processes affect the attainment 
of the policy's objectives. More specifically, the study 
focuses on the operation of two financial instruments of 
Community regional policy, namely the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund 
(ESF). 
The ERDF was chosen because it has the specific role 
of providing assistance to Europe's problem regions and is 
most directly concerned with delivering EC regional 
objectives. However, other Funds, such as the ESF, the 
Guidance section of the Agricultural Fund, the assistance 
available from the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Investment Bank, are also expected to contribute 
towards these goals, although they are not primarily 
conceived as instruments of regional policy. Ideally, it 
would be advantageous to examine the activities of all of 
these other Funds in order to assess whether, in practice, 
they do in fact conform with regional objectives. However, 
time constraints made such a comprehensive approach 
impossible. The ESF was studied because of its 
comparability with the ERDF in terms of the participating 
organisations. 
The theme of policy implementation has in recent 
I 
years attracted growing interest in the academic community, 
principally from researchers in political science and public 
administration (Barratt and Fudge, 1981; Lewis and Wallace, 
1984). In contrast, political geographers have been 
surprisingly slow to appreciate that the results of spatial 
programmes can often be strongly influenced by the means 
through which they are put into effect. Research in other 
fields has shown that it is common for apparently 
well-conceived public policies of all kinds to fail to meet 
their full objectives when put into practice. The existence 
of such an "implementation gap" (Dunsire, 1978) between aims 
and outcomes has often been explained from a "top-down" 
perspective as the result of ambiguous objectives or the 
inability of policy makers to control the actions of those 
responsible for carrying out policy (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979). Other scholars 
adopt a "bottom-up" view which stresses that policies can 
evolve whilst being implemented and that objectives may 
effectively be changed as a result of conditions prevalent 
19 on the ground". This perspective suggests that 
implementation is a process of negotiation and bargaining 
between participating organisations (Barrett and Fudge, 
1981; Hjern, 1982; Stringer and Williamson, 1987). 
In the European Community field, research on policy 
formulation is again in plentiful supply (Wise, 1977, 
1984; Talbot, 1977; Wallace, Wallace and Webb, 1983; 
George, 1985). However, studies of how policies actually 
operate are much less abundant, although some scholars have 
made a start (Laffan, 1983; Coates and Wallace, 1984; 
Glasson and McGee, 1984; Preston, 1985). This is again 
2 
surprising since the implementation of EC policies often 
involves a large number of actors in public and private 
organisations at regional, national and Community levels. 
Hence, they provide very fertile ground for the study of 
what is clearly an important aspect of the policy process. 
Implementation is therefore the major focus of this 
thesis. The study provides a critique of how the ERDF and 
ESF are allocated in the United Kingdom and the impact of 
these processes on the achievement of certain policy 
objectives. 
Having completed this primary analysis, the research 
also examines two other related, but secondary issues. 
Firstly, it contributes to the debate on the role of the 
EC in regional policy. In this context, the research has 
been undertaken at a particularly apposite time, since the 
Community's three Structural Funds (including the ERDF and 
ESF) are currently (August, 1988) undergoing reforms which 
will mean important changes to the ways in which they 
operate. Secondly, an effort is also made to relate this 
particular detailed case-study to the wider debate about the 
nature of the EC. It is important to examine how one policy 
among the many which are formulated and implemented by the 
Community fits into the broader picture. 
At this early stage an important terminological note 
should be stressed. The overall goal of EC regional policy 
is to reduce regional disparities. This thesis is not 
explicitly concerned with examining the extent to which 
Community regional Policy is effective in reducing the 
inequalities between rich and poor regions. Instead, the 
research identifies what will henceforth be referred to as 
the "operational" objectives of Community regional policy 
and examines whether these are being successfully 
implemented. These objectives are the mechanisms which a 
policy adopts in order to achieve its overall goals. They 
include the aim that EC funds should add to national 
expenditure on regional development rather than act as a 
replacement for national spending and the objective of 
concentrating resources on the neediest areas. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the relationship between policy instruments, 
"operational" objectives and overall goals. 
FIGURE 1.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICY INSTRUMENTS, 
OBJECTIVES AND OVERALL GOALS. 
Operational Overall 
Policy obJectives goal 
- Additionality 
- Geographical 
Regional policy concentration Reduce regional 
(ERDF + ESF etc) - Programmes disparities 
- Small and medium 
firms 
Young People 
under 25 
The research focuses on the operation of the ERDF 
Y 
and ESF in the United Kingdom. It examines the roles in 
the implementation process and in the delivery of the Funds' 
operational objectives of the European Commission, the 
national government and the recipients of Community grants 
at the local level. The significance of local initiative 
and organisation is examined by means of case-studies of 
the operation of the two Funds in South West England. 
This region was chosen primarily for logistical regions. 
The research was based in Plymouth and scarce resources 
4 
precluded frequent long-distance travel. Neverthless, South 
West England is a very suitable area for a study of this 
kind. The region has a number of designated assisted areas 
and is therefore eligible for ERDF aid. Moreover, it is 
characterised by marked inequalities between a relatively 
affluent "near South West" centred on Bristol, and a 
relatively deprived, peripheral "far South West" consisting 
of Devon and Cornwall (see Chapter 5). 
The work involved carrying out a series of interviews 
with actors in local organisations applying for grants, in 
national government departments and in the European 
Commission. This unravelling of a highly complex process 
was an important and original aim of the research (Appendix 
1). 
In this overall context, this research has a number 
of specific, inter-related objectives. The primary aims are: 
1. to unravel the processes by which the ERDF and ESF 
are implemented in the United Kingdom (partly by 
means of the case-study of South West England); 
2. to examine whether the implementation process 
facilitates the delivery of the two Funds' 
It operational" objectives. 
The secondary aims of this study are: 
3. to provide a critique of EC regional policy in the 
light of the findings of this research; 
4. to relate I briefly the findings of this study to 
the wider/debate about the nature of the EC. 
The remainder of this Chapter presents a review of 
the literature on policy implementation, followed by an 
introduction to the institutional structure of the EC and 
the ways in which the Community implements its policies. 
Furthermore, it sets out the research methods and data 
sources which were employed in the course'of the study. 
The second chapter discusses the development and overall 
5 
goals of EC regional policy. Subsequently, Chapter 
Three outlines the specific operational objectives of the 
ERDF and examines the role of the European Commission in 
the achievement of the Fund's operational objectives. 
Chapter Four focuseS- attention on the implementation of the 
ERDF in the United Kingdom and outlines the role of the 
national government. Chapter Five then concentrates on the 
applicants and recipients of ERDF grants in South West 
England, examining the spatial and sectoral patterns of 
spending and the processes by which applications are 
initiated. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight then carry out 
similar analyses at Community, national and local levels of 
the operation of the ESF. 
The final Chapter brings together the various 
themes of the thesis in a broad discussion of how 
Community grants are allocated in relation to wider 
conceptualisations of the implementation process. More 
specifically, Chapter Nine will: summarise the main 
empirical findings; assess the relevance of models of policy 
implementation to understanding the operation of the ERDF 
and ESF; briefly examine how the findings of this research 
contribute to the wider debate about the nature of the EC; 
and provide a critique of EC involvement in regional policy 
in the light of both this research on the implementation of 
the ERDF and ESF and the reforms of Community regional 
policy which have been taking place during 1988; 
6 
1.2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES. 
This section examines a variety of concepts arising 
from the extensive literature on policy implementation which 
will help to shed light on the ways in which Community Funds 
are put into operation. 
1.2.1 The Development of implementation research. 
The study of a phenomenon known as "implementation" 
has only emerged relatively recently as a branch of academic 
endeavour. In 1973, an extensive literature search by 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) found no mention of the term 
"implementation" in the abstracts of published research 
papers. As a result, they concluded that no previous 
literature existed on the subject. However, others have 
argued that the study of policy implementation had existed 
before in the guise of research in the field of public 
administration. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) and Dunsire 
(1978) pointed to various studies pre-dating the work of 
Pressman and Wildavsky that were at least implicitly 
concerned with the means by which policies are executed. 
However, the previous literature tended to look at 
it politics" and "administration" as two separate and 
unrelated entities. The latter was regarded as essentially a 
de-politicized, mechanistic process that was unlikely to 
cause major problems (Williams, 1980; Hyder, 1984). However, 
the failure of some of the major social programs of the 
Johnson era in the United States led to an increased 
awareness among practitioners and academics alike that major 
policies could fail to achieve their targets because of the 
discontinuity between policy formulation and practice 
7 
(Bardach, 1977). The term "implementation" was coined to 
describe the processes involved in the "missing link" 
between politics and administration (Hargrove, 1975). 
The research by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) is often 
regarded as the seminal work on implementation. Their study 
was concerned with how a job creation scheme designed in 
Washington failed when implemented in Oakland. This study 
attempted to identify the "decision-points" where the 
program went wrong and concluded that reducing the number of 
these potential stumbling blocks would facilitate simpler 
and more effective implementation. 
1.2.2. The "top-down" perspective. 
The work of Pressman and Wildavsky paved the way for 
subsequent research that dealt specifically with 
implementation as a distinct phenomenon. Many of these 
studies took what has since been termed a "top-down" 
perspective. In other words, they studied the execution of 
policies from the point of view of policy makers trying to 
put policy into effect. Such research invariably began by 
examining the objectives of a policy and assessing the 
extent to which these objectives had been achieved. If this 
process lej to the identification of an "implementation 
gap" (Dunsire, 1978) between policy objectives and outcomes 
then study of the processes by which policies were 
implemented would facilitate the identification of the 
points where policy went wrong and why. Top-down studies 
tended to explain policy failure in terms of the inability 
of policy makers to control those responsible for 
implementation or the failure of policy makers to stress 
clear objectives. 
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The work of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), 
Hargrove (1975), Rodgers and Bullock (1976), Montjoy 
and O'Toole (1979) and Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) 
belonged to this school of implementation research. Van 
Meter and Van Horn, for example, argued that "policy 
implementation encompasses those actions by public and 
private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the 
achievement of objectives set 'forth in prior policy 
decisions" (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975, p447). At this 
time, researchers were at pains to identify the inherent 
limits on implementation. Dunsire (1978), for example, 
suggested that there were certain bureaucratic limits to 
hierarchical control within organisations and that those at 
the top of these hierarchies attempting to control 
implementation would automatically be confronted by these 
limits. 
Among the leading proponents of the top-down approach 
to studying implementation were two American scholars - 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979,1980 and 1983). These authors 
set out a framework for implementation which suggested 
that three sets of independent variables have significant 
impacts on how implementation proceeds in practice (Figure 
1.2), namely: 
1. the tractability of the problem being addressed 
(its complexity and how easily it can be managed); 
2. the ways in which a policy directive can constrain 
the implementation process; 
3. the external variables affecting policy 
implementation (for example, media attention, 
public and political support, other socio-economic 
variables) (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). 
Sabatier and Mazmanian developed their framework from 
research on the implementation of coastal conservation 
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policy in California and it has since been applied applied 
succesfully by other scholars to other policy problems 
(Bullock, 1981; Sabatier and Klosterman, 1981; Goodwin and 
Moen, 1981). This "top-down" conceptual framework would seem 
potentially to provide a useful tool for examining the 
implementation of EC policies and is discussed in more 
detail in relation to the findings of this research in 
Chapter Nine. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the top-down view 
became the subject of considerable criticism. It was at this 
time that European researchers began to show an interest in 
an area of study that had previously been almost exclusively 
North American. Among the leading exponents of this European 
research were Barrett with Fudge (1981) and with Hill 
(1984), Hill et al (1979) and Hjern with his colleagues 
Porter (1981) and Hull (1982). 
These authors pointed out that hierarchical control 
of implementation was often weak and that there are limits 
on the ability of central policy makers to control the 
behaviour of target groups and local implementors 
(Weatherley and Lipsky, 1977; Hanf and Scharpf, 1978; 
Barrett and Fudge, 1981). In the "real world", it was 
argued, implementation "involves loosely connected networks 
of organisations from various levels of Government, none of 
which [is] pre-eminent" (Hiern and Porter, 1981, p212). 
Moreover, the frequent absence of strong hierarchical 
control and the complexity of the environment within which 
policies are carried out means that they should not be 
regarded as fixed entities ready for implementation. 
Instead, they are often flexible and can undergo changes in 
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response to local conditions whilst being implemented. 
A second related criticism is that the concern with 
analysing the achievement of policy objectives is misplaced 
since in reality these are rarely clearly expressed or 
capable of achieving unanimous support (Majone and 
Wildavsky, 1978; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Barrett and 
Hill, 1984; Stringer and Williamson, 1987). In many cases 
the policy-making system involves a variety of individuals 
and organisations with varying aims as regards particular 
areas of policy. Eventual legislation reflects this 
diversity of interests and has objectives that are often 
vague and contradictory. Moreover, Barratt and Hill (1984) 
argued that the same factors which give rise to compromise 
in policy making continue to influence and shape its 
implementation. Consequently, policy making and policy 
implementatiom are different aspects of the same continuum 
and research should not assume them to be separate or 
distinct. As a result of these criticisms a new approach to 
the study of implementation emerged. 
1.2.3. The "bottom-up" perspective. 
Authors such as those mentioned above have adopted a 
"bottom-up" view of implementation in reaction to what they 
considered were significant flaws in the top-down 
approach. These researchers focussed on the actions of local 
participants in implementation and argued that much activity 
originates at this level rather than being instigated by 
top-down policy makers developing policy and attempting to 
put it into effect. Instead of beginning with an 
identifiable policy decision, the bottom-up approach starts 
with an analysis of the actors which interact at the local 
I ', 
level on a particular problem or issue. The focus is on the 
srategies pursued by various organisations in the pursuit of 
their own objectives rather than those of a policy imposed 
from above. Implicit in this approach is the notion that 
policies are best formulated by actors at the local level 
rather than controlled by central decision-makers removed 
from the needs of particular localities and the consequences 
of policies "on the ground". 
This approach recognised that the interactions 
between the policy formulation and implementation processes 
produced a it policy [that] evolved as it was being 
implemented" (Stringer and Williamson, 1987, p36). One of 
the first studies of this kind was that by Majone and 
Wildavsky (1978) who conceptualised the implementation 
process as one of "evolution". They argued that as policy 
is enacted it is automatically changed as resources are 
altered or problems arise. Majone and Wildavsky concluded 
that "implementation will always be evolutionary; it will 
inevitably reformulate as well as carry out policy" (Majone 
and Wildavsky, 1987, p116). Other authors have echoed this 
theme of policy being changed during implementation (Hill et 
al, 1979; Barratt and Fudge, 1981; Stringer and Williamson, 
1987). 
A number of scholars have emphasised that policies 
evove during implementation because of a process of 
bargaining and compromise between more or less autonomous 
actors and organisations (Bardach, 1977; Barrett and Fudge, 
1981; Hanf, 1982; ' Scharpf (1982). As Barrett and Fudge 
argue, "without total control over resources, agencies and 
the whole implementation environment, those wanting to do 
1 
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something may be forced to compromise their original 
intentions in order to get any action at all" 
(Barratt and Fudge, 1981, p16). According to Barratt and 
Hill "the process of implementation is essentially a 
political process characterised by negotiation, bargaining 
and compromise between those groups seeking to influence the 
actions of others and those upon whom action depends" 
(Barratt and Hill, 1984, p220). In this study of EC funds 
there is a great deal of scope for negotiation and 
compromise between Community institutions, national 
governments and local organisations, all of whom 
participate in putting EC policies into operation. 
A key problem identified by the bottom-up approach is 
how to define what is meant by policy. A politician may view 
a relatively vague political intention in a Party Manifesto 
as policy. Others may see only the very detailed legislation 
as the policy. Clearly, whichever view the student of 
implementation adopts will affect what is actually studied. 
If the former view is taken then the processes leading up to 
the framing of detailed regulations must also be regarded as 
implementation. Hill et al suggest that "the distinction 
between policy-making and implementation (rests) upon the 
identification of decision points at which a policy is 
deemed to be made ready for implementation, like a commodity 
which is manufactured and ready for selling" (Hill et al, 
1979, p1l). The bottom-up approach assumes either that 
these decision points cannot easily be identified or that 
making this distinction in the first place is inappropriate 
since the two stages are so closely related and 
interlinked. Hence, proponents of the bottom-up approach 
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argue that the analyst cannot readily understand 
implementation without also looking at how policy is 
formulated. 
These kinds of views, however, have not gone 
unchallenged. Sabatier (1986), for example, argued that 
these bottom-up perspectives often fail to identify the 
external social, economic and legal constraints limiting the 
discretion of participants in a particular area of policy. 
The bottom-up approach, Sabatier suggested, takes as given 
the institutional framework within which actors operate, 
without enquiring into the ability of others to structure 
this framework and so influence the rules of the game. He 
argued that the removal of the distinction between policy 
formulation and implementation is likely to have significant 
costs. Firstly, it makes it difficult to assess the relative 
influence of elected officials and civil servants, 
preventing analysis of important issues such as democratic 
accountability and bureaucratic discretion (an important 
consideration in a study of EC policies where a major actor, 
the European Commission, is unelected). Secondly, the lack 
of a distinction precludes policy evaluation since it seems 
to assume that there is no distinct policy to evaluate. 
How can the success of activity taking place in a particular 
policy arena be judged without relating it to overall policy 
objectives? The bottom-up approach tends to play down the 
fact that much action is generated by policies handed down 
from above and that all activity takes place within a broad 
policy-legal framework. 
Sabatier also argued that, contrary to the views of 
bottom-up scholars, it is both possible and justifiable to 
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identify the point at which a policy is completed and ready 
for implementation. In the present research, for example, 
the Regulations controlling the ERDF and ESF are obvious 
starting points for studying implementation. 
The ideas of "top down" and "bottom up", as well 
as being advocated approaches to studying implementation, 
can also be used as models of how the implementation process 
operates. They describe the ways in which particular 
policies are put into effect. As such, the differences 
between them reflect the fact that different policies may 
operate in different ways - some are imposed from above 
while others are more adaptive to local needs and 
conditions. Chapter Two will show that EC regional policy 
was initially conceived in a top-down fashion. Proposals 
from the Commission were considered and agreed upon by the 
Council of Ministers with only marginal input from potential 
beneficiaries of Community grants at local and regional 
levels. Consequently, the initial approach of this study 
is also "top-down". The policy's operational objectives, 
as decided at the "top", are examined and assessments are 
made of whether or not they are delivered in the UK. 
Subsequently, however, the importance of initiative at the 
"bottom" is also highlighted 
There are obvious parallels between this discussion 
of "top-down" versus "bottom-up" models/perspectives and the 
long-standing debates on the appropriateness of "rational" 
and "incremental" models of decision-making. The classical 
rational models outlined by Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) 
and Lindblom (1968), assume that actors have clearly 
defined policy goals and that decision-making is essentially 
I F. 
concerned with evaluating the alternative strategies which 
could be adopted in order to achieve these objectives. Many 
it real-world" case studies, however, have shown that this 
model may be far removed from what happens in practice. 
Often decision-making is characterised by "disjointed 
incrementalism" (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963) involving 
small "satisficing" decisions (Simon, 1959) as the plethora 
of actors involved in policy formulation bargain and 
compromise their way towards mutually acceptable solutions. 
The implementation of decisions and policies is often 
similarly characterised by a "quest for rational control" 
which can never be satisfied because of real-world 
complexities (Hill, 1981). 
1.2.4. Suggested syntheses of top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives. 
In recent years academics have become more aware that 
bottom-up and top-down views can both have valid uses and 
that the approach adopted may depend on the policy or 
policies which are being examined (Sabatier, 1986). 
Moreover, both approaches/models can shed light on different 
aspects of the same policy. Indeed, according to Hanf and 
Toonen (1985) the two approaches are often studying 
different aspects of the same thing. There have also been, 
stretching back over a period of years, attempts to 
synthesise the two perspectives and to formulate a model 
which takes account of the fact that both hierarchical 
control and local initiative may be equally important 
aspects of policy implementation. 
Hyder (1984) and Lewis and Wallace (1984) 
produced a model which took this into account. They 
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supported the "bottom-uppers" who argued that policy evolves 
because of what happens during implementation. However, they 
also recognised that these changes often occur because of 
re-evaluations carried out by those attempting to put policy 
into practice from the "top". Hyder's initial model was 
formulated as follows: 
P, - Hj- I, - Ej- P2 
where: Plis the problem, 
Hlis the policy (hypothesis), 
Ilis the implementation stage, 
Elis the evaluation and correction stage, 
P2 is the re-evaluated policy and is followed by H2 
and so on. 
The subsequent policies (HN) are, according to Hyder, not 
necessarily superior to earlier versions but are "a 
response either to the process of implementation acting on 
the environment, or to changes in the environment (within 
which policy is formulated and enacted]". There are once 
again obvious parallels here with rational and incremental 
models of the policy process. Hyder himself anticipated that 
his evolutionary model could be construed as a simple 
restatement of the classical "incrementalist" view of the 
policy process. However, he went on to argue that his model 
in no way implies that decisions to amend or develop 
policies need be small or gradual in the way that the 
incrementalist view suggests, but that changes can be both 
major and discontinuous. Furthermore, he pointed out that 
some rational evaluation does take place as policy is 
revised in the light of experience gained from a period of 
implementation. Hyder concluded that his "evolutionary model 
could be regarded as an attempt to bridge the gap between 
incrementalist and rational views of the policy process" 
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(Hyder, 1984, p16). This model will be referred to again in 
the context of our discussion of the development of EC 
regional policy in Chapter Two. 
The theme of conceptualising implementation in ways 
which synthesise top-down and bottom-up perspectives has 
occupied a number of other scholars. A prominent example of 
this approach is the idea of "implementation structure" 
developed by Hjern and Porter (1981) and subsequently 
adopted by, among others, Hanf (1982), Wittrock et al 
(1982), Thrasher (1983), Toonen (1985). Hjern and Porter 
argued that "a multiorganizational unit of analysis, an 
implementation structure, should be used when describing and 
evaluating the implementation of programs" (Hjern and 
Porter, 1981, p211). This idea was initially a reaction 
against the earlier top-down approach but in practice it 
actually "bridges the (perhaps) false polarization of 
'top-down' versus 'bottom-up' perspectives" (Barrett and 
Fudge, 1981, p37). This model describes the entire 
implementation system without making assumptions about where 
initiative lies and also permits the identification of 
elements of "top-down" control which may influence the 
implementation process. Hjern and Porter suggested that, 
from the point of view of those who are part of the 
implementation structure, the network of contacts and 
interactions involved in a particular policy area may be 
more important than the actual institutions in which they 
are formally employed. They argued that many implementation 
structures are not designed but evolve from the initiative 
of individuals in response to a particular policy; that is 
by what Hjern and Porter refer to as "self-selection". In 
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other words, involvement with a particular policy is often 
the result of choices made by individuals within 
organisation operating "on the ground". They concluded that 
there is a potential "pool of organisations" from which an 
implementation structure is formed. One concern of this 
thesis will be to identify the "pool of organisations" in 
the EC's "implementation structure". 
On a related theme, Toonen (1985) argued that the 
underlying framework of institutions, and the relationships 
between and power bases among these institutions, will be 
crucial in determining how policy is implemented. He 
focussed, in particular, on the differences between federal 
and unitary systems of Government and the implementation 
structures that develop under these systems. Both Toonen and 
Elmore (1985) suggested that federal structures are likely 
to consist of a wide variety of relatively autonomous 
organisations, whereas unitary structures are often simpler 
and more uniform, answering to one ultimate source of 
authority. In the words of Toonen: 
A federalist structure seems to provide the more 
difficult and complex cases, entailing all sorts of 
problems in terms of co-ordination, enforcement, 
pursuasion and control. A unitary structure seems to 
provide a more generous setting for implementing 
nation-wide policies. The asymmetry of the state 
seems to favour the centre (Toonen, 1985, p162). 
Others may disagree with this assertion. Barrett and 
Fudge (1981) for example, provided a variety of case studies 
of implementation in the United Kingdom -a unitary state 
- which highlight difficulties posed by implementation in a 
unitary structure. Toonen himself went on to admit that the 
amount of "federalism" or "unitarism" within political 
systems can vary greatly across a variety of policies and 
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that implementation structures need not be obviously 
"federal" or "unitary" in the respective systems. For the 
purposes of the present study a key point to note is that 
the unique institutional structure of the European Community 
is a particularly interesting framework within which to study 
policy implementation. The existence of supranational 
institutions such as the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice gives the Community some of the 
attributes of a federal structure. On the other hand, the 
member states are enmeshed at all levels of the Community's 
policy-making and policy implementation systems, thereby 
distinguishing the Community from a normal federal system. 
1.3. POLICY MAKING AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. 
This section is divided into three parts. The first 
outlines the wider institutional structure of the EC within 
which policies are formulated. The second provides a general 
introductory discussion of how Community policies are put 
into practice. These reviews provide a context for the more 
specific and detailed studies of the ERDF and ESF presented 
in subsequent Chapters. The third section outlines a number 
of conceptual views of the Community's political system 
which will be assessed in the light of the findings of this 
research in the study's final Chapter. 
1.3.1. Policy-making in the European Community. 
The processes by which Community decisions are made 
and policies formulated are, at their simplest, the result 
of interactions between two major institutions, namely the 
Council of Ministers and the European Commission. These 
institutions are "supranational" in character. In other 
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words, they are responsible for formulating policies and 
laws which are binding on the member states and which take 
precedence over national laws. The Commission is responsible 
for making proposals for European policies which the Council 
of Ministers then accepts, rejects or returns to the 
Commission for amendment. However, other institutions, 
notably the European Parliament, the European Court of 
Justice and, to a much lesser extent, the Economic and 
Social Committee, also impinge on the policy-making process. 
The European Commission. 
The Commission of the European Community is headed by 
a group of Commissioners appointed by the member states. 
Despite their backgrounds as national politicians, the 
Commissioners are supposed to renounce their national 
connections and act as servants of the "Community interest". 
However, it is generally accepted that in practice 
Commissioners*retain some links with their country of origin 
and are one means of injecting national viewpoints into the 
deliberations of the Commission. 
There are currently seventeen Commissioners - two 
from the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain, together with one from each of the seven smaller 
countries. Each Commissioner is assigned the portfolios for 
one or more areas of policy. For example, at the time of 
writing (August 1988), the Commissioners for Regional Policy 
(including the ERDF) and Social Policy (ESF) are Alois 
Pfeiffer (a German) and Manuel Marin (a Spaniard) 
respectively. The work Of Policy formulation and management 
is carried out within the framework of twenty-two 
Directorate3General (DGs) each headed by a Director General 
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of different nationality from the Commissioner with 
responsibility for that policy sector. 
The Commission has three main roles: to act as 
initiator of policy; to ensure that Community law is 
respected; and to administer policies and legislation which 
has been agreed by the Council of Ministers. The Commission 
does have certain powers of decision in areas specified by 
the Treaty or designated by the Council. An example of the 
latter is the ability of the Commission to award ERDF and 
ESF grants (subject in the case of the ERDF to the approval 
of a management committee on which the member governments 
are represented and within the terms of legislation made by 
the Council). The main power of the Commission is its 
ability to devise proposals for the Council. In fact, the 
Council of Ministers can usually only act on the basis of a 
proposal from the Commission. In formulating these 
proposals, the Commission is supposed to promote the "common 
European interest" and/or seek compromise solutions which 
all member states can accept. 
The staff of the Commission do not work in isolation 
in drawing up proposals. They carry out extensive 
consultation with national governments, interest groups and 
11 experts" of various kinds. The Commission also participates 
fully in the network of committees linking the main 
Community institutions. 
The Council of Ministers. 
The final decisions producing EC legislation and 
policy are made by the Council of Ministers. The Council is 
composed of ministers delegated by the twelve member states, 
but its precise composition is dependent on the matter under 
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discussion. For example, if agriculture is being considered 
then those present will be the member states' respective 
ministers for agriculture. 
The process by which the Council of Ministers makes 
decisions is complex. The Treaty of Rome, which created the 
European Economic Community in 1957, required "qualified 
majority voting". According to this system, each member 
state would be allocated a number of votes based very 
roughly on population size, although the larger states have 
far fewer votes and the smaller ones far more than size 
alone would dictate. This method was intended to apply 
to many Community decisions, whereas others considered 
particularly important would be taken by unanimous voting. 
In the enlarged Community of twelve these shares are as 
follows: 
West Germany, United Kingdom, France and Italy - 10 
votes 
Spain -8 votes 
Greece, Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal -5 votes 
Ireland and Denmark -3 votes 
Luxembourg -2 votes. 
Total votes available - 76. 
A total of 54 votes are required to achieve what is known as 
a "qualified majority". As a result the five largest states 
are unable to muster sufficient votes to overcome the seven 
smaller countries. The Single European Act (Commission, 
1986a), a package of significant institutional reforms which 
came into operation in July 1987, extended qualified 
majority voting to a number of policy areas which had 
previously required unanimity. These include, those 
concerned with the completion of the Community's common 
internal market and with the Community's "economic and 
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social cohesion" (including regional and social policies). 
Majority voting was intended to allow Community 
decisions to be taken by the Council without undue delay. 
However, since 1966 the reality of the national veto has 
generally been accepted. At that time, President De Gaulle 
had taken France out of the Community's decision-making 
processes for six months. This was a result of French belief 
in the principle that member states should not be outvoted 
on matters where important national interests were at stake. 
The so-called "Luxembourg Compromise" of 1966 ended the 
French boycott but also allowed governments to prevent 
decisions being taken by claiming that an issue concerned 
their "vital national interests". Since then, member states 
have been able to slow down the decision-making by arguing 
that many issues threaten these important interests. One 
problem is that this term cannot be clearly defined and is 
therefore difficult to challenge. The Single European Act 
does not remove this obstacle to speedier decision-making 
and national governments are likely to continue to resist 
threats to what they consider to be their vital interests. 
In the process of negotiation about particular 
policies and decisions, the Council is aided by the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which 
is composed of permanent ambassadors to the Community 
appointed by the member states. This body prepares the 
ground for Council meetings and in practice the Council 
often simply "rubber-stamps" many minor or procedural 
decisions which have already effectively been taken by 
COREPER. Below COREPER is a myriad of other committees which 
prepare COREPER and Council of Ministers' meetings. These 
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committees, which sketch out the bases of agreements and 
identify the main points of conflict, are composed of 
national civil servants and representatives of the 
Commission. Uncontroversial matters are effectively settled 
by these Committees. 
In recent years, the European Council, which is 
made up of the Heads of Government of the twelve member 
states, has evolved into the institution which takes the 
major decisions regarding the future of the Community. For 
example, the negotiations of 1987 and 1988 on the financing 
of the Community budget and reform of the CAP have taken 
place at this European Council level. The Council was 
institutionalised following the 1974 Summit of EC leaders 
in Paris and meets twice per year (Bulmer, 1985). 
The European Parliament. 
The original architects of the European Community 
intended that the European Parliament would provide an 
element of democratic control over the activities of the 
Commission and the Council. However, it was not until 1979 
that the first direct elections to the Parliament were held; 
previously its members had been appointed from among the 
members of national parliaments. 
The Parliament's main role is consultative. It does 
have the power to dismiss the Commission (but not to appoint 
another one) and has some control over the Community's 
overall budget. However, in most other policy areas it has 
only been able to give its opinion on Commission proposals 
and thus has often been peripheral to the more crucial 
dialogue between the Commission, the Council of Ministers 
and the national governments. The Single European Act, 
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however, incorporates the European Parliament more firmly 
into the decision-making process. The Council of Ministers 
must make decisions "in co-operation with the European 
Parliament". In practice, this allows the Parliament to 
block decisions taken by the Council with which it disagrees 
and to force the Commission to re-examine its proposals. A 
revised proposal from the Commission must then be adopted 
unanimously by the Council. However, Parliament's opinion 
remains non-binding and need not necessarily be incorporated 
into the final decision. Nevertheless, the power to 
interrupt decision making may in future mean that 
Parliament's opinion is taken more fully into account. 
The European Court of Justice. 
A further important Community institution is the 
European Court of Justice, which is responsible for giving 
final legal judgement on interpretations of the Paris and 
Rome Treaties and on the operation of Community legislation. 
Private individuals, firms, local authorities, national 
governments or the Commission can appeal to the Court 
(which consists of judges appointed by the member states) 
when they consider that Community legislation is not being 
implemented as intended. 
Other institutions. 
Finally it is briefly worth mentioning two other 
Community institutions. The Court of Auditors exists as a 
watchdog for Community revenue and expenditure. It has 
powers to enquire into how Community money is being spent 
and is particularly interested in the activities of the 
various Community financial instruments. The Economic and 
Social Committee (ECOSOC) has a somewhat peripheral 
2' 
advisory role. It was established to inject an element of 
,I public opinion" into the Community's decision-making 
process and provide another "expert" source of advice. 
ECOSOC consists of representatives of unions, employers 
and other general interest groups and its members are 
proposed by the member states. It is divided into a number 
of specialist sub-committees which give opinions on 
Commission proposals. However, its influence on 
decision-making is minimal. 
1.3.2. Policy imDlementation in the EuroDean Community. 
Having outlined the institutional structure within 
which European Community policies are formulated, the 
discussion now proceeds to consider how these decisions and 
policies are put into practice. 
Implementation of Community policies takes a number 
of forms depending on the legal status of the particular 
legislation. There are five types of legal instrument: 
Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations and 
Opinions. The latter two have no binding force and do not 
arise during this study. However, the first three, which are 
legally binding to varying degrees, are of importance in 
the current context and are implemented in different ways. 
Regulations have direct effect on member states and must be 
applied in the same way as national laws, over which they 
take precedence. Directives are also legally binding as 
regards the aims to be achieved but it is left to national 
governments to decide exactly how they should be put into 
effect. Finally, Decisions are concerned with specific 
problems and are binding on those whom they effect, whether 
they be governments, private organisations or individuals. 
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In most policy sectors member states are primarily 
responsible for the implementation of Community legislation. 
However, the European Commission may also be involved in a 
variety of different ways. In the majority of cases this 
role is restricted to supervising and monitoring the 
implementation by national governments of Regulations and 
Directives. On the other hand, in a limited number of cases 
such as common policies for agriculture and the steel 
industry, the managerial role of the Commission is a more 
central component of the implementation process. In some 
areas, management committees have been created to increase 
collaboration between responsible national authorities and 
the Commission. The major examples of these are the 
committees which supervise the production and marketing of 
agricultural products and those which participate in the 
operation of the ERDF and ESF (see Chapters 3 and 6). 
In one of the few previous studies concerned 
explicitly with the implementation of Community 
policies, Coates (1984) concluded that in the development of 
common food standards the uncontroversial nature of 
legislation led to the creation of a relatively small 
it policy community" allowing the legislation to be almost 
to self-implementing", uninhibited by pressure for radical 
change within a complex institutional structure. 
In other areas the picture may be somewhat different. 
Some policies are carried out much more in the "public 
eye" and hence are likely to encounter greater problems as 
they are put into practice. This examination of the 
ERDF and ESF will amply illustrate that policies which 
concern the potentially emotive issue of allocating 
financial assistance may extend the number of organisations 
involved in the Community process. In spite of this, few 
studies have been made of how, where and on what Community 
money is spent. A brief study of the implementation of 
Community funds by Coates and Wallace is one of the few 
examples. They concluded that "implementation in the United 
Kingdom has been administratively efficient ... technically 
the formal requirements of implementation have been largely 
fulfilled" (Coates and Wallace, 1984, p180). They went on to 
say that there is evidence of limited EC influences "seeping 
through the filters which continue to separate Community and 
national officials, but there is no new policy community yet 
emerging to transcend the boundary between the two" (Coates 
and Wallace, 1984, p180). 
A modest number of other studies have also focussed 
implicitly on how Community funds, including the ERDF and 
ESF, are operated. Glasson and McGee (1984), for example, 
carried out a survey of all local authorities in Great 
Britain to examine the reasons for varying local responses 
to the opportunities provided by all forms of EC aid. They 
concluded that in 1982, when the research took place, 
counties in the assisted areas of England and Wales and some 
Scottish regional councils were very aware of the 
availability of Community financial assistance and were well 
organised to gain access to it. On the other hand, many 
authorities outside assisted areas regarded the EC as a 
"shadowy spectre irrelevant to our situation" (district 
council officer quoted by Glasson and McGee, p27). Their 
research emphasised the importance of information and the 
initiative of individuals in determining how involved 
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authorities were with the EC (McGee, 1982; Glasson and 
McGee, 1984). 
A more detailed case-study by Preston (1985 and 1986) 
concentrated on local-authority responses to the ERDF in the 
County of Humberside. This research pointed to a variety of 
external and intra-organisational factors which determined 
local-authority responses to the ERDF opportunity. 
Preston's external factors included the availability of 
advice and assistance and central Government controls on 
capital expenditure. Those factors which were internal to 
the organisation included local political beliefs and 
individual initiative. 
The ESF has received less attention than the ERDF. 
However, Collins (1983) provided a general survey of the 
operation of the Fund in the UK prior to its most recent 
reform in 1983. Her study is the most useful secondary 
source on the ESF before its reform. Furthermore, Laffan 
(1983) produced a paper concerned more explicitly with the 
implementation of the ESF prior to the 1983 reforms. She 
concluded that: 
the implementation process is best viewed from the 
bottom up with low central control. The Commission 
- is heavily dependent on national bureaucracies to 
operationalise the Fund (Laffan, 1983, p407). 
This thesis will demonstrate that Laffan's conceptualisation 
of national government involvement as "bottom-up" seriously 
misrepresents the position of the member states in the EC's 
institutional hierarchy. The national governments are also 
able to exert significant control over the implementation 
process and are therefore in no sense subordinate to the 
supranational Commission. 
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1.3.3. The European Community: supra-pational or 
intergovernmental decision making. 
The main purpose of this section is to place this 
study of the implementation of specific Community policy 
instruments into the broader debate about the nature of the 
EC. The ideas outlined in brief here will subsequently 
contribute to our understanding of how Community policies 
are implemented and whether policy objectives are achieved. 
At the same time, these findings may shed some light on the 
nature of the Community's institutional structure. 
One aim of the original architects of the European 
Communities in the 1950s was that "supranational" 
institutions "above" the level of the nation states should 
be given decision-making powers to create policies and pass 
laws which would be binding on member states and would take 
precedence over national laws. The Treaty of Rome created a 
number of supranational institutions. These included: the 
Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the Court of 
Justice; and the European Parliament. It was often argued 
that European integration would involve the gradual transfer 
of national sovereignty over economic and political matters 
to these higher authorities (Haas, 196E?; Lindberg, 1963). 
Others have questioned the desireability of such a goal. 
Holland (1980) argued forcibly that the move towards 
supranationalism would lead to the marginalisation of 
national parliaments in favour of the crucial dialogue 
between the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 
Moreover, Holland was particularly suspicious of the idea of 
majority voting, which he felt would "relegate whole nation 
states and major regions to minority status" (Holland, 1980, 
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p127). 
However, a series of institutional innovations in 
the 1960s and 1970s mean that Holland's arguments appear 
overstated. Many observers argued, firstly, that 
sovereignty was not being transferred to a supranational 
level of authority and, secondly, that national governments 
not only had remained the dominant actors in the EC's 
policy-making process but had retained a large degree of 
independence from supranational institutions (Wallace, 1973; 
Webb, 1977; Wallace, 1982; Taylor, 1983; ). Foremost among 
these developments was the crisis of 1965/66 which led to 
the "Luxembourg Compromise" and the assertion of the primacy 
of it national interests" as defined by governments. 
Moreover, the development of COREPER and the emergence of 
the European Council (George, 1985; Bulmer, 1985) were also 
regarded as evidence of a decline in supranational authority 
in favour of "intergovernmental" decision-making forums in 
which national governments were the dominant actors. As 
early as 1966, Hoffman emphasised the importance of national 
governments in determining the pace of integration. He 
viewed them as the "gatekeepers" between domestic political 
systems and the Community. Furthermore, William Wallace 
(1983) argued that: 
the conceptual mistake of the most enthusistic 
supranationalists was to assume that the Community 
would succeed in entirely displacing the actions and 
authority of national governments, and that it would displace their actions over a steadily widening range 
of issues (W. Wallace, 1983, p420). 
- 
The intergovernmental approach regarded governments 
as independent, cohesive units able to identify and defend a 
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set of general interests and priorities which can be defined 
as the "national interest" (H-Wallace, 1973; Taylor, 1983). 
Furthermore, the approach assumed that sovereignty is an 
intrinsic element of nation states and is best kept in 
national government. hands. 
However, the intergovernmental perspective has also 
been criticised for a number of reasons. Firstly, national 
governments are by no means coherent, monolithic structures 
(Webb, 1983). On the contrary, they are responsive to a 
whole range of domestic political and economic interests. 
The intergovernmental view neglects the mechanisms by which 
domestic policy-making environments affect the negotiating 
positions of- governments within the Community's 
decision-making system (Bulmer, 1984; W. Wallace, 1982). John 
Pinder (1981) argued that attention should be focussed on 
political decisions and strategies within member states. It 
is these processes which determine the capacity of member 
states to transfer policy instruments to supranational 
authorities. Moreover, these conflicting domestic pressures 
may lead to a lack of coherence between different national 
ministries. In this regard, Bulmer (1983) cites the 
long-standing conflict between the desire of successive 
German Finance Ministers to control Community spending and 
the desire of German Agriculture Ministers to maintain the 
incomes of German farmers by means of high guaranteed 
prices. 
A second problem associated with the 
intergovernmental view is that it overlooks the many 
contacts between ministries in different national 
governments. The consensus-building mechanisms between 
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member- states on various policy issues are a crucial aspect 
of the Community's policy-making system. The term 
"transgovernmentalism" has been used to characterise these 
processes (Webb, 1983). 
In common with the idea of "transgovernmentalism", 
other authors have stressed the "interdependence" of nation 
states in the Western economic system. Keohane and Nye 
(1975), for example, emphasised that economic and political 
power has become diffused among 19transgovernmental 
coalitions" and that individual governments have lost much 
of the power to determine their own economic destinies. 
However, they also argue that supranational institutions in 
the EC have not, as yet, eclipsed the power of member 
governments. Keohane and Nye describe the EC as an 
"international regime" and play down the role of both the 
Community institutions and the EC's legal framework. 
Puchala (1979) also minimalised the role of Community 
institutions. He describes the Community as a "system of 
managed interdependence 
The "interdependence" perspective can be criticised, 
however, for under-estimating the role of the Community's 
legal and institutional framework (George, 1985). The 
Commission does have the power to make proposals and can 
make certain decisions designated by the Treaties or the 
Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the Council is in many 
ways a "supranational" institution. Although member 
governments try to protect their interests within this 
framework (and often succeed), the decisions which the 
Council does frequently make (often by qualified majority 
voting) are based on compromises which take both varying 
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national viewpoints and the "Community" considerations of 
the Commission into account. Indeed, recent developments, 
particularly the entry into force of the Single European 
Act, may have served to extend the process of majority 
voting. Arguably, therefore, there are continuing and 
perhaps increasing elements of "supranationalism" in the 
way in which the Community operates and therefore renewed 
fears for those such as Holland who seriously question the 
desit-cL, bility of supranational decision-making. William 
Wallace (1983) supported this view, arguing that the 
Community is "more than an international regime". No 
perspective accounts for all variations in policy processes 
and aspects of each may be relevant. Webb suggested that 
the EC is a "multi-level political system which lacks a 
clearly defined and universally acceptable hi, erarchy 
for 
policy making" (Webb, 1983, p38). 
One broad, secondary aim of this thesis is to see 
what light this specific case study of policy implementation 
sheds on these larger encompassing perspectives about the 
nature of the EC. Although our ambitions are strictly 
limited, just as researchers such as Wallace, Wallace and 
Webb (1977 and 1983) have tried to relate analyses of policy 
making to these broader themes, so this study will see what 
insights policy implementation studies might provide. 
The remainder of Chapter One examines the methods and 
sources used to carry out this analysis. 
1.4. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY: DATA SOURCES AND RESEARCH 
METHODS. 
The methods and sources employed in this study were 
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designed to tackle two related themes. Firstly, in order to 
examine the extent to which a variety of the Funds' 
"operational" objectives are being achieved, use was made of 
data on the allocation of ERDF and ESF expenditure in 
the UK. Secondly, the research was concerned to obtain data 
and information on the processes by which the two funds are 
allocated so that the impact of the implementation process 
on the achievement of policy objectives could be assessed. 
1.4.1. The allocation of the ERDF and ESF: sources and 
methods. 
Data on the allocation of the ERDF and ESF were 
obtained from a variety of published and unpublished 
sources. The main sources available at the Community, UK 
national and South West England levels are outlined in Table 
1.1. Additional economic and unemployment data have been 
obtained from a variety of other sources. These include the 
Statistical Office of the European Community which 
publishes economic, unemployment and other data on a 
Community-wide basis. Other sources include the 
unemployment statistics published by the Department of 
Employment in "Employment Gazette" and data on 
local-authority expenditure published by the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA). These 
data have been used to measure, firstly, the "need" of areas 
for European Community assistance and, secondly, the 
relative success areas have had in attracting Community 
grants. 
1.4.2. The implementation of the ERDF and ESF: sources and 
methods. 
The complexity of the processes involved in the 
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implementation of Community funds does not make research 
easy. Many important decisions and interactions are 
undocumented. Moreover, material that is readily available 
often does little to illuminate the detailed mechanisms by 
which funds are allocated. Consequently, this study made use 
not only of the limited documentary evidence but also (and 
more importantly) of data derived from interviews and 
questionnaires. 
Documentary sources. 
There is very little published documentary evidence 
available on how the ERDF and ESF are put into effect. 
Almost the only material that is available is that produced 
by the European Commission. The most useful sources are the 
Annual Reports of the ERDF and ESF. These contain 
interesting data on the applications submitted and the 
grants that are made broken down to the regional level. The 
Annual Reports also provide helpful comment on the problems 
that are being encountered from the point of view of the 
Commission. A second somewhat less useful source of 
information from the Commission is the series of COM 
documents which set out the ideas and working practices of 
the Commission over the whole spectrum of Community 
policies. From time to time and in an ad hoc manner, these 
COM documents provide snippets of information which are of 
use in analysing the implementation of Community regional 
policy. 
From the viewpoint of the academic analyst neither 
the COM documents nor the Annual Reports provide 
sufficiently detailed insight into the processes at work. 
The unpublished and often confidential documentation 
3.9 
generated within the Commission for internal use may provide 
a richer source. However, the time and financial resources 
necessary to gain access to this material were beyond the 
scope of this study, concerned as it is to adopt an holistic 
view of the whole implementation system rather than to focus 
explicitly on the role of the Commission. 
At the national level documentary evidence is in 
even shorter supply. The United Kingdom Government 
produces very little written material for external 
consumption on how the ERDF and ESF are implemented within 
the UK. The only exceptions are the Notes for Guidance 
produced by the Department of the Environment (DoE) and the 
Department of Employment (DE) for potential applicants for 
ERDF and ESF grants respectively. However, these are of 
little use in understanding in detail the role of the UK 
Government in the decision-making process. 
At the local or regional level, written evidence is 
again very scarce. Within South West England, Devon and 
Cornwall County Councils produce annual policy documents 
which set out all their major policies and programmes 
and include very brief accounts of the use made of 
Community funds (Cornwall County Council, 1986; Devon 
County Council, 1987). Of greater interest to the researcher 
are the files which are invariably kept by organisations 
regarding their involvement with Community funds. Cornwall 
County Council, for example, holds voluminous files 
containing all manner of documents, correspondence and 
minutes of meetings which could be a highly profitable 
sour6e of information for a more detailed study of the 
activities of a single local authority. Although some use 
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was made of the information contained in such files, the 
overall view taken of the implementation system involved 
extracting information from such a large variety of 
organisations. Therefore, no detailed or systematic study 
of files could be carried out. 
one published secondary source of information which 
has been used frequently in the course of this research is 
the European Information Service (EIS) bulletin published 
each month by the British Sections of the International 
Union of Local Authorities/ Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions (IULA/CEMR). This publication 
provides useful information on discussions held between 
officials of the Commission, the United Kingdom Government 
and local authorities to which the researcher would not 
otherwise be able to gain access. It also provides 
information derived from the daily communiques released 
by Agence Europe, a news agency based in Brussels which 
is primarily concerned with the activities of the EC. 
The absence or inaccessibility of detailed 
documentary evidence on the operation of the ERDF and ESF 
means that a fundamentally different approach to the 
gathering of detailed data was required; namely the use of 
personal interviews and questionnaires. These are tried and 
tested methods of social science research and there is a 
large volume of literature on their usage. There is no need 
to review this material in any detail (see for example 
Dexter, 1970; Bulmer, 1978; Young and Mills, 1979; 
Oppenheim, 1986). Nevertheless, it is necessary briefly to 
discuss those methods which were employed during the current 
research and to explain and justify their use. 
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Interviews. 
The major information-gathering tool of this research 
was a series of 50 interviews carried out with actors in 
organisations involved in applying for and allocating ERDF 
and ESF grants. These interviews can be divided into three 
categories: interviews with the appropriate Directorates 
General- cf the European Commission in Brussels; with 
representatives of the United Kingdom Government Departments 
concerned with administering applications; and with actors 
in organisations which apply for Community grants. A summary 
of these interviews is given in Table 1.2 and a more 
detailed list is given in Appendix One. The details of the 
interviews carried out at each of these three levels will be 
examined more thoroughly in Chapters Three to Eight which 
form the major original empirical contribution of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, at this juncture it is necessary to 
elaborate somewhat on the ways in which potential 
interviewees were identified and selected. 
In most cases the relevant actors were identified by 
the use of key informants in particular organisations who 
were able to point to the actors in other institutions 
involved in applying for and administering Community grants. 
In this way it was possible to identify the network of 
individuals and organisations (the "pool of organisations") 
involved in the process of implementing the two funds. This 
was paralleled by a search for the most appropriate sample 
of organisations in which to interview. At the national and 
Community levels it was clearly necessary to'interview those 
actors directly concerned with administering the Funds and 
making decisions on their allocation and therefore no 
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sampling as such was carried out. In addition, interviews 
were essential in nationally-based organisation such as the 
Manpower Services Commission and the Engineering Industry 
Training Board which are involved in applying for and 
administering ESF grants. 
At the South West regional level the large variety of 
organisations involved, together with differences in the 
operation of the two Funds meant that it was appropriate to 
adopt two different approaches. In the case of the ERDF, 
interviews were carried out with recipients of grants in the 
region. These included most of the eligible local 
authorities and public utilities as well as a number of 
other organisations which have been awarded ERDF grants. 
Those ERDF recipients which were not interviewed were those 
which had made very little use of the Fund. However, these 
organisations were contacted by telephone in order to obtain 
a relatively small amount of information. The ESF, on the 
other hand, provided a number of different problems because 
of the much larger number and more disparate nature of the 
applicants for grants. As a result, a combination of 
interviews and questionnaires was used to obtain the 
necessary information. Interviews were carried out with all 
local-authority recipients of ESF grants in the South West. 
However, in the case of ESF recipients in the private and 
voluntary sectors, postal questionnaires were deemed to be 
the most appropriate means of extracting information (see 
below). 
The research used semi-structured interviews to 
elicit the required information from respondents. In this 
type of interview the researcher has a list of questions 
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and topics to discuss, but the way the interview is 
directed and the precise questions asked are dependent on 
both the researcher's discretion and to some extent of 
course on priorities and attitudes of the interviewees. 
However, a number of basic questions were asked of all 
respondents. This type of interview, as opposed to those 
which are more structured, produces few data which can be 
quantified and analysed statistically. Nonetheless, it was 
believed that a standardised questionnaire designed to 
produce statistical precision could only scratch the surface 
of the complex processes operating in a variety of different 
organisations. However, Chapters Five and Eight do make 
some effort to compare interviewees' responses to certain 
common questions. The interview schedules used for local 
authorities, public utilities and Central Government are 
set out in Appendices Two and Three. The variety of 
different organisations and differences between the two 
funds meant that the questions asked in particular 
interviews inevitably varied. The three interview schedules 
are therefore only indicative of the questions which were 
asked. 
Questionnaires. 
Two modest postal questionnaires were carried out: 
one with ESF recipients in the private sector and one with 
those in the voluntary sector (Appendix 4). These were 
intended to produce some information on how these 
organisations initiate applications for ESF aid and the 
problems encountered when applying. Questionnaires were 
sent to all organisations which have received ESF grants 
over the study period adopted for the ESF (1984-1987). 
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Questionnaires were chosen instead of interviewing a sample 
of the recipients for two related reasons. Firstly, the 
moderate amount of information required could be adequately 
elicited, despite any problems of low response rates, from a 
simple questionnaire of this kind. Furthermore, the desired 
information was not sufficiently detailed or central to the 
project to warrant the expense of travelling the length and 
breadth of South West England in order to carry out 
interviews. 
In conclusion, this first chapter has set out the 
general scope of this research and its objectives. The 
reader has been introduced to the literature on 
public-policy implementation and its-relevance to the EC, as 
well as the wider issue of the nature of the Community. In 
addition, the methods and sources which have been used to 
tackle the aims of the study have been outlined. The 
following Chapter introduces the central subject of this 
thesis; namely European Community regional policy and, in 
particular, the European Regional Development Fund and the 
European Social Fund. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT AND OVERALL GOALS OF EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY REGIONAL POLICY: THE ROLES OF THE EUROPEAN 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL 
FUND. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter examines the development and overall 
goals of European Community regional policy and the roles of 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which is the 
major policy instrument, and the European Social Fund (ESF), 
which also has important regional objectives. The discussion 
provides a necessary background for chapters Three to Eight 
which examine in detail the specific "operational" 
objectives of the two funds and how they are implemented in 
the United Kingdom. This Chapter also looks briefly at the 
changes in the Community's regional policy heralded by the 
adoption of the Single European Act in July 1987. 
The difficulty identified in Chapter One of 
distinguishing between policy-making and policy 
implementation is not ignored here. The view that these two 
stages of the policy process are indistinguishable (Hill et 
al, 1979; Barratt and Hill, 1984) does not apply to these 
case-studies. The Council of Ministers Regulations and 
Decisions controlling the ERDF and ESF (Council Regulation 
(EEC) 1787/84, Council Decision 83/516/EEC, Council 
Regulation (EEC) 2950/83) are clearly identifiable as the 
points at which policies are ready to be put into effect. 
Therefore, this study starts by taking the completion of 
these Regulations as the dividing line between policy and 
implementation, thus supporting Sabatier's view (1986) that 
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it is both possible and desirable to make such a clear 
conceptual distinction. However, the analysis outlines a 
number of changes made to these Regulations over time 
which suggest that the further development of policy is 
indeed influenced by the process of implementation (Hyder, 
1984). This analysis is a crucial background to the study 
of implementation, since many of the factors influencing 
policy formulation are likely to be of equal importance 
during implementation. 
Before discussing the development of EC regional 
policy, it is necessary, first, to outline briefly the 
extent of spatial disparities in the Community and, second, 
to place the EC's regional development efforts in the 
context of national attempts to reduce these inequalities. 
2.2. REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. 
European Community regional policy has developed in 
response to the perceived existence of wide disparities in 
socio-economic welfare among the countries and regions of 
the Community. However, the extent of these disparities has 
altered over time in response to both changes in the 
European economy and an increase in the number of Community 
member states to twelve. 
When the Treaty of Rome, which created the 
European Economic Community, was signed in 1957 only the 
Mezzogiorno of Southern Italy was suffering from serious 
economic problems. Of the other member states, only the 
rural areas of southern, central and western France France 
were significantly less-developed. Moreover, it was 
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believed by many at the time that the creation of the Common 
Market would itself be sufficient to reduce disparities 
between rich and poor regions (Talbot, 1977; Wallace, 1977). 
During the 1960s it seemed as if this belief would 
prove to be correct. In this period there was a marked 
convergence of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
between member states (Commission, 1987b). Moreover, the 
gap between the richest and poorest regions in terms of 
GDP per capita narrowed from a ratio of 4: 1 in 1965 to 2.9: 1 
in 1970 (Commission, 1973a). This period was characterised 
by high overall growth rates in most of the six member 
states. 
Following the economic crisis of the mid 1970s, 
overall growth rates declined substantially and regional 
disparities began to widen once more. By 1977 the ratio 
between the richest and poorest regions had again reached 
4: 1. Following the accession of Greece to the EC in 1981, it 
increased to 5: 1 (George, 1983). BY 1985, GDP per capita in 
the Community's richest region around Groningen in Holland 
was more than five and a half times that of the poorest, 
namely Thrace in Greece (Commission, 1987b). 
The most recent comprehensive review of regional 
problems in the EC is the Commission's "Third Periodic 
Report on the Social and Economic Situation and Development 
of the Regions of the Community" which was published in 
1987 (Commission, 1987b). This report, which followed the 
enlargement of the EC in 1986 to include Spain and Portugal, 
pointed out that regional inequalities are partly the result 
of differences between member states and partly of those 
within countries. 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the main differences in levels 
of wealth and employment between member states. This shows 
that the ratio between the richest and poorest countries is 
of the order of 2.4: 1. Moreover, the three most recent 
members of the Community - Greece, Portugal and Spain - are 
all well below the EC average. As regards unemployment, 
disparities between states are again wide. In Spain, 
unemployment in 1985 stood at 21.5% compared with just 2.5% 
in Luxembourg. Furthermore, the three most affluent 
countries all have unemployment rates below the Community 
average. However, the two weakest member states in terms of 
per capita GDP (Greece and Portugal) have comparatively low 
unemployment rates. This is caused by the predominance of 
underemployment, particularly in agriculture, which means 
that many people are gainfully employed only part-time, but 
are excluded from official unemployment figures. 
There are thus clear disparities between member 
states in terms of per capita GDP and unemployment. However, 
inequalities also exist within countries. In Italy, for 
example, unemployment in 1986 ranged from 19.3% in Sardinia 
to just 4.6% in Valle d'Aosta in the North West. Moreover, 
per capita GDP in Lombardy, the region around Milan in the 
North, was more than double that of Calabria in the South. 
In Spain, there is a clear prosperity gradient from North 
East to South West. Per capita GDP in the Basque region, for 
example, is more than twice that of Extremadura (Commission, 
1987b). 
These intranational disparities are also found in 
countries where overall levels of GDP and employment are 
relatively high, demonstrating that regional problems are 
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not confined to the less-developed member states. In the UK, 
for example, unemployment rates range from 6.1% in the 
Buckinghamshire/ Oxfordshire area to 17.6% in Cleveland/ 
Durham and 18.7% in Northern Ireland. In France, there are 
also large variations in both GDP and unemployment. The 
Ile-de-France around Paris, for example, is twice as 
affluent as Corsica (Commission, 1987b). 
These wide disparities between countries and regions 
are a major justification for EC involvement in regional 
policy. it has frequently been argued (Commission, 
1977b, 1981a, 1987b, Pinder, 1983) that persistent 
inequalities threaten the achievement of European union and 
the concept of a genuine common market. In response to the 
inequalities within states, all Community member countries 
have pursued their own regional policies. In order to put 
the EC's efforts into perspective, it is necessary briefly 
to dwell on the main characteristics of these national 
policies. 
2.3. NATIONAL REGIONAL POLICIES. 
There is a wide body of literature on the development 
and objectives of regional ecomomic policy in the UK 
(Armstrong and Taylor, 1985; Damesick and Wood, 1987; Moore, 
Rhodes and Tyler, 1980) and in the other countries of 
Community Europe Mill, Allen and Hull, 1980; Hudson and 
Lewis, 1982; ECOSOC, 1985; Clout, 1987). It is not 
appropriate to review these in any detail here. However, it 
is worth pointing out the major characteristics of these 
national policies in order to place the Community's role 
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into context. Because this research is especially concerned 
with the UK, the following comments are also based primarily 
on the British experience. 
Until the economic crisis of the mid-1970s and the 
subsequent onset of recession, regional policies enjoyed a 
period in which their utility was not generally questioned. 
However, the latter half of the 1970s witnessed a breakdown 
in the existing consensus on the role of regional policy. 
Traditional regional policy, which was primarily concerned 
with encouraging firms to move from areas of low 
unemployment to the regions where unemployment was high, 
became the target of a variety of criticisms. For example, 
the automatic nature of regional grants was criticised for 
providing aid to schemes which had no locational choice and 
would have gone ahead in an assisted area in any case. 
Furthermore, aid schemes were criticised for concentrating 
on the declining manufacturing sector rather than on the 
service sector where the opportunities for growth may have 
been much greater (Damesick, 1987). 
Armstrong and Taylor (1985) complained about the lack 
of clarity of regional policy objectives in the UK. They 
argued that regional policy aims should be more specific and 
should be quantified in order to allow their effectiveness 
to be measured. However, as Chapter One showed, a lack of 
clear objectives is a common failing of public policies in 
general and is likely to cause problems for both policy 
implementation and attempts to measure policy 
effectiveness. 
In response to these sorts of criticisms, regional 
policies in the 1980s have been undergoing a number of 
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significant changes. For example, there have been 
substantial reductions in total spending on regional aid 
schemes. In the UK, aid provided by the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) fell from a peak of 41300 million 
in 1975/76 to just *4350 million in 1985/86 (Armstrong and 
Taylor, 1987). Reductions in regional aid budgets are also 
apparent in other EC member states (Allen, Yuill and 
Bachtler, 1987). These spending cuts have been paralleled 
by more explicit targetting of aid on the neediest areas. 
In the UK, for example, the map of assisted areas has been 
reduced substantially since 1979 and most recently in 1984. 
In Britain and elsewhere, policy makers and others 
have argued in favour of a variety of new directions for 
regional policy (Allen, Yuill and Bachtler, 1987; Armstrong 
and Taylor, 1987; DTI, UK Regional Development Programme 
1986-90; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, White 
Paper, 1988; European Parliament, 1986a). These include, 
firstly, a general change from automatic to discretionary 
grants. The 1988 reforms in the UK abandoned entirely the 
system of automatic Regional Development Grants. In other 
countries there has been a similar, albeit less radical, 
move away from automatic incentives in favour of 
discretionary schemes which target the most needy projects 
(Yuill and Allen, 1987). Secondly, increasing emphasis is 
being placed on aiding the service sector and on assisting 
small firms in order to utilise the indigenous resources of 
problem regions to create economic growth in sectors such as 
tourism and services (Damesick, 1987; Allen, Yuill and 
Bachtler, 1987; Martin, 1987). According to the DTI's 
Regional Development Programme for 1986 to 1990, which forms 
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the framework for EC regional aid in the UK: 
devising means by which new and small firms can be 
encouraged in the Assisted Areas is one of the major 
challenges of regional policy (DTI, 1986, para 2.18). 
The 1988 reforms in the UK created two new types of 
incentive which aim to assist the small-firm sector; namely 
"Innovation Grants" for firms employing less than 
twenty-five people and "New Enterprise Initiatives" for 
helping with the costs of setting-up small-business 
consultancy services (Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, White Paper, 1988). 
These are the major characteristics of recent 
developments in the national regional policy arena. It 
should be emphasised, at this juncture, that spending on 
economic development in problem areas is not the exclusive 
domain of central government regional aid schemes. 
Armstrong and Taylor (1987) point out that, in the UK, a 
large variety of organisations have become active in trying 
to stimulate economic development in the assisted areas. In 
Britain, assistance to private firms is now available from 
local authorities; English Estates; the Highlands and 
Islands Development Board; the Mid-Wales Development Board 
and the Development Commission. In fact, Armstrong and 
Taylor calculate that, in 1983/84, "spatial industrial 
policies" of one sort or another amounted to approximately 
11.4 billion. Of this total, only about 35% was provided by 
the DTI's regional incentive schemes. A further 
increasingly important component of total public spending in 
problem regions is the assistance provided by the EC. 
Having outlined national attempts to reduce 
disparities, we can now examine the development of Community 
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regional policy and the roles of the European Regional 
Development Fund and the European Social Fund. 
2.4. ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGIONAL POLICY. 
The Treaty of Rome contained a number of references 
to helping problem regions, albeit these did not add up to a 
coherent regional policy. The preamble of the Treaty 
declared that its signatories were: 
anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies 
and to ensure their harmonious development by 
reducing the differences existing between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the less-favoured 
regions (Preamble of Treaty of Rome, 1957). 
However, other sections of the Treaty simply set out 
various general regional aims- without providing the 
mechanisms to achieve them. Among these Treaty provisions 
are articles concerned with reducing disparities between 
agricultural regions; avoiding threats to employment in 
the regions; assisting transport concerns in under-developed 
areas; and (in the Chapter on competition policy) 
permitting state aids in areas of high unemployment or low 
standards of living. 
The Treaty did create one institution designed to 
play a more positive part in aiding problem regions. 
One of the objectives of the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
was to provide loans to "help finance projects for 
developing less-developed regions" (Treaty of Rome, 1957, 
Article 130). The EIB was intended to be of particular 
use in helping the Italian Mezzogiorno. 
Another source of financial assistance created by 
the Treaty of Rome was the European Social Fund (ESF). 
Initially the Fund was designed to "improve employment 
5S 
opportunities for workers in the Common Market and to 
contribute thereby to raising the standard of living" 
(Treaty of Rome, 1957, Article 123). However, it was not 
explicitly regional in nature. The ESF is a major focus of 
this thesis and its subsequent development and growing 
importance as an instrument of regional policy are discussed 
in greater detail in section 2.6. 
The regional provisions of the Treaty of Rome, 
together with the inherent bias in favour of declining 
coal and steel regions of the grants provided by the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created by the 
Treaty of Paris in 1952, could not be regarded as a coherent 
regional policy. What was lacking was, firstly, any means 
to co-ordinate these disparate instruments into a genuine 
Community policy and, secondly, a Community Fund concerned 
exclusively with regional development. 
It was not until the creation in 1967 of a new 
Directorate General for Regional Policy (DG XVI) that the 
Community had the means to create these policy 
pre-requisites. The President of the Commission, Jean Rey, 
soon displayed the Commission's determination to create a 
more genuine regional policy when he stated that regional 
policy in the EC "should be as the heart in the human body 
... [aiming] to re-animate economic life in regions which 
have been denied it" (quoted in Wallace, Wallace and Webb, 
1977, p140). In, 1969 DG XVI issued a Memorandum on 
Regional Policy which suggested that continuing disparities 
among the regions held back the successful implementation 
of other Community policies (Commission, 1969). This 
Memorandum therefore proposed that a Regional Development 
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Fund and a Regional Development Committee should be created. 
These suggestions met with a lukewarm response from most 
member states. Only Italy was clearly committed to a 
Community regional policy. Other member states preferred to 
retain national control over their own policies and avoid 
Community interference. At this stage, no consensus existed 
on the role of the Community in the regional policy arena. 
Nevertheless, regional policy was soon to assume a 
much higher position in the list of Community priorities. 
Wallace (1977) suggested two reasons why this was so. These 
were, firstly, the Community's objective of Economic and 
Monetary Union and, secondly, the first enlargement of the 
Community in the early 1970's. 
In 1969, the Hague Summit of EC Heads of Government 
called for the realisation of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) within the Common Market. However, the debate which 
followed this declaration suggested that regional imbalances 
would prejudice the achievement of EMU. Moreover, it was 
argued that EMU could actually worsen the problems of 
disadvantaged regions by exposing them to increased 
competition from the more prosperous parts of the Community. 
Hence, the creation of a financial instrument of Community 
regional policy began to be seen as a necessary parallel 
to the progressive establishment of economic union. 
The negotiations on the enlargement of the Community 
in the early 1970's, culminating in the accession of the 
United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark in 1973, 
were a further spur towards the creation of a Community 
regional fund. It was recognised that enlargement would 
greatly add to the scale of regional problems. In the 
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enlarged Community of nine the UK and Ireland both 
suffered severe problems of regional decline and 
under-development. Ireland's difficulties were primarily 
agricultural in nature, whereas those of the UK were related 
to the restructuring of traditional labour intensive 
industries and the resulting decline of the regions 
dependent upon them. 
These factors put regional policy more firmly on the 
Community agenda and the creation of a regional fund became 
a priority issue. At The Paris gummit of October 1972 the 
Community took a large step towards this goal. The summit 
instructed the Commission to prepare "without delay" a 
report on regional problems and declared that from then on 
the member states would attempt to co-ordinate their 
regional policies. Furthermore, the Governments invited the 
Commission to create a Regional Development Fund. This Fund 
was to be set up before the end of 1973 and should be 
financed from the Community's budget. However, the summit 
could not agree on important matters such as the size and 
distribution of the Fund. The UK, Ireland and Italy wanted a 
large Fund, whereas the other six member states, 
particularly West Germany, favoured a much smaller one. 
2.5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
FUND. 
2.5.1. The Creation of the ERDF. 
In 1973, as requested by the Heads 
the 1972 summit, the Commission published a 
Re0ional Problems of the Enlaroed 
so-called "Thomson Report") (Commission, 
document elucidated the large spatial 
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of Government at 
Report on the 
Community (the 
1973a). This 
variations in 
socio-economic welfare throughout the Community and provided 
the basis for a subsequent set of Commission proposals 
(Commission, 1973b) which led eventually to the 
establishment of the ERDF in 1975 (Council Regulation (EEC) 
724/75). These proposals addressed three key issues: 
1. the volume of resources that would be allotted to 
the ERDF from the EC budget; 
2. the member states and regions which would be 
eligible to receive ERDF assistance; 
3. how the decisions would be made on which 
particular projects in which regions would 
actually receive grants. 
The Commission argued that the Fund should be large 
enough to have a significant impact on regional imbalances. 
This was welcomed by the Italians and Irish who saw 
themselves as major beneficiaries. Others, notably the West 
Germans, were very reluctant to agree to a new policy which 
would increase their already large net contribution to the 
Community budget. The British occupied an intermediate and 
somewhat ambiguous position. At the start of the 
negotiations a pro-Community Conservative government was 
still in office and urgently in need of actions which would 
show a sceptical public and Parliament that concrete 
benefits were resulting from Community membership. The 
perception that Britain would gain from a Community regional 
fund led the UK to support Italy and Ireland in a coalition 
which provided the necessary political impetus for the 1973 
initiative. However, the Conservative Government's ambitions 
were strictly limited; as one observer put it: 
All that was being sought was an institutionalised 
subsidy from the Community for British expenditure in 
the regions. An integrated Community policy for 
regional development was not on the agenda (George, 
1985, p146). 
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But even this limited objective proved difficult to achieve 
in the face of West German opposition and the general 
indifference of other wealthy member states. 
When a Labour Government, unenthusiastic about the 
Community, came into office in March 1974, UK pressure for a 
regional fund subsided in favour of demands for a radical 
revision of British membership terms as a whole. This meant 
that British support for the Regional Fund was obscured in 
the face of more general issues such as the Community budget 
and institutional reform. Despite the lessening of UK 
support, Italy and Ireland maintained their enthusiasm for 
the Fund. They eventually went as far as threatening to 
boycott the 1974 summit of Heads of Government in Paris if 
the ERDF was not placed at the top of the agenda. 
Consequently, one of the outcomes of this Summit was 
the agreement to set up the ERDF. The Fund was provided with 
resources totalling 1300 Million European Units of Account 
(EUA), about 4540 Million, over three years (Council 
Regulation (EEC) 724/75). This relatively meagre sum was 
short of the Commission's original proposal of 3000 Million 
EUA and was eloquent illustration of the power of the 
national governments within the EC's political system and 
the reluctance of most member states to move beyond what 
amounted to little more than gestures towards a Community 
regional fund and the problems it was supposed to tackle. 
The negotiations over how this modest "regional cake" 
should be divided up reveal the same points about the EC's 
political structure. Initially, the Commission did not 
propose any means of allocating a specific share of the Fund 
to particular member states. Instead, the proposals simply 
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set out criteria that would determine which regions would be 
eligible to receive assistance regardless of any national 
considerations. Such regions would be characterised by a 
combination of: 
1. a preponderance of agriculture in the region's 
economy, resulting in low incomes and 
underemployment; 
2. declining industries and high unemployment; 
3. structural underemployment and a lack of basic 
infrastructure; 
4. GDP per capita below the Community average. 
These criteria were sufficiently broad to include 
parts of the more affluent states such as FR Germany, 
France, Denmark and the Netherlands. The Commission clearly 
took the view that eligibility criteria that excluded these 
richer states would not have been acceptable to the Council 
of Ministers, where the agreement of all member governments 
is so important (Talbot, 1977). 
Although grant applications would originate in member 
states, the Commission expected to exert considerable 
influence over the distribution of the Fund's resources. 
An ERDF Committee, composed of representatives of member 
states, would make the final decisions on the award of 
grants by qualified majority voting, unhindered by the 
"Luxembourg Compromise", thereby reducing the chances that 
the Commission's project proposals would fail to gain 
acceptance. The absence of a pre-determined share of the 
Fund for particular countries would give the Commission 
considerable discretion to concentrate aid in the most needy 
regions. This discretion would come at the stage of the 
initial examination of submitted applications by DG XVI when 
it would be able to decide which projects from which regions 
it would send to the ERDF Committee for formal approval. 
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However, the Commission's optimism evaporated as 
negotiations proceeded. The wealthier member states, 
especially France, were unhappy about adopting a system 
which allowed the Commission so much discretion and did not 
guarantee them a certain share of Fund resources. In the 
event the Community leaders decided at the 1974 summit to 
divide up the Fund according to a system of national quotas 
loosely based on the per capita GDP's of the member states. 
These shares would be biased towards the poorer member 
states but would still guarantee the more affluent a share 
(Table 2.1). The stamp of national perceptions and 
interests on the whole exercise was underlined in the 
agreement that regions qualifying for ERDF assistance would 
be those defined by national governments in the context of 
their own domestic regional policies. The Commission's 
efforts to define eligible regions according to 
Community-wide criteria had been thwarted. 
TABLE 2.1: THE NATIONAL QUOTAS AGREED AT THE 1974 PARIS 
SUMMIT. 
MEMBER STATE QUOTA % OF FUND 
BELGIUM 1.5 
DENMARK 1.3 
FR GERMANY 6.4 
FRANCE 15.0 
IRELAND 6.0 
ITALY 40.0 
LUXEMBOURG 0.1 
NETHERLANDS 1.7 
UNITED KINGDOM 28.0 
EC 9 100.0 
Source: Council Regulation (EEC) 724/75 
The potential of the Commission to exercise decisive 
influence on the allocation of grants was curtailed by the 
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national quota system. National governments would be able 
to submit the number of projects required to meet their 
quota, plus an allowance for a few projects which might 
be judged technically ineligible. This would mean that the 
decisions on which projects in which regions would receive 
aid would in effect be taken by the member governments. In 
other words, the geographical allocation of the ERDF 
would be controlled by the member states and the role of the 
Commission and the ERDF Committee would be relatively minor 
- simply sifting out a small number of ineligible projects. 
The major goal of the original ERDF, and of EC 
regional policy in general, was to: 
correct the principal regional imbalances within the 
Community resulting in particular from agricultural 
preponderance, industrial change andstructural 
underemployment (Council Regulation (EEC) 724/75, 
Article 1). 
The Fund would work towards this goal by providing 
assistance to national, local and other public authorities 
for projects concerned with, firstly, infrastructure and, 
secondly, industrial, craft and service sector activities. 
The value of the grants awarded would be 50% of project 
costs. However, the available instruments were clearly 
insufficient to enable the goals to be achieved. For 
example, the ERDF remained miniscule in comparison with the 
overall size of the Community budget and national regional 
policy expenditure. In 1977, the Fund accounted for just 
4.9% of Community expenditure, 72% of which was spent on 
agriculture. Moreover, the 16l million of ERDF assistance 
allocated to the UK in 1977 contrasted with the -^1200 
million spent by the Department of Trade and Industry on 
regional aid in the 1976/77 financial year (Armstrong and 
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Taylor, 1987). Wallace (1977) argued that "the sums of money 
so far allocated are so minute that it will be difficult to 
prove effectiveness on economic rather than political 
criteria" and that the Fund was little more than an exercise 
in "pork barrel politics" (Wallace, 1977, p161). In other 
words, the Fund was essentially a creation based on 
political bargains and compromises rather than a genuine 
attempt by the Community to reduce disparities between rich 
and poor regions. 
The creation of the ERDF at the 1974 Paris Summit was 
accompanied by the establishment of the Regional Policy 
Committee. This Committee would be composed of national 
government officials and a representative of the Commission. 
It would discuss a wide range of issues relating to regional 
policy, providing information and making recommendations to 
facilitate a further regional policy objective which was the 
co-ordination of Community and national regional policies. 
(Council Decision 75/185/EEC). The major instruments of 
co-ordination were intended to be the Regional Development 
Programmes (RDPs) (Commission, 1976). These documents were 
to be submitted to the Regional Policy Committee and the 
Commission every five years by the national governments and 
were supposed to set out the nature of regional problems 
within member states and the measures being pursued to 
tackle them. The RDPs were designed to give the Commission 
an overall view of regional disparities and provide a 
framework for the efficient use of ERDF assistance (Martins 
and Mawson, 1983). 
A further goal of Community regional policy following 
the creation of the ERDF was that other Community activities 
6 
should be co-ordinated with regional policy (Armstrong, 
1978). The main instruments for achieving this objective 
were Regional Impact Assessments (RIA) of other Community 
policies. These assessments were supposed to examine the 
regional implications of otherwise non-spatial Community 
policies and to allow some of these implications to be taken 
into account in policy formulation. As a result of this 
objective, DG XVI produced a series of reports on the 
regional impact of a number of sectoral policies, such as 
the Common Agricultural Policy and the Community's external 
trade policy (Commission, 1981b; Commission, 1984b). 
2.5.2. Subsequent reforms of the ERDF, 1978-1980. 
When the initial three year allocation of resources 
came to an end in 1977 the size of the Fund was increased 
(Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2), although the high rates of 
inflation at the time made this growth more apparent than 
real. In addition, the Commission proposed that 15 percent 
of the Fund should be reserved for a new "non-quota" 
section which would help finance "specific Community 
measures", designed to tackle problems resulting from the 
adverse effects of Community policies in other fields (such 
as the free market in coal and steel products) and not 
restricted to nationally designated assisted areas 
(Commission, 1977a). Furthermore, the Commission proposed 
that non-quota measures would be drawn up on the initiative 
of the Commission in consultation with the member states. 
The proposals from the Commission on these specific 
Community measures would then be decided upon by the 
Council, on the basis of a qualified majority (Martins 
and Mawson, 1981). Clearly, the Commission was attempting to 
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break the rigid national quota system and make some modest 
move towards the ERDF becoming an instrument of regional 
development with a more genuine Community character rather 
than a limited subsidiser of separate national policies. 
TABLE 2.2: THE GROWTH OF ERDF RESOURCES: 1975-1987. 
Size of ERDF Annual Share in EC 
Year (Million ECU) increase M budget M 
1975 257.6 (1) 4.8 
1976 394.3 (1) 53.1 5.6 
1977 378.5 (1) -4.0 4.9 
1978 581.0 53.5 4.6 
1979 945.0 62.7 6.1 
1980 1165.0 23.3 6.7 
1981 1540.0 32.3 7.3 
1982 1759.5 14.3 7.6 
1983 2010.0 14.2 7.6 
1984 2140.0 6.5 7.3 
1985 2289.9 7.0 7.5 
1986 3098.0 35.3 8.6 
1987 3341.9 7.9 9.0 
Notes. 1) The European Currency Unit (ECU) replaced the 
European Unit of Account (EUA) in 1978. The size of the Fund 
in EUA before this were: 300 million (1975), 500 Million 
(1976), 500 Million (1977). 
Source: Commission (1988b). 
In the event these proposals were only accepted by 
the Council of Ministers (Council Regulation (EEC) 214/79) 
following three significant amendments. Firstly, the 
non-quota section was limited to just 5% of the ERDF's 
total resources. Secondly, this small proportion could be 
allocated only by unanimous decision in the Council of 
Ministers instead of by qualified majority vote. Finally, 
the Commission would only be involved in establishing the 
broad framework for these specific Community measures; the 
initiation of actual projects to be funded would rest with 
member states who would forward applications to the 
Commission and the ERDF Committee. Once again this 
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demonstrated the power of individual member states to 
restrict the Commission's ambitions for a regional policy 
based more fully on Community-wide perspectives. 
Nevertheless, 1979 also saw the establishment of a 
new aspect of Community regional policy; namely the concept 
of Integrated Operations (IOs). These were defined as 
packages of co-ordinated measures to be employed in areas of 
the Community with particularly serious socio-economic 
problems. In implementing these measures the Community would 
co-operate with national and local authorities by providing 
resources from its various financial instruments (ERDF, ESF, 
EIB, etc) in the framework of multi-annual programmes of 
investment. Two pilot schemes were soon launched in Belfast 
and Naples (Martins and Mawson, 1983). These IOs reflected 
the strengthening of the objective of co-ordinating the 
ERDF's activities with other Community policies in order to 
provide broader-based attacks on regional disparities. 
2.4.3. New member states, new proposals and a new 
Regulation, 1981-86. 
The accession of Greece, a comparatively poor 
country, to the Community in 1981 invigorated the debate 
about regional development in the EC (Martins and 
Mawson, 1981; Wabe, Eversley and Despicht, 1982), leading 
the Commission to present a new set of ultimately 
unsuccessful proposals for ERDF reform in 1981 (Commission, 
1981a). The Commission proposed two major changes in the 
means by which the ERDF was distributed. 
The first of these was that the quota section of the 
Fund would be limited to areas suffering from "serious 
structural problems". These problems were quantified 
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according to a scale on which the Community average was 100. 
If the average of GDP per capita and long-term unemployment 
on this scale in a particular region was worse than 75 then 
it would qualify for ERDF assistance. The areas involved 
would have been the whole of Ireland (including Northern 
Ireland), Greece (except Athens and Thessalonika), the 
Italian Mezzogiorno, Greenland, French Overseas Departments, 
Wales, Scotland and the Assisted areas of Northern England. 
In other words, national quotas would be created that 
excluded FR Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
mainland France and Denmark (Table 2.3). 
TABLE 2.3: THE 1981 PROPOSALS FOR THE QUOTA SECTION OF THE 
ERDF. 
MEMBER STATE EXISTING QUOTA(1) PROPOSED QUOTA % 
BELGIUM 1.11 
DENMARK 1.06 1.30 (2) 
FR GERMANY 4.65 - 
FRANCE 13.64 2.47 (3) 
GREECE 13.00 15.97 (4) 
IRELAND 5.94 7.31 
ITALY 35.49 43.67 (5) 
LUXEMBOURG 0.07 - 
NETHERLANDS 1.24 - 
UNITED KINGDOM 23.80 29.28 (6) 
EC TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Notes. 1. Quota established in 1981 following the accession 
of Greece. 
2. Greenland only. 
3. Overseas Departments only. 
4. Except Athens and Thessalonika. 
5. Mezzogiorno only. 
6. Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland and assisted areas of 
Northern England only. 
Source: Commission (1981a). 
The second proposal from the Commission suggested an 
extension of the non-quota section to account for 20% of the 
total. This section of the ERDF would continue to tackle 
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problems resulting from the adverse effects of Community 
policies in other fields, but would now be allocated by 
majority vote in the ERDF Committee rather than by unanimity 
in the Council. This procedural change was designed to 
weaken the ability of national governments to insist on 
"their share" and to facilitate the Commission's efforts to 
focus assistance on areas most in need according to 
"Community" criteria free of crude national bargaining. 
The Commission's desire to loosen the grip of 
national governments on the ERDF was also apparent in its 
proposals to alter the way in which the quota section of 
the Fund supported regional development. The existing system 
of financing individual projects was to be progressively 
phased out and replaced with coherently conceived 
programmes of related projects (Martins and Mawson, 
1982). The Commission suggested that these programmes would 
be drawn up by national governments in close co-operation 
with both local authorities and the Commission as part of an 
effort to make the ERDF a distinct Community policy 
rather than a source of subsidy for separate member state 
policies. 
The Commission hoped that this would not only 
strengthen the impact and cost-effectiveness of ERDF 
spending, but also secure the genuine "additionality" of 
that expenditure. Previously, there had been considerable 
doubts about whether ERDF grants were truly "additional" 
sources of regional assistance. Many believed that 
governments were using the grants to reimburse already 
committed national expenditure (Wilson, 1980; Meny, 1982; 
Preston, 1983; Wise and Croxford, 1988). The Commission's 
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participation in these new co-ordinated Programmes was 
intended to provide a means by which it could monitor and 
scrutinise this issue more closely. (Chapters 3 and 4 will 
examine the question of "additionality" in more detail). 
Negotiations over these proposals dragged on in the 
Council for two years, blocked by conflicts about the size 
and distribution of the Fund. The richer states were unhappy 
at the prospect of getting little or nothing, while one of 
the then less affluent states, Britain, was more concerned 
with winning some sort of rebate from the overall Community 
budget. In such a climate of haggling over national 
contributions and receipts the more "European" aspirations 
of the Commission could not thrive. Hence, the 1981 
proposals were withdrawn by the Commission so that new, 
possibly more acceptable proposals could be formulated. 
In 1983, revised proposals (Commission, 1983b) were 
presented to the Council. These sought to replace the quota 
and non-quota sections with a series of "Quantitative 
Guidelines" (later known as "indicative ranges") which set 
upper and lower limits on the amount of money each member 
state might receive from the Fund. This system represented 
a compromise between the "Community" objective of 
concentrating aid on the neediest areas and the "national" 
desire to be guaranteed a certain proportion of the Fund. 
Each country would be assured of its minimum quota provided 
it submitted sufficient eligible projects. These lower 
limits would have totalled approximately 83% of the total 
Fund, leaving about 17% that would be linked to the 
submission of applications in the form of programmes. 
Clearly the Commission hoped to use this system to direct a 
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greater proportion of resources to the most deprived areas. 
It also proposed that within four years at least 40% of the 
ERDF would be reserved for programmes (Martins, Mawson and 
Gibney, 1985). 
The idea of indicative ranges was combined with a 
proposal to increase the rate of ERDF assistance from 30% to 
50% cent of project costs. This change meant that not only 
would ERDF assistance be a more important element in the 
financing of individual projects, but that competition for 
available finance would be increased since a smaller 
proportion of applications could now be funded. 
On the basis of these proposals the Council of 
Ministers adopted a new ERDF regulation which came into 
operation in January 1985 (Council Regulation (EEC) 
1787/84). There were, however, a number of changes agreed in 
the Council which further diluted their Community character 
and maintained the national mould determining the broad 
pattern of ERDF allocations. Firstly, in almost all cases 
the lower limit was higher in the eventual Council 
Regulation than in the original Commission proposals. The 
result was that the minimum allocations now totalled about 
89% not 83%. Therefore, the Commission now had just an 11% 
margin to distribute as it wished via the ERDF Committee 
(Table 2.4). Secondly, the Council decided that programmes 
would account for 20% of the total Fund within three years 
(rather than the Commission's aim of 40%). Finally, the 
eventual Regulation did not require member states to submit 
applications in the form of programmes in order to receive 
allocations from the Fund above their minimum level. The 
indicative ranges agreed by the Council were to apply 
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initially to the three-year period from 1985 to 1987. 
TABLE 2.4: THE SYSTEM OF INDICATIVE RANGES ADOPTED BY THE 
COUNCIL AND AMENDED FOLLOWING THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN AND 
PORTUGAL. 
MEMBER STATE MAXIMUM LIMIT% MINIMUM LIMIT% 
BELGIUM 0.61 0.82 
DENMARK 0.34 0.46 
FR GERMANY 2.55 3.40 
FRANCE 7.48 9.96 
GREECE 8.36 10.64 
IRELAND 3.82 4.61 
ITALY 21.62 28.79 
LUXEMBOURG 0.04 0.06 
NETHERLANDS 0.68 0.91 
UNITED KINGDOM 14.50 19.31 
SPAIN (1) 17.97 23.93 
PORTUGAL (1) 10.66 14.20 
EC TOTAL 88.63 117.09 
Note. 1) The limits for Spain and Portugal apply only to the 
1986-1987 period. In 1985, slightly higher ranges were 
applied to the other ten member states. 
Source: Council Regulation (EEC) 3641/85 
The new Regulation introduced two types of Programme: 
"National Programmes of Community Interest" (NPCIs) 
which are formulated by authorities within member 
states for a limited geographical area; and "Community 
Programmes" which are initiated by the Commission and, as a 
rule, cover parts of the territory of more than one member 
state. This thesis does not examine in any detail the 
implementation of either Community Programmes or the old 
non-quota section. Neither of these is relevant to the 
case-study of South West England. Moreover, although funds 
were allocated in 1987 to the first two Community Programmes 
(Commission, 1988c), no assistance has yet been spent in the 
regions concerned; namely, the least-developed areas of the 
Community (including Northern Ireland). 
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Another aspect of the Programme approach, which is 
examined in more detail in this study, was outlined in 
Article 15 of the new Regulation. This offered financial 
support for schemes attempting to tap the potential within 
each region for internally generated development. This new 
aspect of the ERDF's activities reflects the wider 
change of direction of regional policies towards economic 
development using indigenous resources. Grants allocated 
under Article 15 of the Regulation would be directed in 
particular to schemes which promote the small-firm sector 
and tourism. 
The revised Regulation also placed more emphasis on 
the overall regional policy objective of co-ordinating ERDF 
spending with national regional policies and and with other 
European Community financial instruments, such as the 
European Social Fund and the European Investment Bank. In 
particular, the Regulation attached priority to ERDF 
spending forming part of "Integrated Development Operations" 
(IDOs) involving the co-ordinated activities of more than 
one EC Fund (Commission, 1986e). A further aspect of the 
co-ordination of Community instruments agreed in 1985 were 
the "Integrated Mediterranean Programmes" (IMPs) (Council 
Regulation (EEC) 2088/85). The object of these programmes 
was to "improve the socio-economic structures of the 
southern regions of the Community ... in order to facilitate 
their adjustment to the new situation created by 
enlargement" (Commission, 1986f). These multi-annual 
schemes were restricted to certain designated areas in 
France, Italy, Greece and Spain and Portugal (following the 
1986 enlargement). The IMPs also involve the co-ordinated 
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use of a variety of EC funds and the EIB. 
The 1984 reform arguably marked at least a modest 
move towards the ERDF becoming an agent of regional 
development more influenced by Community perspectives 
(Wise and Croxford, 1988). The system of minimum and 
maximum allocations to countries enlarged the 
Commission's ability to influence, through the ERDF 
Committee, both the geographical distribution of ERDF 
resources and the ways in which they are spent. In order to 
win more than their guaranteed minimum share of resources 
member states are obliged to submit a larger number of 
grant applications, many of which have no certainty of 
success on eligibility grounds alone. The Commission should 
thus enjoy - within the controlling framework of the ERDF 
Committee - greater discretionary power to select from among 
an excess number of applications in a way which directs the 
uncommitted proportion of the Fund (about 11.4%) towards the 
most needy areas. Chapter Three will examine whether the 
implementation,. of the new Regulation has enabled the 
Commission to exercise this discretion in the way it 
intended. 
The new Regulation also went some way towards 
clarifying the overall objective of the ERDF. Its purpose 
was now to: 
contribute to the correction of the principal 
regional imbalances within the Community through 
participation in the development and structural 
adjustment of regions whose development is lagging 
behind and in the conversion of declining industrial 
regions (Preamble to Council Regulation (EEC) 
1787/84) . 
The Regulation recognised that Community regional 
policy did not possess the resources to do much more than 
I q, 
supplement the regional development efforts of member 
states. For example, the size of the ERDF, although 
significantly increased, remained small in relation to 
overall Community spending and equivalent action by member 
states. In 1986 the Fund accounted for just 8.6% of the 
Community budget. Moreover, the Commission estimated that 
in 1982 the Fund ammounted to less than 5% of total national 
assistance to private firms and about 3% or 4% of total 
expenditure on economic infrastructure in areas eligible 
under national regional aid schemes (Commission, 1987b). The 
main emphasis of the ERDF since the new Regulation came into 
operation is on improving the impact of the Fund by 
providing assistance to multi-annual programmes of 
investment. However, not all observers agree that the 
Community should be so closely involved in devising 
programmes for limited areas within member states. 
Armstrong (1978 and 1985) argued that the Community's powers 
in the field of regional policy should be restricted to 
decisions relating to the overall size of the ERDF and its 
broad geographical distribution. He suggested that detailed 
decisions on the types of schemes which the Community should 
fund are best left to local and national decision-makers who 
are more familiar with local needs and conditions. 
2.6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND. 
Having examined the development of the ERDF and the 
overall objectives of Community regional policy, we can now 
examine the evolution of the European Social Fund (ESF) 
since its creation in 1958. At this juncture the emphasis is 
on the relationships between the ESF, which is primarily a 
7? 
sectoral policy, and EC regional policy. 
2.6.1. The Original ESF, 1958-1970. 
The ESF was created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, 
since when its principal aim has been: 
to improve the employment opportunities for workers 
in the Common Market and to contribute thereby to 
raising the standard of living ... (by) rendering the 
employment of workers easier and ... increasing their 
geographical and occupational mobility (Treaty of 
Rome, Article 123). 
It was decided initially that the Fund would be 
administered by the European Commission, with assistance 
from an advisory committee composed of representatives of 
the national governments, employers and trade unions. This 
arrangement is still in operation at the present time. The 
system was based upon applications from the member states 
which meant that governments were immediately in a position 
to influence the number and type of applications submitted 
(Collins, 1983). Those eligible to submit applications 
included not only the national government itself but any 
organisation governed by public law. The Fund would provide 
50% of the cost of eligible schemes. 
During the 1960's the ESF played only a minor role in 
helping to retrain and resettle workers from the 
declining sectors and regions of the European economy. The 
budget available was extremely limited. By 1972, for 
example, the ESF accounted for just 2.9% of the EC budget 
(Commission, 1987b). Furthermore, there were no mechanisms 
for transferring resources from richer to poorer regions. 
Indeed, during the 1960's West Germany was the largest 
recipient of ESF aid (Table 2.5), primarily because of its 
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training measures for large numbers of migrant 
"Gastarbeiter" (Collins, 1983). Since the beginning of the 
1970's the Fund has undergone three major reforms; in 1971, 
1977 and 1983. 
TABLE 2.5: DISTRIBUTION OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND, 
1960-1973. 
Grants in 
Member state Million EUA % receipts 
Belgium 10.9 3.3 
West Germany 138.0 42.2 
France 46.5 14.2 
Italy 117.5 35.9 
Luxembourg 0.02 0.05 
Netherlands 13.4 4.1 
EC 6 326.32 100.0 
Source: Collins, 1983. 
2.6.2. The ESF reforms, 1971 and 1977. 
The 1971 reform (Council Regulation (EEC) 2397/71) 
represented a fundamental change in the operation of the 
ESF. It was divided into two sections with separate budgets. 
One half of the Fund (Article 4) was intended to help 
workers threatened with unemployment as a direct result of 
continuing integration in the Community. The schemes which 
could be funded would be operated by national public 
authorities in various "areas of intervention" designated 
by the Council of Ministers, acting on a proposal from 
the Commission. The categories of eligible persons included: 
1. workers moving out of agriculture; 
2. textile workers; 
3. Community migrants; 
4. non-Community migrants; 
5. young people, under 25, 
6. women over 25 who required training or preparation 
for work; 
7. handicapped workers. 
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These objectives were primarily sectoral but had a 
number of associated regional implications. For example, 
aid for retraining textile workers threatened with 
unemployment was logically directed to those areas where 
the declining textile industry was concentrated. 
Furthermore, aid to the Under 25s also had regional 
implications because of the above average unemployment 
rates for this age group in relatively less affluent 
Southern Italy. 
The second half of the ESF (Article 5) was less 
clearly defined. The Fund would provide grants to training 
schemes helping backward or declining regions or industries 
affected by technical progress. Of this section, the largest 
proportion (about 60%) went to Italy and, following their 
accession to the Community in 1973, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland (Shanks, 1977). In the case of both Articles 4 and 
5, the ESF contribution would normally be 50% of the cost of 
the scheme. 
In the period between the reforms of 1971 and those 
of 1977 the environment within which ESF intervention was 
taking place changed significantly in a number of ways. In 
the first place, the unemployment situation in the Community 
altered substantially. In 1970 approximately 2.12 million 
people were unemployed in the original nine member states. 
By 1977 the numbers out of work had risen to about 5.68 
million (Collins, 1983). Moreover, the worsening of the 
unemployment situation had its greatest impact in regions 
dependent on traditional and declining industries. 
A second factor affecting the development of the ESF 
in the 1970's was the enlargement of the Community in 1973 
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to include the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. 
Furthermore, the Community's increased commit ment to 
helping problem regions by means of the ERDF helped to 
focus attention on the potential role of the ESF as a 
further instrument of regional policy. 
The potential benefit of the ESF to the UK was not a 
major factor in the British accession negotiations. However, 
the severe problems of industrial decline being experienced 
in the UK meant that Britain was potentially a major 
influence on the development of the Fund. Following 
enlargement, British interest in the ESF (and with the 
ERDF) was obscured in the face of broader questions of the 
terms of British membership following the election of a 
Labour Government in 1974. 
The debate leading up to the 1977 reform echoed that 
which surrounded the development of the Regional Fund. 
Some member governments were concerned that the Commission 
should not be allowed too much discretion to choose between 
applications submitted by the member states. It was believed 
at the time that this could be achieved by establishing 
national quotas for the ESF on the lines of those 
controlling the allocation of the ERDF. Michael Shanks a 
former Director-General of Social Affairs at the European 
Commission, argued that "this would reduce the bureaucracy 
in Brussels concerned with administering the ESF but would 
destroy any pretensions which the Fund may have to be 
concerned with the quality of training schemes" (Shanks, 
1977, p25). Shanks was concerned that under a quota system 
member countries would simply submit schemes up to the level 
of their pre-determined share, allowing the Commission 
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little discretion to choose between applications on the 
basis of the quality or innovative nature of the scheme. The 
Commission, meanwhile, was beginning to regard the work of 
the ESF as an important parallel to the activities of the 
ERDF (Collins, 1983). The Regional Fund would enlarge 
employment opportunities in the regions and the ESF would 
help provide the labour force with the skills required to 
take advantage of these new jobs. 
The 1977 reform of the ESF expanded the regional 
aspect of ESF activities (Council Decision 77/861/EEC). The 
Fund now allocated 50% of its resources to explicitly 
regional projects. Moreover, 60% of this was directed to the 
areas where the most serious long-term problems of 
unemployment were to be found, as well as to young people 
under the age of 25. However, any pressure to introduce a 
quota system to the geographical allocation of the ESF was 
resisted by the Commission and the Fund remained free of 
formal national shares. 
One innovation of the 1977 reforms was the the 
introduction of published Commission "Guidelines" setting 
out the types of schemes which the Commission wished to 
Fund. Before 1977 guidance on the types of scheme the 
Fund would support was limited to the formal regulations 
controlling the activities of the ESF (Council Regulation 
(EEC) 2397/71), which listed a range of aids and the 
circumstances under which they could be used. However, it 
became apparent that this list contained categories of 
assistance which were both difficult to define and 
indistinguishable from other sorts of allowances and 
subsidies provided by member states which were not intended 
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to be eligible for ESF assistance. Moreover, after the 1971 
reform the number of applications soon outstripped the 
finance available. Consequently, it became apparent that 
more exclusive selection criteria were required to help the 
Commission choose between competing applications. In 1973 
the Commission produced a statement of its own priorities 
for the ESF, setting out what it would look for in the 
selection of schemes to be funded (Collins, 1983). 
Unfortunately, these priorities remained largely internal to 
the Commission, published only retrospectively in the Annual 
Reports of the ESF. The enlargement of the Community, the 
growth in the number of applications and rises in 
unemployment increased the pressure for clearer guidelines. 
As a result, the 1977 reform required that the Commission 
Guidelines should be published in the Official Journal and 
should set out the types of schemes and particular regions 
to which the Commission would give priority. The Guidelines 
now served two purposes. Firstly, they provided useful 
information to prospective applicants on the types of 
schemes favoured by the Commission. Secondly, the Guidelines 
relieved the Commission to some extent from the task of 
examining a vast number of competing applications. In 
practice, only schemes covered by the Guidelines would stand 
any chance of being funded. 
2.6-3. The ESF since 1983. 
The third major reform of the ESF took place in 
1983 (Council Decision 83/516/EEC). Again the economic 
environment was one of rapidly rising unemployment 
throughout the Community with a particularly severe impact 
in the declining industrial areas. In fact, in 1983, the 
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numbers of people unemployed in the nine original member 
states had risen to 11.96 million (12.0 million in the 
Community of Ten (Eurostat, 1985). This reform was the first 
in a running 5-year programme of Fund reviews instituted by 
the Council of Ministers in 1982. The second has been 
taking place during 1988 (see section 2.7 below). 
The 1983 reforms greatly simplified the operation of 
the Fund. It would no longer assist projects in a variety 
of "areas of intervention". Instead, the aims of the ESF 
were narrowed. From 1983 onwards, 75% of the Fund would be 
reserved for schemes aimed at people aged under 25. The 
remainder would assist the long-term unemployed, women 
wishing to return to work, migrant workers, handicapped 
persons and people employed in small and medium-sized 
enterprises. At the same time, the geographical 
concentration of the ESF in the Community's less-favoured 
areas was to be increased; 40% of its resources would now be 
directed to all of Greece and Ireland, the Italian 
Mezzogiorno, Northern Ireland and the French Overseas 
Departments. Following the accession of the two Iberian 
countries to the Community in 1986, this list was extended 
to include much of Spain and all of Portugal. At the same 
time the amount of money guaranteed to the least-favoured 
areas was increased to 44.5% (Council Decision 
85/568/EEC). Furthermore, the resources available to the ESF 
now broadly matched the size of the ERDF. In 1985, for 
example, the Social Fund accounted for 6.6% of the Community 
budget, compared with the ERDF's share of 7.5% (Commission, 
1986g). 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight of this thesis, which 
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examine the implementation of the ESF, deal with the 
activities of the Fund since 1983. This coincides not only 
with the most recent reform of the ESF but also with the 
first year for which detailed data became available on the 
regional distribution of assistance in the UK. Prior to this 
date neither the Commission nor the Department of Employment 
kept records of the ESF's regional allocation. Furthermore, 
it was at this time that the UK Government began submitting 
applications to the Fund from local authorities and other 
regionally based organisations. Previously, the Fund had 
been devoted almost exclusively to nationally based schemes, 
particularly those run by the Manpower Services Commission 
and other Government organisations. 
2.7. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGIONAL POLICY, THE SINGLE 
EUROPEAN ACT AND CURRENT REFORMS. 
In early 1986 the member states of the European 
Community agreed to a package of institutional reforms 
brought together in the Single European Act (SEA) which was 
designed to make "concrete progress towards European unity" 
(Commission, 1986a, SEA, Preamble) and came into operation 
in July 1987. Apart from changes to the Community's 
decision-making procedures, and an extension of qualified 
majority voting to a wider range of policies (see Chapter 
1), the SEA also inserted into the Treaty of Rome a more 
explicit policy towards the regions. However, it did not 
actually use the term "regional policy". Instead, the aim of 
11 reducing disparities between the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least-favoured regions" is part of the 
wider objective of to promoting overall harmonious 
development" (Commission, 1986a, SEA, Article 130A). Under 
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the title "Economic and social cohesion", the principal 
mechanism for achieving this regional objective is the ERDF, 
the aim of which is to: 
help redress the principal regional imbalances in the 
Community through participating in the development 
and structural adjustment of regions whose 
development is lagging behind and in the conversion 
of declining industrial regions (Commission, 1986a, 
SEA, Article 130D). 
However, the SEA also stated that all three of the 
Community's Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF and EAGGF Guidance 
section) and the other financial instruments (EIB, ECSC 
grants and loans) must also contribute to the regional 
objectives. The Commission was required by the SEA to submit 
a proposal to the Council putting forward amendments to the 
three Structural Funds "necessary to clarify and rationalise 
their tasks" in this respect (Commission, 1986a, SEA, 
Article 130D). This "Framework Proposal" was submitted to 
the Council in August 1987 (Commission, 1987c, ) and agreement 
on its main ingredients was reached at the February 1988 
European Council meeting in Brussels (European 
Information Service, No 88). This agreement followed a 
series of protracted negotiations which had lasted for much 
of 1987 and concerned a whole package of reforms proposed by 
the Commission. These negotiations also concerned 
Commission proposals for reducing agricultural spending and 
improving budgetary discipline in general. In its proposals 
for the Structural Funds, the Commission, supported by the 
poorer member states such as Spain, Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland, suggested that the total available resources should 
be doubled by 1992. At first, the British Government was 
vehemently opposed to such an increase. However, eventually 
a6 
a compromise solution was eventually reached and the 
European Council created legal controls on farm spending and 
doubled the value of the three Structural Funds by 1993 (not 
1992 as the Commission had originally proposed). 
Subsequently, the Commission produced a revised 
Framework Proposal taking the February 1988 agreement into 
account (Commission,. 1988d) and this was formally agreed by 
the Council of Ministers in June 1988 (Council Regulation 
(EEC) 2052/88). The Structural Funds will now focus on the 
following five objectives: 
1. promoting the development and structural 
adjustment of the less-developed regions 
(Objective 1); 
2. converting the regions, employment areas and urban 
communities seriously affected-by industrial 
decline and facilitating restructuring of 
declining industries (Objective 2); 
3. combating long-term unemployment (Objective 3); 
4. facilitating the occupational integration of young 
people (Objective 4); 
5. with a view to reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, a) speeding up the adjustment of 
agricultural structures and b) promoting the 
development of rural areas (Objective 5 a) and b) 
(Council Regulation (EEC) 2052/88). 
The Regulation goes on to elaborate how each of the 
three Funds will contribute to these objectives. These ideas 
are illustrated by Table 2.6 which shows that a large 
proportion of the ERDF (approximately 80%) will be directed 
towards the Community's least-developed areas; namely all of 
Portugal, Ireland and Greece, Northern Ireland, parts of 
Spain, the Italian Mezzogiorno and the French Overseas 
Departments. A further 18% will be spent in designated 
"declining industrial areas" and the remaining 2% will be 
directed to It rural areas" designated under Objective 5 b) 
(European Information Service, No 92). 
The Framework Regulation will be followed in 
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September 1988 by a further "horizontal Regulation" 
embracing all three Structural Funds, covering Committee 
procedures and other financial and administrative matters 
common to all three Funds. Agreement on this Proposal is 
expected in the Autumn of 1988. In parallel, proposals for 
11 vertical Regulations" will emerge from the Commission, 
detailing the operation of each individual Fund. The 
current time-table envisages that the new ERDF Regulation 
will come into force in 1989 and the reformed ESF in 
January 1990 (European Information Service, No. 90). The 
implications of these on-going reforms will be discussed in 
more detail in the final Chapter in the light of the 
findings of this research (Chapter 9). 
2.7. CONCLUSIONS. 
This Chapter has examined the development and overall 
goals of European Community regional policy and introduced 
the reader to the two funds with which this thesis is 
concerned; namely the ERDF and the ESF. 
The development of the Community's regional policy 
was essentially a "top-down" process. The initiative for 
policy creation and development arose primarily at Community 
and national levels, out of concern for assisting the 
least-developed and declining areas of the Common Market as 
well as a desire in certain member states such as the UK, to 
win what they considered to be a more equitable share of 
the Community budget. Pressure for the establishment of 
Community regional assistance from organisations such as 
local authorities likely to benefit from aid of this kind 
played only a minor role. Since the ERDF was created in 1975 
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this process has been characterised by the dominance of 
national political concerns over the "Community" ideals held 
by the Commission. 
The reasons why member states in the Council of 
Ministers have been reluctant to allow the Commission any 
substantial degree of control over the allocation of ERDF 
grants are not hard to find. The Ministers in the Council 
are representatives of national governments which are 
accountable to national rather than Community-wide 
electorates. Therefore their actions are largely determined 
by national rather than European concerns. In the case of 
the ERDF this has meant that, with the assistance of the 
"Luxembourg Compromise" and unanimous voting, the member 
states have to-date maintained considerable control over 
many aspects of the Fund, despite the efforts of the 
Commission to increase its own influence over where and on 
what the Fund is spent. Nevertheless, this process has 
produced an ERDF which is not completely free of a 
"Community" content. The national quota system has 
transferred a limited amount of funds to the poorer 
countries even though the more affluent states still retain 
shares. Furthermore, the Council has also introduced other 
elements of the Fund which reduce national control and 
increase that of the Commission. These include: the 
non-quota section of the ERDF (1979-1984); the system of 
indicative ranges (1985-present); the programme approach; 
and the integrated approach. 
Moreover, the on-going reforms of the Structural 
Funds following the adoption of the Single European Act 
seem likely to increase still further the Community nature 
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of regional policy by concentrating more assistance in the 
poorest areas and increasing the emphasis on programme and 
integrated approaches. 
The ESF, on the other hand, has undergone a different 
development process from the ERDF. The Fund has rarely 
been the subject of the intense political debate that has 
characterised the emergence of the ERDF; albeit the 
negotiations of 1987 and 1988 concerning Structural-Fund 
reform have now given the ESF a higher profile. The 
development of the ESF has been a process of concentrating 
resources on particular groups such as young people under 
25 as well as expanding the Fund's role as an instrument of 
regional policy. Debate surrounding the ESF has rarely 
centred on the relative merits of national government or 
Commission control over the decision-making process. 
The overall goals of EC regional policy have been 
somewhat vague. The aim of correcting regional imbalances 
is of limited practical use since it is not clear which 
particular disparities policy is aiming to reduce (e. g 
unemployment, GDP) or by how much. This goal does not 
provide a yardstick against which to measure the 
effectiveness of EC regional policy. However, as we have 
seen, this lack of clarity is not surprising given the way 
in which the ERDF in particular has developed. The range 
of national and Community interests which the Fund has had 
to accommodate mean that it is very difficult to create more 
specific objectives which could secure unanimous agreement 
in the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, the current 
reforms appear to be producing objectives which are much 
more specific than hitherto. Chapter Nine examines this 
issue in more detail. 
There are clear parallels between the development of 
Community regional policy and the evolutionary model of the 
policy implementation process put forward by Hyder (1984). 
As explained earlier this model concerned the re-evaluation 
of policy following a period of implementation and the 
subsequent emergence of an appropriately reformed policy. 
Hyder suggested that policies are re-evaluated in response 
to either the implementation process itself or to changes 
taking place in the environment within which policy is 
enacted. 
The history of the ERDF in particular mirrors this 
process. The original ERDF Regulation was put into practice 
until 1977 at which time the Commission began to re-evaluate 
the way the Fund was implemented. As a result the Commission 
proposed the introduction of a non-quota section because of 
its concern that national domination of the operation of the 
ERDF was preventing the Fund from making any meaningful 
contribution to regional development. Further periods of 
implementation and evaluation followed until the Fund was 
reformed more radically in 1984. The negotiations following 
the adoption of the Single European Act are the latest stage 
in this policy/implementation/re-evaluation process. 
Similar re-statements of policy can be seen in the 
case of the ESF. In this case the periods of policy 
evaluation are as much a result of changes in the 
employment environment within which the Fund was operating 
as a consequence of the implementation process itself. For 
example, the 1971,1977 and 1983 reforms of the ESF followed 
Commission proposals for fund reforms based on the rapid 
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increases in unemployment in the Community and the 
particular concentration of unemployment in the declining 
industrial and structurally under-developed areas. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF THE ERDF AND THE 
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN IMPLEMENTATION. 
3.1. INTRODUCTION. 
The remainder of the thesis examines in detail how 
the ERDF and ESF are implemented in the United Kingdom and 
whether the implementation process facilitates or hinders 
the achievement of the Funds' it operational" objectives. 
Chapter Two showed that the development of EC regional 
policy was largely a "top-down" process. This Chapter 
continues this top-down theme by outlining the objectives of 
the ERDF and assessing the ability of one policy-making 
institution (the European Commission), which also has the 
task of managing Community policies, to control the 
implementation process and to ensure that these objectives 
are fulfilled. Subsequent Chapters examine the role of the 
UK national government in implementation and the importance 
of "bottom-up" local initiatives in putting policy into 
effect. 
3.2. THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF THE ERDF. 
Some of the ERDF's operational objectives are set out 
in the ERDF Regulation itself, while others represent the 
to sharpening-up" of objectives by the European Commission in 
an attempt to improve the Fund's effectiveness. However, 
these Commission aims are not necessarily shared by the 
national governments. 
A number of objectives can be identified, some of 
which have only been in operation since the introduction of 
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the current Regulation in January 1985. This study is 
concerned with the following primary objectives: 
1. the "additionality" of ERDF assistance; 
2. the geographical concentration of aid in the 
neediest areas; 
3. the programme approach; 
4. the encouragement of the potential within regions 
for internally generated development. 
3.2.1. The objective of "additionality". 
One aim of the ERDF is that its regional development 
resources should add to and supplement those provided by 
member states. The objective of "additionality", as it is 
known, was enshrined in the 1975 ERDF Regulation which 
states that "the Fund's assistance should not lead member 
states to reduce their own regional development efforts but 
should complement these efforts" (Preamble, Council 
Regulation (EEC) 724/75). This principle has been variously 
defined and interpreted but in general terms, and as far as 
it concerns the ERDF, it is the requirement that Community 
resources should lead to an increase in the overall level of 
spending on regional policy and regional infrastructure 
carried out within the member states. It seeks, according to 
Preston (1983), to make: 
an obvious distinction between funds from Brussels 
and member states so that arguments about the 
relative efficacy of national and Community policy 
measures can be clearly and separately articulated 
(Preston 1983, p20). 
Additionality is possible at two levels - "global" or 
"individual". The former means that ERDF aid is added to the 
overall volume of regional development expenditure in a 
member state. The latter would lead to ERDF aid 
supplementing national assistance given to an individual 
project. The Regulation allows member states to choose which 
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of the two forms they will pursue and all have opted for 
global additionality (Comfort, 1987). This means that, in 
the case of industrial, craft and service sector projects, 
the British Government, for example, can (in theory at 
least) use the ERDF to increase the overall size of its 
regional aid budget. As a result, ERDF grants are paid to 
the UK Treasury rather than to the actual investor 
concerned. As far as infrastructure projects are concerned, 
grants are initially paid to central government and then 
forwarded in full to the local authority or other public 
organisation responsible for the project. 
The Commission has reiterated the importance of 
additionality on a number of occasions. The 1986 Annual 
Report of the ERDF, for example, pointed out that "the 
Commission attaches great importance to ERDF grants being 
additional to national financial assistance and makes every 
effort to demonstrate that ERDF money does indeed top-up 
national funding" (Commission, 1988b, P6). Unfortunately, 
evidence for the existence of additionality is, in the UK in 
particular, but also in other countries, somewhat equivocal. 
Chapter Four examines the UK experience in more detail and 
shows that the Commission can exert very little "top-down" 
control over this aspect of the implementation process. 
3.2.2 The geographical concentration of spending in the 
most needy areas 
Unlike the aim of additionality, the objective of 
concentrating spending on the neediest areas has never been 
explicitly referred to in the Regulations controlling the 
ERDF. However, the Regulations do imply that assistance 
should be concentrated on both the poorest countries and 
the most needy regions. The 1975 Regulation stated that: 
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the principle should be adopted that the Fund's 
assistance should be allocated according to the 
relative severity of regional imbalances (Council 
Regulation (EEC) 724/75, Preamble). 
There was an implication in this statement that ERDF 
assistance was to be directed to those areas which suffer 
from the most severe inequalities. Moreover, the system of 
national quotas does ensure that the largest proportion of 
aid is directed to the poorer member states, albeit the 
richer countries also receive shares. 
The Commission, in sharpening-up the Fund's 
objectives, has often referred to the spatial concentration 
of spending as an explicit aim. Following the publication 
of the First Periodic Report on the social and economic 
situation in the regions (Commission, 1980) the Commission 
suggested that, given the limited size of the ERDF, 
intervention should be concentrated more heavily on the 
regions suffering from serious problems of either structural 
under-development or industrial decline. Since then, the 
Commission has often re-iterated this objective 
(Commission, 1981c; 1983a; 1986f). For example, the 1985 
ERDF Annual Report stated that: 
one of the conditions for the effectiveness of ERDF 
assistance is that it must be concentrated on 
well-defined targets. Geographical concentration of 
Fund assistance on certain regions with the most 
acute problems ... is one of the Fund's explicit 
aims. It allows grants from the Fund to achieve a 
critical mass and to have a significant impact on the 
economic development of the regions (Commission, 
1986f, P16). 
The Commission clearly regards geographical 
concentration as an important aim of the ERDF and is 
supported in this respect by the European Parliament's 
Committee on Regional Policy and regional Planning, which 
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stressed the importance of "a concentration of ERDF funds'in 
the weakest regions in each member state" (European 
Parliament, 1985a, p3). However, it is equally apparent 
that not all the member states share the Commission's view. 
The Council of Ministers has ensured in the past that all 
countries, even the most affluent, have received fixed 
quotas of the Fund. However, the indicative range system 
introduced by the most recent reform of the ERDF seems to 
have given the Commission increased scope to direct more 
resources to the poorest states and regions (see section 3.3 
below). 
3.2.3. The aim of a programme approach. 
The most recent reform of -the ERDF in 1984 
formalised a new objective. There would now be an emphasis 
on a programme approach to the provision of ERDF 
assistance. As was shown in Chapter Two, the 1984 ERDF 
Regulation created two types of programmes; namely, 
Community Programmes and National Programmes of Community 
Interest (NPCI). 
The switch from individual projects to coordinated 
programmes was designed, firstly, to strengthen the impact 
and cost-effectiveness of ERDF assistance by creating 
genuine Community schemes which would have a real influence 
on regional development activities, rather than simply 
subsidising what was taking place in any case (Commission, 
1986b). Secondly, the programme approach was intended, 
from the point of view of the Commission, to help secure the 
genuine additionality of Community expenditure in that 
the ERDF would have a greater impact on the local planning 
process and on the nature of projects which would take 
9a 
place. The ERDF Regulation indicated that 20% of available 
assistance should be committed to programmes by the end of 
1987. 
3.2.4. The objective of encouraging "internally generated 
development". 
A further new objective was contained in Article 15 
of the 1984 ERDF Regulation. The Fund would now attempt to 
encourage regions to make use of the potential for 
economic development based on indigenous resources. It 
should be added that the Regulation makes no attempt to 
quantify the proportion of the ERDF which should be 
allocated to these kinds of schemes. 
Article 15 is primarily aimed at strengthening the 
small-business sector particularly in fields such as 
tourism, a sector in which South West England in particular 
may hope to benefit. The kinds of projects which Article 15 
is intended to fund include aid schemes for small businesses 
and small-firm advisory services. 
3.3. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 
Having outlined the main "operational" objectives of 
the ERDF, we can now examine the role of the European 
Commission in the implementation process. Apart from 
being an important actor in the Policy-formulation process, 
the Commission also has a major role in implementing 
Community policies. The discussion focuses on the means by 
which the Commission can control the operation of the ERDF 
in order to achieve the Fund's objectives. 
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3.3.1. Orizanisational structure of DG XVI. 
The Directorate General for Regional Policy (DG XVI) 
is the Commission department with primary responsibility for 
the ERDF and it is divided into three individual 
Directorates. Each Directorate contains a number of 
Divisions. Figure 3.1 illustrates this organisational 
structure. The discussion below relates to the activities of 
two Divisions which are of importance in allocating ERDF 
grants. These are the National Programmes and Integrated 
Operations Division of Directorate B and the Project 
Operations Division of Directorate C. Interviews were 
carried out with three British and one Danish official 
working in these divisions. 
3.3.2. Decision-makino Drocesses for T)roJects and 
rogrammes. 
The processes by which applications are examined are 
basically the same whether they concern individual projects 
or entire programmes. This procedure can be divided into 
five basic stages: 
a. arrival of applications; 
b. determining basic eligibility; 
c. assessment of "Community interest"; 
d. consultation with the ERDF Committee; 
e. final decision. 
a) Armlications. 
Applications for projects costing less than 15 
million ECU are submitted by national governments at the 
beginning of each quarter in the form of packages of 
projects from particular regions. Projects of more than 15 
Million ECU and NPCIs may be submitted separately and at any 
time of the year. 
Since the creation of the ERDF in 1975 the numbers of 
applications for aid have risen at a similar rate to the 
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general increases in the size of the Fund (see Chapter 2). 
Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1 illustrate that applications have 
increased from 3252 projects in 1980 to a peak of 7249 
projects and 17 NPCIs in 1985. 
TABLE 3.1. INCREASES IN NUMBERS OF ERDF APPLICATIONS, 
1975-1986. 
Numbers of applic- 
ations for indiv- % Applications 
Year idual projects increase for NPCIs 
1975 1521 
1976 2112 38.9 
1977 2477 17.3 
1978 1940 -21.7 
1979 3771 94.4 
1980 3252 -13.7 
1981 (1) 3752 15.4 
1982 5117 36.4 
1983 5102 -0.3 
1984 5906 15.8 
1985 7249 22.7 17 
1986 (2) 6154 -15.1 47 
Notes. 1) Greece joined the Community in 1981. 
2) Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. 
Sources: Various ERDF Annual reports. 
One criticism of the ERDF prior to the 1984 reform 
was that the lack of competition between member states for 
ERDF assistance allowed national governments simply to 
submit sufficient applications to meet their national 
quotas. The Commission was unable to exercise any real 
influence over the choice of projects to be assisted. 
Furthermore, member states, assured of their fixed quotas, 
had little incentive to put forward particularly imaginative 
projects. The advent of indicative ranges meant that the 
Commission would enjoy greater discretion to choose which 
particular projects to assist and would therefore be able 
to select the projects which best served the Community's 
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objectives. Moreover, the system of ranges was intended to 
encourage member states to submit a larger number of 
applications in order to improve their chances of obtaining 
the maximum allocations (Commission, 1986f), thereby 
increasing still further the discretion of the Commission 
The evidence as to whether the new System has 
generated a greater volume of applications is inconclusive. 
Table 3.2 compares the numbers of applications submitted 
immediately prior to these reforms with those submitted in 
the two-year period afterwards. In 1983 and 1984, the 
assistance applied for exceeded the amounts available by 
15.4% and 26.5% respectively, compared with an overbid in 
1985 of 124.4%. To some extent, this was a result of the 
increase in the normal rate of ERDF assistance from 30% to 
50% of project costs, which meant that each application was 
now seeking more assistance. Nevertheless, the 1300 extra 
projects submitted in 1985 caused the Commission, in its 
1985 Annual Report, to suggest that the new system was 
allowing DG XVI greater discretion to select projects that 
most clearly reflected the "Community interest" 
(Commission, 1986f). Particularly large increases were 
registered in 1985 by Greece and Italy, this being a welcome 
development for the Commission in its efforts to steer 
resources into the poorest areas (Croxford, Wise and 
Chalkley, 1987). 
However, in 1986, despite the arrival of Spain and 
Portugal, the numbers of applications for individual 
projects fell by 15% and the overbid was just 21.5% (Table 
3.2). This reduction was partly offset, however, by the 47 
applications for NPCIs. The Commission (1988b) then 
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suggested that the 1985 peak figure was something of an 
anomaly caused by member states holding back applications 
from 1984 so that they could be dealt with under the new 
Regulation which came into operation in January 1985. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence from the UK that the 
British Government has responded to the indicative range 
system in the way that the Commission intended. A UK 
Government spokesman at a recent House of Lords Committee 
Enquiry indicated that the DoE tries to forward 25% more 
applications than the maximum allocation to which the UK is 
entitled (House of Lords, 1988). 
In conclusion, the indicative range system has led 
to a modest expansion of the Commission's ability to 
exercise "top-down" control over the operation of the Fund 
in order to ensure that it conforms with the "Community" 
objective of concentrating on the neediest areas. The next 
section examines how the Commission attempts to exert this 
potential authority. 
b) Assessment of the basic eligibility of applications. 
The initial examination of submitted projects and 
programmes is intended to determine whether applications 
meet certain eligibility criteria laid down in the Fund 
Regulation. These criteria are absolute and therefore 
failure to meet any one of them will disqualify the project 
from receiving a grant (interview with official of 
Directorate C, DG XVI). The criteria for individual projects 
include: the minimum size of a project (50,000 ECU); the 
availability of a public authority contribution to project 
costs; location in an assisted area; the names of the 
authorities responsible for the project; and various 
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other technical criteria (Council Regulation (EEC) 1787/84). 
The Regulation also lists a number of items which an 
NPCI application must contain. These include: specific 
objectives; a timetable for the implementation of the 
various measures within the programme; a detailed financing 
plan; descriptions of the most significant projects; and 
arrangements for publicity. When checking these criteria, 
the Commission concentrates on firstly, the programme's 
analysis of the particular area's economy, which should 
highlight the major problems being faced as well as any 
particular strengths which the area may have. For example, 
the Programme may relate to a region where there is 
potential for increased investment in the tourism 
sector, or where new infrastructure is a prime 
requirement. Secondly, the NPCI Division verifies that all 
applications contain a ltstrategy" for the economic 
development of the area, including a number of explicit 
programme objectives. The nature of this strategy should 
reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the area concerned. 
Furthermore, the Programme must contain a variety of 
measures other than just a collection of infrastructure 
projects. For example, the Commission is particularly 
concerned to see measures for local business development 
under Article 15 of the Regulation. Finally, submitted 
programmes should contain, within the overall strategy, a 
number of sub-programmes concerned with developments planned 
in particular sectors such as roads or industrial estate 
provision (interview with official of Directorate B, DG 
XVI). 
la I 
c) The assessment of "Community Interest". 
If a project or programme satisfies these basic 
eligibility criteria then it passes on to the stage at which 
the "Community interest" of the scheme is assessed. This 
process was introduced by the 1984 reform of the ERDF in 
order to facilitate the choice between competing 
applications. The Fund Regulation stated that: 
ERDF assistance shall be decided upon by the 
Commission according to the relative severity of the 
economic imbalance affecting the region where the 
investment project is carried out and the direct or 
indirect effect of the project on employment (Council 
Regulation (EEC) 1781/84, Article 21). 
The reformed Regulation also set out a series of 
criteria which measure the "Community interest" of both 
projects and programmes (Council Regulation (EEC) 1787/84, 
Articles 11 and 21). Subsequently, the Commission put these 
criteria in order of priority (Commission, 1985b). The most 
important was "contribution to and consistency with the 
Community's objectives". This would be measured by three 
variables. The first of these was the relative severity of 
the economic inequalities affecting the region concerned in 
relation to both other parts of the same member state and 
the rest of the EC. Furthermore, it would be measured by 
consistency with Community objectives in other policy 
sectors such as communications and the environment and, 
finally, by the extent to which the ERDF assistance was 
additional to national spending. 
The second most important criterion used to measure 
"Community interest" was the project's "contribution to the 
economic developemt of the region". The third was the 
"direct and indirect effect" of the scheme on employment. 
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The aim of this assessment was to eliminate 
applications which, although satisfying the technical ERDF 
criteria, were of little or no "Community interest" 
(interview with official in Directorate C of DG XVI). In 
this way, the Commission was attempting to assert "top-down" 
control over the operation of -the Fund so that it 
could function according to perceived "Community" criteria. 
However, in attempting to operationalise the 
potential authority which it possesses, the Commission has 
encountered a variety of problems. For example, in 1985, 
applying the above criteria proved very problematic, mainly 
because of the difficulty of quantifying criteria such as 
"indirect effect on employment" or "contribution to economic 
development". The resulting problems were so great that in 
1986 little attempt was made to apply the new method and it 
was only in 1987, at the end of the three year period to 
which the indicative ranges initially applied, that the 
final decisions were made on how to allocate the 11.4% 
margin between the minimum allocations to which member 
countries were entitled and the total funds available. 
During 1987 a system was devised that quantified the 
assessment criteria in order to measure the relative 
importance of each variable (interview with official in 
Directorate C, DG XVI). This allowed each project to be 
given a supposedly objective Community interest "score", 
facilitating the selection of the "best" projects for ERDF 
assistance. The criterion receiving the highest weighting 
was the "relative scale of regional imbalances". Thus, the 
Commission hoped to use this method to increase the 
concentration of spending on the neediest regions (interview 
10 4 
with official of Directorate C, DG XVI). 
The idea of calculating a "score" to judge the merits 
of competing applications risks giving a spurious 
objectivity to what is in reality a highly subjective 
judgement. The calculations depend upon the weightings 
applied to the various criteria; a process which is based on 
the judgement of individuals within the Commission. In 
reality the whole scoring system is a means of applying 
"top-down" control over the implementation of the ERDF, in 
order to pursue what the Commission perceives to be the 
desirable objectives of the Fund, rather than an attempt to 
judge the precise worth of competing applications in a 
detached way. 
The confusion over the allocation of the 11.4% margin 
created problems in 1987. In this final year of the 
three-year period of the initial indicative ranges, the 
staff of DG XVI had to be particularly careful that the 
final allocations were within the set limits (interview with 
official in Directorate C, DG XVI). In addition, it would 
have been politically unacceptable to the less affluent 
countries if a richer member state received its maximum 
allocation from the Fund. Moreover, such an outcome would 
have been at odds with using the indicative range system to 
concentrate more assistance in the poorest areas. 
Consequently, decisions on grant applications taken by 
Commission staff in 1987 had to take into account more than 
just the relative merits and "Community interest" of 
submitted applications. Paradoxically, it was possible that 
projects refused assistance in 1987 were more worthy of 
finance than projects which were funded during 1985 and 1986 
1 10 
(interview with official of Directorate C, DG XVI). Table 
3.3 shows that despite all of these problems the Commission 
had succeeded at the end of 1987 in increasing slightly the 
concentration of spending in the poorer member states. Both 
Greece and Ireland, whose per capita GDPs are well below the 
EC average, received the maximum allocation to which they 
are entitled. Of the other countries, Italy (another less 
affluent member state) and the UK also received shares 
closer to the maximum than the other richer countries. 
Once the Commission has assessed the "Community 
interest" of projects and NPCIs, it produces a draft 
decision detailing the schemes it intends to Fund. This 
decision is a legal document required because the Commission 
is empowered to take final decisions on the allocation of 
ERDF grants, subject to having consulted the ERDF Committee 
(see below), without involving the Council of Ministers. 
This draft decision contains all the projects the Commission 
wishes to fund. Three of these decisions are prepared each 
year in preparation for the three meetings of the ERDF 
Committee which is the final hurdle that applications must 
face. 
d) The ERDF Committee. 
This committee is composed of representatives of the 
member states who are normally civil servants from a 
relevant national ministry. For example, the British 
representatives are Assistant Secretaries at the Department 
of Trade and Industry and the Department of the Environment, 
with occasional representation from the Scottish, Welsh and 
Northern Irish offices. 
The 1984 ERDF Regulation altered somewhat the 
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operation of the ERDF Committee. Before 1985, it was 
required to deliver an opinion on all projects costing more 
than 10 million ECU. In addition, it could be consulted on 
any smaller projects which a member state or the Commission 
wished the Committee to discuss. The reformed Regulation 
introduced a new procedure which reduced the Committee's 
workload and hence its influence over the allocation of 
assistance. It would now be consulted on all projects 
greater than 5 million ECU and all programmes but could no 
longer discuss any smaller schemes. As Table 3.4 shows 
these procedural changes reduced substantially the number of 
projects on which it was consulted. A list of smaller 
projects is now presented by DG XVI as a "fait accompli" and 
the decisions on these projects are now entirely the 
responsibility of the Commission. These changes are an 
example of how authority has shifted slightly away from the 
member states to the Commission. The Commission has greater 
scope to control the operation of the Fund without needing 
to secure the agreement of member governments. Apart form 
projects greater than 5 million ECU, the ERDF Committee is 
also consulted on all applications for NPCIs, Community 
Programmes and Article 15 measures. As usual, voting takes 
place according to the qualified majority system. The 
Committee also discusses a variety of other matters relating 
to the management of the ERDF, such as new application 
forms, procedural changes, new interpretations of different 
types of projects and the assessment of Community interest. 
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TABLE 3.4. THE ACTIVITY OF THE ERDF COMMITTEE, 1983-1986. 
% of total 
Year >10 MECU <10 MECU Total applications 
1983 149 443 592 13% 
1984 199 630 829 14% 
>5 MECU >15 MECU Total Progs. 
1985 233 
1986 232 
103 336 7 4.6% 
117 349 14 5.7% 
Source: Commission (1984c, 1985 , 1986f, 1988b). 
The Committee is required to give an opinion on all 
the projects on which it is consulted. Three outcomes are 
possible: a positive opinion; a negative opinion; or no 
opinion. A positive opinion means that the Committee 
endorses the award of a grant to a project or the funding of 
a programme. A negative opinion means that the Council of 
Ministers would have to be consulted about the project and 
could overturn the Commission's provisional decision. 
However, while the ERDF has been in operation, the Committee 
has never given a negative opinion. There are two reasons 
why this is the case. Firstly, the Committee votes by 
qualified majority voting according to the same system 
designed for the Council of Ministers. Therefore it is very 
difficult to muster enough disapproval among national 
delegations about an individual project or programme to 
secure enough votes to give a negative opinion. On many 
occasions, individual national delegations have delivered 
negative votes or abstained from voting altogether. In 1986, 
for example, 18 projects were the subject of negative votes 
or abstentions. But these have not been sufficient to 
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block the Commission's draft decision. A second reason for 
the lack of negative opinions delivered by the Committee as 
a whole is that the Commission will not normally present any 
schemes which are highly controversial. It is very careful 
to check that all criteria are clearly satisfied and to 
discuss potentially borderline cases with member governments 
in advance. 
The role of the ERDF Committee is essentially 
advisory and regulatory. It has certain powers but the 
practice of majority voting and the caýe exercised by the 
Commission to submit acceptable schemes, means that these 
powers are seldom formally exercised. The importance of the 
Committee is essentially its potential to monitor the 
activities of the Commission. Its existence means that the 
Commission is not given an entirely free hand in the 
allocation of grants. 
e) The final decision. 
Once the ERDF Committee has been consulted, the 
Commission produces a final formal decision on the 
allocation of grants. This decision is formally taken by 
the seventeen Commissioners, but in practice this is 
essentially little more than a "rubber-stamping" exercise on 
decisions which have already been taken by Commission 
officials and the ERDF Committee. 
Since 1975, these decisions have resulted in the 
provision of grants totalling 20.17 billion ECU 
(approximatelyý14 billion). Table 3.3 shows how this aid 
has been divided up among the member states. Obviously, 
this distribution has been largely controlled by the system 
of national quotas and indicative ranges (see Chapter 2). 
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The Table and Figure 3.3 show that the largest 
beneficiaries in absolute terms have been Italy, United 
Kingdom, France, Greece, Spain and Ireland. Of course, 
Greece only joined the Community in 1981 and the two Iberian 
countries did not join until 1986. In fact, in the 1986 to 
1987 period, the rank order of recipients was Italy, Spain, 
United Kingdom, Portugal and Greece (Figure 3.3). 
However, the member states vary greatly in population size, 
ranging from 61 million in FR Germany to 0.37 million in 
Luxembourg. Therefore, a more meaningful measure of 
benefits from the ERDF is the per capita allocation (Figure 
3.4). On this basis, three less-affluent member states, 
Ireland, Greece and Italy, have been the leading 
recipients since 1975 (although Greece only joined the 
Community in 1981). Moreover, in 1986 and 1987 the five 
countries with GDP per capita below the EC average have also 
been the five most-aided countries according to this per 
capita measure; namely, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain and 
Italy. The UK, which since the arrival of Spain and 
Portugal has had a GDP per head above the EC average, has 
received the second largest absolute share of the ERDF since 
1975 (third largest since 1986), but on a per capita basis 
has received a level of assistance below the Community 
average (Figure 3.4). Therefore, despite the quota and 
indicative range systems, which guarantee even the richest 
states shares of the Fund, the bulk of assistance has been 
directed to the less-affluent countries. Moreover, as we 
have seen, the ability of the Commission to increase this 
concentration appears to have been increased. 
In the three years since the entry into force of the 
I 16 
a: z 
C13 CD 
cr- UJ D 
ul m2 (D Z zi, x 
cr 0 LLJ LLI Lu :) 
LL a. ZC ca -j 
nIýý7 
2 
0 
Z 
Sid 
UJ LLI auuz 
LU zwZ< 
.j 
i- 
<w ; (- -. j Z Cc CC CL 
LU 
D U. (D 
Co 
0-) 
LU 
11 T-- 
On 
;7Z 
0< 
c: 3 
h-7: r--, 00 
(-) m 
LO 
IT 11 
u 
LLJ 
(C) 
r- 
Co 
OD 
u 
uj 
c 
0 
'7 
C 
04 
r- 
co 
0) 
117 
r- 
00 
co 
< 
a) 
i-z 
U 
co 
LLJ 
CL 
z 
(D 00 C') U- V- ol 
= (D LLJ 00 
0 
7' 
Z 
0< 
ý 
CL 
< 
co -:; 
T- 
u 
LO 
LU 
< 0-) 
D 
U LU 
2 
1 11 
0 
C 
CY) 04 
1984 Regulation, the programme approach has not developed at 
quite the speed envisaged at the outset. The Council of 
Ministers has to-date agreed two Community Programmes. The 
STAR Programme concerned the improvement of advanced 
telecommunications and was allocated 777 million ECU. The 
Valoren Programme related to the use of indigenous forms of 
energy and was provided with 393 million ECU. Only the 
least-favoured areas of the Community (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, the Mezzogiorno, much of Spain, Northern Ireland, 
the French Overseas Departments and Corsica) were eligible 
for assistance from these programmes (Council Regulation 
(EEC) 3300/86 Council Regulation (EEC) 3301/86). In 1987, 
two other Community Programmes were proposed to the Council; 
the Resider programme concerned declining steel areas and 
the Renaval programme related to areas dependent upon 
shipbuilding (Commission, 1988c). 
Table 3.5 illustrates the amounts allocated to NPCIs 
in each member state since 1985. In comparison with the 
original target of 20%, programmes accounted for 15.4% of 
assistance in 1987. However, in all the member states, 
except Italy, Spain, Portugal and FR Germany, the 20% target 
was exceeded in 1987. The poor performance of the Iberian 
countries in this regard can be partly explained by the 
fact that they joined the Community only in 1986. 
Consequently, potential participants in the programme 
approach in these countries need time to develop the 
considerable expertise required to draw-up and submit these 
schemes. The lack of successful Italian Programmes is less 
easy to explain. Italy has received ERDF contributions for 
Integrated Mediterranen Programmes (IMPs) operating in the 
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Mezzogiorno. However, the amounts of assistance allocated 
have hitherto been relatively small. The potential benefits 
of programmes in the poorest regions may not be realised if 
authorities in these areas lack the administrative capacity 
to develop programmes of this kind. This point illustrates 
the importance of "bottom-up" initiative in determining the 
extent to which a Community policy objective is 
implemented. The Commission cannot allocate assistance 
unless applications are forthcoming. 
TABLE 3.5. NUMBERS OF NPCIS APPROVED BETWEEN 1985 AND 1987. 
No. of Assistance committed (MECU) % 
Member state programmes 1985-1987 1987 1987 
Belgium 3 17.1 13.7 58 
Denmark 2 5.4 3.1 25 
FR Germany - - - - 
Greece (1) 6 125.2 107.6 36 
Spain 1 27.3 27.3 4 
France (2) 18 184.5 184.5 45 
Ireland 1 66.9 66.9 41 
Italy (1) 7 30.9 30.9 3 
Luxembourg 1 2.0 1.0 30 
Netherlands 1 5.3 5.3 26 
Portugal 1 29.0 29.0 7 
UK 10 262.2 131.2 21 
EC 12 51 755.8 541.7 15 
Note. 1) All Greek and Italian NPCIs are ERDF contribution 
to Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. 
2) Some French programmes are ERDF contribution to 
Integrated Development Operations. 
Sources. Commission (1986f, 1988b). 
3.5. CONCLUSIONS: ELEMENTS OF TOP-DOWN CONTROL. 
Having examined the decision-making processes with 
which the Commission attempts to put the ERDF's 
11 operational" objectives into practice, the discussion 
concludes by concentrating on some conceptual implications 
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of the Commission's role in policy implementation. 
Proponents of a "top-down" approach are concerned to 
identify those elements of the implementation system which 
allow policy makers who wish to achieve certain objectives 
to control the activities of other actors involved. 
The Commission has a degree of authority at its 
disposal to determine how the ERDF operates. Moreover, it 
has been able to increase these powers gradually over time. 
Firstly, the non-quota section of the ERDF allowed the 
Commission greater control over the allocation of the Fund 
by instituting a small proportion of resources which could 
be spent on programmes initiated by the Commission in 
specific sectors such as shipbuilding or textiles. 
Furthermore, the introduction of an indicative range system, 
following the 1984 reforms, gave the Commission more 
discretion to choose between competing projects (subject in 
the case of large projects and Programmes to the approval of 
the ERDF Committee) and thereby partly to determine the 
spatial and sectoral distribution of funding. Although, as 
we have seen, the Commission had great difficulty 
translating this potential authority into an effective 
system for choosing between applications according to their 
"Community interest". The programme approach, moreover, 
means that the Commission has the opportunity to use the 
Fund to influence the nature of regional development 
activities and thereby to improve the effectiveness of Fund 
assistance. This is particularly the case as far as 
"Community Programmes" are concerned since these are 
instigated by the Commission itself. 
Thus, the Commission has some powers to exert 
top-down control over the implementation process and to put 
the Fund's objectives into practice. However, these powers 
are limited. Many aspects of the Fund's activities remain 
in the grip of the member states. Firstly, the presence of 
the ERDF Committee means that DG XVI must be careful not to 
present projects which are likely to receive any degree of 
disfavour from a majority of member states. The lack of 
negative opinions from the Committee relects, not the 
Committee's impotence, but the care exercised by the 
Commission to build a consensus of opinion among all the 
member governments. 
A second constraint on the Commission's authority is 
that, despite the extra flexibility of the indicative range 
system, the proportion' of resources which are free of 
national quotas is still only 11.4% of the Fund. On the 
other hand, the programme approach, which the Commission 
views as the most effective instrument of EC regional 
policy, is developing in many member states into an 
important aspect of the ERDF's activities. 
In conclusion, the Commission has some authority 
to exert "top-down" control in order to promote "Community" 
objectives within a framework in which national interests 
are taken into account. However, the following Chapter 
will show that in the UK "national" control is strengthend 
by government's tight hold on the purse-strings of ERDF 
assistance and by its pivotal role in the decision-making 
process. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ERDF IN THE UK AND 
THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. 
4.1. INTRODUCTION. 
This Chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first examines how far the operational objectives of the 
ERDF are achieved in the UK. The second assesses the role 
of the United Kingdom government in the ERDF's 
implementation structure. Our emphasis is on the means by 
which national government can control how Community policy 
is implemented. 
4.2. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ERDF OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM. 
The four objectives highlighted earlier were: 
1. the "additionality" of ERDF assistance; 
2. the geographical concentration of aid in the 
neediest areas; 
3. the objective of a programme approach; 
4. the encouragement of the potential within regions 
for internally generated development. 
4.2.1. The objective of "additionality". 
Many questions have been raised as to whether the 
assistance provided by the ERDF has really been used to 
supplement the resources available within member states for 
the development of problem regions (Wilson, 1980; Meny, 
1982; Preston, 1983; Comfort, 1987; Court of Auditors, 
1987). The European Court of Auditors, for example, noted 
that almost all schemes for which applications were made had 
started before a decision was made to grant assistance. They 
argued that "it follows that in practice there is no direct 
relationship between the execution of a given project and 
the Commission's aid decision" (Court of Auditors, 1984, 
P8). 
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The UK experience of additionality has been the 
subject of particular scrutiny (Preston, 1983; 
Armstrong, 1985; Wise and Croxford, 1988). As far as 
industrial, craft and service sector projects are concerned, 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) applies for ERDF 
grant aid for projects which already receive national 
regional aid. The subsequent Fund assistance is then used 
to reimburse the DTI's own expenditure. Successive Labour 
and Conservative Governments have argued that: 
although Fund receipts for industrial projects are 
retained by the Government, they are taken into 
account when determining the levels of regional 
assistance which would be lower without the Fund 
receipts (DTI Memorandum to House of Lords Select 
Committee, House of Lords, 1984, p29). 
This contention is difficult to prove or disprove 
since it is impossible to determine how much would be spent 
on regional aid if the ERDF did not exist. Suffice it to ask 
in a period of public expenditure reductions (in the 
regional policy field in particular) and of concern about 
British contributions to the overall Community budget, 
whether the Government could resist the temptation to use 
the ERDF to replace its own expenditure on regional aid. 
In the case of infrastructure projects, the 
Government again operates a restrictive interpretation of 
the additionality principle. The award of an ERDF grant to a 
local authority does not result in an expansion of the 
volume of capital spending the authority is carrying out, 
since it is not permitted to increase its Government-imposed 
external borrowing or capital spending limits by the amount 
of ERDF assistance received. The award of the grant simply 
means that the local authority does not need to borrow the 
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money required to carry out the scheme, which it would have 
to have done without the ERDF. Consequently, although the 
benefits of an ERDF grant are significant on the revenue 
side of the authority's budget (no need to repay the loan in 
future years and no interest payments), the award of a grant 
does not lead to a corresponding increase in the volume 
of capital spending that is taking place. 
Instead of permitting additionality at the local 
level, the Government argues that additionality is applied 
at the national or "global" level. The Government is able 
to estimate likely ERDF receipts when setting overall public 
spending levels and therefore it insists that these are 
higher than would be possible if national resources alone 
were available. However, this overall increase is 
relatively small. Average annual ERDF receipts in England 
of about 1100 million compare with total local-authority 
capital spending of approximately 15000 million 
(Representative of DoE in House of Lords, 1988). 
Moreover, because the Fund contributes to national levels of 
local government spending, all local authorities throughout 
the Country effectively benefit from a small proportion of 
this limited additional spending. Therefore, it is clear 
that the resources of the ERDF are not being used 
exclusively for regional development purposes in the UK. On 
the contrary, as the 1988 House of Lords report suggests: 
grants are not directed specifically where they are 
most needed but rather are seen by the Government as 
providing a supplement for the national budget in 
the fields eligible for Fund support (House of Lords, 
1988, p9). 
Nevertheless, there was widespread agreement among 
those interviewed in this research in South West England 
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that the savings made on revenue expenditure made the task 
of applying for ERDF assistance more than worthwhile. 
Indeed, a DoE spokesman at the recent House of Lords enquiry 
pointed out that: 
we (the DoE) see no lack of keenness from local 
authorities to apply for the ERDF - or other bodies 
for that matter - so clearly they see some 
additionality in it (House of Lords, 1988, p7l). 
Furthermore, a representative of the British Sections of 
IULA/CEMR argued that: 
we (local authorities) put quite a lot of store by 
the (ERDF) funding ... it has helped considerably 
those areas where there is structural regeneration 
taking place ... they (ERDF grants) create new 
opportunities for change and growth in an otherwise 
constrained environment (House of Lords, 1988, p90). 
Notwithstanding these accepted local benefits, there 
remains considerable doubt whether ERDF assistance is 
leading to an increase in regional development spending 
commensurate with the level of the actual grants which are 
awarded. The precise benefits are very difficult to 
quantify. However, Chorley (1986), an officer of Strathclyde 
Regional Council, has made an attempt to do so, concluding 
that, although they are important, actual benefits are 
considerably less than the value of grants awarded. Chorley 
calculated that: 
Strathclyde's average annual receipts are between A10 
and J15 million. On the basis that an ERDF grant is 
50% of a project cost then loan charges [on the 
project] are correspondingly reduced by 50%, and as 
grants accumulate the annual value [of these 
reductions in loan charges] can become quite 
significant - for Strathclyde they are now in the 
order of A7 million per annum. Sadly for rate payers, 
the Treasury claws over half of this back in a 
reduction of the rate support grant ... Rate payers in Strathclyde get a benefit of about . 4.3 million per 
annum [compared with nominal annual receipts of 
between (10 and f-15 million] (Chorley, 1986, p28). 
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The problem highlights- the ability of national 
government to control the implementation of a Community 
policy. All applications are submitted on behalf of the UK 
Government and all ERDF payments are formally paid to the 
national Treasuary. The Government is thus able to keep 
tight control of the ERDF's purse strings and to absorb 
Community finance into overall levels of public 
expenditure. 
4.2-2. The geographical concentration of spending in the 
most needy areas. 
This section outlines the spatial pattern of ERDF aid 
within the UK and assesses whether the Fund's resources are 
being directed to those areas which are most in need of such 
assistance. 
The broad geography of ERDF spending among the UK 
Standard Regions is shown by Table 4.1. This Table, which 
includes all allocations since 1975, shows that the most 
successful region has been Scotland which has received 
almost 24% of the UK's share of the ERDF. Of the other 
regions, Wales has won approximately 15%, Northern Ireland a 
little over 10% and the English regions, with the North and 
North West foremost, sharing about 48%. The remaining 3% has 
been devoted to schemes covering more than one region. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the allocation of ERDF 
assistance among the counties of England and Wales and the 
Scottish regions between 1983 and 1987. It was possible to 
map only the data from 1983 onwards because prior to that 
date the available data simply listed the schemes which 
were funded and gave regional totals of grants awarded 
without detailing the value of the individual grants at the 
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FIGURE 4.1. ALLOCATION OF ERDF ASSISTANCE TO ENGLISH AND WELSH COUNTIES 
SCOTTISH REGIONS AND NORTHERN IRELAND, 1983-1987. 
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county level. The most successful counties in Great Britain 
(Figure 4.1) have been the major metropolitan counties, 
namely: Strathclyde (which includes Glasgow); Merseyside; 
Tyne and Wear; and West Midlands; followed by South 
Yorkshire; Cleveland; Greater Manchester and Mid Glamorgan. 
Behind these major urban areas, a second rank of assisted 
counties includes rural areas such as Cornwall and the 
Scottish Islands, together with a mixed group of counties 
including Durham, Humberside, Lothian, Tayside and Devon. 
Table 4.1 also shows the allocation of aid on a per 
capita in assisted area basis. According to this measure, a 
somewhat different pattern of spending emerges. The most 
successful regions now include the East Midlands and South 
West England. Indeed, the assisted population of the East 
Midlands has received almost four times the average 
allocation. Furthermore, although Scotland and Northern 
Ireland maintain their high levels of funding, their 
allocations are now almost matched by that of South West 
England. Moreover, according to this measure the North West 
receives only 70% of the UK average. The very high 
allocation to the assisted population of the East Midlands 
results from the fact that only a very small area (the Corby 
Travel to Work Area and small parts of Derbyshire and 
Leicestershire) and a relatively small population have been 
eligible for assistance. Consequently, only a small number 
of grants are required to produce a large per capita 
allocation. Moreover, the effect of a small number of large 
grants for expensive projects is to weight the figures 
firmly in favour of the areas with the smallest populations. 
A large road scheme, for example, will cost the same whether 
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it serves 90,000 people in Corby or 3.5 Million in Scotland. 
To some extent the relatively high per capita allocation to 
the assisted areas of South West England is also the result 
of the relatively small population in the region. 
At the county level (Figure 4.2) we can see that on 
a per capita basis a different group of counties are the 
most successful. These include rural areas such as Cornwall 
and the Highlands and Islands of Scotland and a number of 
counties in Wales, together with Tayside in Scotland. Apart 
from Tyne and Wear, which is one of the most successful 
counties on a per capita basis, the major metropolitan areas 
are now part of a group of middle-ranking counties which 
also includes Devon, Durham, Gwynned, West Glamorgan and 
three Scottish regions. 
A number of factors can be put forward at this stage 
to help explain this broad spatial pattern of activity. The 
first of these is the extent of assisted areas in the 
various regions. Only those areas which are eligible for 
national regional aid are able to win ERDF assistance. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the changing map of eligible areas 
since 1975 when the ERDF was created. These maps show 
how the extent of assisted areas has been progressively 
reduced since 1979 removing many areas from the possibility 
of attracting ERDF assistance. All regions have been 
affected by this process as the eligible population has 
been reduced from 47% of the UK total in 1982 to 30% 
following the November 1984 reforms to national regional 
policy. Partly as a result of these changes, South West 
England's receipts, for example, went down from a peak of 
*. 28.6 million in 1984 to S. 10.4 million in 1985. On the other 
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hand, the West Midlands County was awarded assisted area 
status following the 1984 review and as a result became 
eligible for ERDF assistance for the first time. In fact, in 
1985 and 1986, the West Midlands received a total of A990.4 
Million from the Fund. 
Also of importance in determining the geography of 
ERDF grants is the density of population in these areas. The 
aggregation of factors such as relatively large and dense 
population, many eligible organisations with large capital 
spending budgets, together with the resulting greater need 
for infrastructure and industrial development, means that 
areas like Strathclyde, Merseyside, Tyneside, Humberside and 
West Midlands are able to generate the largest numbers of 
ERDF applications and hence receive the largest total shares 
of assistance. Conversely, areas such as South West England, 
rural Wales and Northern Scotland are relatively sparsely 
populated and have less scope for attracting the very 
largest volumes of grant aid. Although in per capita terms, 
as we have seen, these areas do relatively well. 
The ability of particular regions to generate larger 
numbers of ERDF applications is one factor explaining the 
broad spatial pattern of assistance. This reflects the 
"bottom-up" nature of the implementation process. Unless 
applications are forthcoming then no grants can be 
allocated. However, elements of "top-down" control over the 
allocation of aid may also influence this spatial pattern. 
It is appropriate here to highlight an issue that has been 
put forward in the past to explain the regional allocation. 
It has often been argued (Armstrong, 1978; Wilson, 1980; 
Meny, 1982 and Martins, Mawson and Gibney, 1985) that the 
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Department of Trade and Industry, which, oversees all UK 
applications, has imposed an "informal quota" on the 
distribution of assistance. According to a House of Lords 
Select Committee report: 
a fairly tight and consistent rationing system (has 
been] operated by the Department of Trade and 
Industry, ensuring that English regions received 
about 45% of the available ERDF grants, Scotland 25%, 
with Wales and Northern Ireland sharing the 
remainder. (House of Lords, 1984, p5). 
Under the rigid quota system by which assistance was 
allocated to each country until the end of 1984, the DTI was 
able to control the distribution of ERDF grants within the 
UK by submitting only enough applications to meet the UK's 
quota (Girling, 1984). In this way, the regional pattern was 
controlled by the DTI rather than by the Commission. 
However, evidence for the existence of an "informal quota" 
is not conclusive. Table 4.2 shows the proportions of the 
ERDF allocated to particular regions from 1975 until 1986. 
It is clear that in each year shares of the Fund vary 
substantially. For example, Scotland has received annual 
proportions ranging from 15.8% to 36.7%. However, total 
allocations over this period do broadly match the figures 
quoted in the House of Lords Report. The reforms of the 
ERDF which came into effect in 1985 have certainly reduced 
the UK Government's potential to influence the spatial 
pattern of spending in this way. Under the indicative range 
system it is now in the interests of the Government to 
submit as many applications as possible in order to maximise 
the UK's receipts. As a result, the Commission has greater 
scope to select projects in a way which does not always 
conform with the UK government's "informal quota". 
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The regional pattern of spending can also be examined 
in terms of the "need" of regions for such financial 
assistance. On one level, because the Fund is directed only 
to the designated assisted areas it is clearly going to 
those areas which the UK Government at least considers to be 
"in need". However, the question should be asked whether aid 
is directed to the most needy areas. 
The most common measure of need is unemployment and 
this is the basis on which assisted areas in the UK are 
formally designated. Table 4.1 shows unemployment rates and 
numbers of people unemployed in the assisted parts of the 
various regions and compares these measures with the 
allocation of the ERDF on a per unemployed person basis. 
These figures illustrate the difficulty of measuring 
relative need. The highest rates of unemployment do not 
necessarily coincide with the largest number of unemployed 
persons. In the assisted areas of the North West region, for 
example, about 320,000 people were unemployed in October 
1986 yet the 16% overall rate of unemployment was less than 
many other assisted areas. Furthermore, in South West 
England the designated Development Areas had a combined 
unemployment rate of 21.6% yet the assisted areas as a whole 
had only about 41,000 unemployed people. On the per 
unemployed person basis, South West England and the East 
Midlands score particularly well. The relatively small 
numbers of unemployed in these assisted areas compared with 
other regions has a major effect on the figures. These 
points illustrate that the measurement of relative "need" 
can in practice be very problematic. Moreover, this poses 
difficulties for assessing whether the ERDF is achieving its 
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objectives. 
Northern Ireland is, by all standard measures, the 
neediest region in the UK. The Province's unemployment rate 
was 22.4% in October 1986, the highest in the UK and one of 
the highest in the Community. In fact in some places 
unemployment was as high as 38% (Employment Gazette, 
December 1986). Furthermore, Northern Ireland scores poorly 
on the Community's Synthetic Index of regional problems, 
which places it 33rd worst out of 160 regions (Commission, 
1987b). Moreover, the Structural Fund reforms of 1988 
include the whole of Ireland, including the North, in its 
list of most seriously underdeveloped areas, putting the 
province on a par with Portugal, Greece, the Republic of 
Ireland, Southern Italy, and much of Spain. 
Despite these serious economic problems and the 
commitment of the Community to provide assistance, together 
with the other serious social and political problems faced 
by the Province, Northern Ireland is only the fifth largest 
benficiary region in the UK. On a per person in assisted 
area basis its allocation is exceeded by Scotland and the 
East Midlands and is almost matched by South West England. 
Furthermore, according to the per unemployed person measure 
Northern Ireland is only the fifth largest recipient. 
Nevertheless, according to a representative of the Northern 
Ireland Office at the 1988 House of Lords enquiry, the ERDF 
is currently providing about j40 million per year out of 
total expenditure in the province on roads, water and 
industrial infrastructure of about 1250 million per annum 
(House of Lords, 1988). 
However, in some respects this analysis is spurious. 
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Because the Government applies additionality at the "global" 
(national) level, any aid attracted by Northern Ireland (and 
Scotland and Wales) is paid initially to the UK Treasury. 
These receipts are only one of a number of factors which the 
Government then considers when determining overall levels 
of public expenditure in the province. Thus, ERDF 
assistance won by Northern Ireland contributes only 
indirectly to economic development in the province. As 
usual the Government argues that the ERDF receipts are taken 
into account when setting overall levels of public 
expenditure and levels of spending in Northern Ireland are 
greater than would otherwise be possible. 
The application of additionality at the national 
level in this way means that levels of ERDF receipts are 
intimately related to the wider issue of the high level of 
public subsidy allocated to Northern Ireland from the rest 
of the UK. From the point of view of isolating the 
Community's regional development efforts and measuring their 
effectiveness, this is a very unsatisfactory state of 
affairs. Moreover, it illustrates how closely national 
government can control the operation of the ERDF and use it 
to support national levels of spending rather than 
explicitly to promote regional development. 
As far as the other regions of Great Britain are 
concerned it is again difficult to come to firm conclusions 
as to whether ERDF spending has been directed to the 
neediest areas. The arguments above apply to the English, 
Scottish and Welsh regions, as well as to Northern Ireland; 
the ERDF is used by the Government as a resource for 
subsidising national expenditure. However, unlike 
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Northern Ireland where the bulk of ERDF grants are nominally 
allocated to the Northern Ireland Office (a central 
government department), some benefits are felt at the local 
level in the rest of the UK where local authorities 
and others are more involved in providing economic 
infrastructure. As has already been shown, local 
authorities are able to substitute ERDF grants for loans 
they would otherwise have to take out. Because there are 
clear benefits for those applying for ERDF aid in Great 
Britain, it is valid to ask whether the neediest areas 
have attracted the largest proportions of assistance. 
In order to assess whether this has been the case, 
statistical correlation tests were carried out at the level 
of English and Welsh Counties and Scottish Regions between 
unemployment rates and both actual and per capita levels of 
ERDF receipts (as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2). In both 
cases the correlation co-efficient calculated were 
significant at the 99% confidence level. In other words, 
there is a statistical association between levels of ERDF 
receipts and unemployment at county level. Consequently, we 
can conclude that there is a relationship between "need" (as 
measured by unemployment) and ERDF receipts. However, it is 
also apparent that ERDF aid has been spread throughout a 
most of the UK. Although the changes in the map of assisted 
areas in 1984 has served to increase the geographical 
concentration of the Fund. 
4.2.3. The objective of a Programme approach. 
A number of NPCIs have been submitted and approved 
between 1985 and 1987 for areas in the UK. These are 
outlined in Table 4.3. In South West England two NPCIs have 
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been submitted to the European Commission, but at the 
time of writing no decision has yet been made in Brussels 
(August 1988). One of these Programmes concerns the Plymouth 
Travel to Work Area, the other is for the assisted areas of 
Cornwall. The Programmes both involve the County 
authorities, all the District Councils in the respective 
Programme areas as well as various public utilities and 
other organisations. 
TABLE 4.3. THE NATIONAL PROGRAMMES OF COMMUNITY INTEREST 
AGREED FROM 1985 TO 1987 IN THE UK. 
Total ERDF 
Period of assistance 
Area Programme Committed (4Million) 
Shildon/Newton Aycliffe/ 1984-89 18.1 
Bishop Auckland 
Mersey Basin 1984-87 66.7 
Glasgow 1984-88 68.0 
Tees Corridor 1984-87 18.8 
Mid Glamorgan 1986-89 32.8 
Tayside 1986-90 20.7 
Northern Ireland (1) 1986-88 3.3 
West Lothian 1986-90 26.7 
Birmingham 1987-91 113.0 
Total 368.1 
Note. 1) The NPCI for Northern Ireland consists entirely of 
Article 15 measures and was devised by the Northern Ireland 
Office. 
Source. Commission (1986f, 1988b); European Information 
Service, Dec 1987. 
For the organisations involved in NPCIs there are a 
number of reasons why involvement in this type of programme 
submission is desirable and more advantageous than the 
previous individual project applications. Firstly, a 
succesful programme application guarantees a flow of 
assistance from the Community to the organisation; involved 
over a period of years. This increases the effectiveness of 
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forward planning in that organisations are assured of 50% 
assistance for individual projects within the programme well 
in advance. As a result, the ERDF may come to have a greater 
influence on the type of investment organisations are 
carrying out, rather than the simple financial windfall for 
already-committed projects that it has been in the past. 
In financial terms, the Programme gives individual 
schemes wider eligibility criteria. In particular, when 
presented as part of a programme, there is no minimum level 
of funding for individual projects (this is otherwise 
currently set by the ERDF Regulation at 50,000 ECU - about 
. 430,000). Moreover, it also gives the organisations involved 
certain cash-flow advantages. The local co-ordinating 
committee structure which manages the implementation of the 
programme enables money to be forwarded to an authority for 
a particular project at a much earlier stage than with 
individual project applications (interview with planning 
officer, Cornwall County Council). 
The Commission views the programme approach as the 
way in which the ERDF can make its most effective 
contribution to regional development. Consequently, it is 
given priority in the allocation of ERDF assistance. 
Therefore, organisations can increase their chances of 
obtaining money from an ERDF which is oversubscribed. 
Furthermore, as the programme approach gathers momentum 
there will be less assistance available for individual 
project applications and the chances of obtaining money by 
this route will be increasingly problematic. 
Although the advantages of the programme approach are 
considerable, there are nevertheless a number of problems 
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with which local authorities and other interested 
organisations will have to contend and which restrict its 
translation from policy aim into practice. These are 
firstly, restrictions imposed by central Government capital 
spending limits and, secondly, failure to implement the 
programme on schedule. 
The perennial problem of government-imposed capital 
spending limits arises during the implementation of an NPCI. 
All the schemes funded within the programme must be 
accommodated, as with individual ERDF grants, within the 
expenditure limits set by the Department of Environment. 
Unfortunately, because these limits are set annually and 
local authorities cannot be certain how much money they will 
receive in future years, there is no guarantee that the 
money will be available to provide the authority's 50% 
contribution to projects due to be carried out in the later 
years of the programme. In those NPCIs which are already 
operating this has meant that authorities have been unable 
to implement parts of the programme and hence have been 
prevented from taking up all the ERDF assistance to which 
they are entitled (interview with DoE official in London). 
It is ironic that the government puts its name to an NPCI 
application and then fails to provide the resources 
necessary to implement the programme in full. Thus the 
Commission's aim of an innovative approach to regional 
development is hindered by national policies which 
effectively prevent local authorities from planning on 
anything but a year-by-year basis. 
On the other hand, the blame for the failure of 
authorities to implement the NPCIs at the speed envisaged 
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does not rest entirely with the tightening of government 
spending limits. Projects do not always go ahead on 
schedule and others envisaged fail to materialise at all. 
However, delay and postponements may be less of a problem 
than anticipated since the Commission is unlikely to 
decommit money and consequently ERDF aid can be provided 
beyond the last year of the programme (interview with 
official of DG XVI at the Commission in Brussels). 
The current research revealed, moreover, that the 
DoE has been ambivalent towards the vision cherished by the 
European Commission of a more extensive programme approach 
to Community regional assistance. The DoE officials 
interviewed recognised the Commission's commitment to this 
multi-annual, co-ordinated form of investment but did not 
share in the Commission's enthusiasm. The policy of the DoE 
has been neither actively to encourage nor to discourage 
local authorities from formulating NPCIs. Instead, the 
submission of NPCI applications has simply been left to the 
initiative of the local authorities themselves. if 
authorities choose to formulate such applications then the 
Department's regional offices and head office in London will 
provide the necessary assistance. However, they are careful 
to stress what they see as the disadvantages of applying for 
this kind of assistance. Firstly, the application process 
for NPCIs has in the early years of its existence been 
significantly more bureaucratic than the procedures for 
applying for individual projects because of the greater 
complexity of programmes. The Department had hoped that the 
Programme approach would become an easier route to ERDF 
assistance and would reduce administrative demands on the 
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DoE. However, it has become apparent that substantially 
increased effort is required to obtain finance in the first 
place. Furthermore, the allocation of this money by means of 
a programme co-ordinating committee chaired by the DoE 
further increases the effort required. In the words of one 
DoE official, the project route to Fund assistance was 
"tried and tested" whereas the new programme approach 
represented "a lot of work for no extra money". (interviews 
with officials of DoE in Bristol and London). 
For the European Commission the programme approach 
will mean a welcome reduction in the heavy workload 
associated with the current project approach of the ERDF 
since it will no longer have to examine large numbers of 
individual submissions. Furthermore, programmes are a more 
efficient means of dispensing Community funds. However, less 
certain is the overall effect of the new approach on 
regional development in the Community's problem regions. 
Government control of local authority spending levels, of 
the delimitation of areas eligible for ERDF aid and of the 
implementation of programmes conspire to reduce the 
effectiveness of the ERDF as an agent of regional policy. 
, 
4.2.4. The aim of encouraging "internally generated 
development". 
The implementation of this objective has been very 
slow to develop. At the time of writing only three Article 
15 measures have been approved in the UK (European 
Information Service, No 86). Two of these grants were part 
of NPCI submissions for Shildon and Northern Ireland. The 
third was for the Strathclyde Business Innovation Centre 
which aims to help businesses put new ideas into practice 
14 : 
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and was accepted in November 1987. The slow beginning for 
these measures in the UK is a result of action taken by the 
UK Treasury which has blocked almost all applications for 
Article 15 measures. The reason for this is related to the 
familiar theme of controlling public expenditure. The 
Treasury was concerned to prevent the ERDF assistance for 
these schemes (which involve on-going revenue expenditure 
rather than one-off capital spending) leading to an increase 
in overall levels of local government spending which would 
be beyond the control of central government. 
Once again this illustrates the grip held by central 
government over the implementation of the ERDF. Despite the 
commitment to these kinds of measures in the Council 
Regulation governing the Fund. However, in December 1987 the 
UK Treasury announced that it would now allow Article 15 
applications to be forwarded to the Commission (European 
Information Service, January 1988). This decision followed 
increasing pressure on the Treasury from local-authority 
organisations, the Department of the Environment and the 
European Commission (interview with official of the DoE). 
This decision may also be related to the problems the UK was 
experiencing in 1987 in generating enough applications to 
meet its minimum quota from the ERDF. 
4.3. THE ROLE OF THE UK GOVERNMENT. 
The administration of ERDF grants in the UK is not 
the responsibility of a single central government 
Department. Instead, a number of branches of government are 
involved. These are illustrated by Figure 4.4 which shows 
the ERDF's "implementation structure" in the UK. Interviews 
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were carried out in the Department of Environment offices in 
Bristol and London and in the Department of Trade and 
Industry office in London. Because the focus of this study 
was on South West England it was not thought necessary to 
carry out interviews in other regional offices or in the 
Welsh, Scottish or Northern Ireland offices. However, some 
information on the activities of these departments has been 
gleaned from secondary sources. 
4.3.1. The role of the DoE regional offices. 
The regional offices of the DoE deal with ERDF 
applications from local authorities and a variety of other 
organisations. Applications from public authorities such as 
the Water and Port authorities, on the other hand, are sent 
to the relevant sections of the DoE in London. The Bristol 
regional office's involvement with ERDF applications, which 
must be assumed to be typical, is in three stages. The 
first is the provision of advice for and consultation with 
potential applicants. The second stage is the initial 
examination of applications. 
a) Advice and consultation. 
The earliest involvement of the DoE regional office 
with applications for ERDF grants is in the provision of 
advice and assistance for organisations which show an 
interest in the ERDF. Regional offices respond to enquiries 
by issuing a package of information and "Notes for 
Guidance". This package includes background information on 
the fund, advice on eligible applications and on how to 
complete the application forms. The regional offices also 
provide advice on the likely eligibility of particular 
projects about which local authorities and other 
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organisations may enquire. 
The regional office does not seek to publicise the 
ERDF to a wider range of possible beneficiaries. The 
significance of this is not clear. Preston (1985,1986), 
writing about the Leeds office of the DoE, suggested that 
the lack of positive encouragement before 1982 for local 
authorities in applying for assistance was understandable 
since "nationwide bids for grant aid outstripped supply by 
about 500%". However, Preston then points out that "by 1983 
the Leeds Regional Office accepted that one of its roles was 
to positively encourage local authorities to apply for 
grant-aid" (Preston, 1985, p27). This new attitude was 
partly due to the first reduction in 1982 of the extent of 
assisted areas in the Yorkshire and Humberside region and in 
the country as a whole. Further cxmendments to the assisted 
area map in 1984 and continuing restrictions on 
local-government spending have meant that demand for ERDF 
assistance is now barely keeping up with supply. Regional 
Offices must now begin to adopt a more missionary attitude 
towards promoting the ERDF if the UK is to maximise its 
receipts. The Bristol regional office regards increasing the 
range of organisations that apply for ERDF aid as a 
priority, since it is likely that local authorities are 
now submitting as many applications as possible. (interview 
with official in Bristol office of DoE). 
b) Initial examination of applications. 
Having helped potential applicants determine the 
eligibility of particular projects, the second task of the 
DoE regional office is to provide an initial examination of 
submitted applications. This process is in three stages. 
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The first is to examine the basic eligibility criteria. The 
second is to assess the compatibility of projects with the 
UK Regional Development Programme and the third is to assess 
the economic justification of the applications. 
The ERDF's basic eligibility criteria are laid down 
in the Council Regulation governing the operation of the 
Fund and in the majority of cases, eligibility is not 
difficult to determine, particularly as failure to meet any 
one criterion disqualifies an application from receiving 
assistance. However, in cases which are marginal the 
regional office will forward the project directly to London 
for a decision to be made. Large projects seeking more than 
, 41 Million from the 
ERDF are automatically forwarded to 
London and the role of the regional office in these cases is 
minimal 
The second stage is to verify that submitted schemes 
correspond to the objectives of the UK's Regional 
Development Programme (RDP). This document sets the 
framework within which ERDF activity is intended to take 
place and is constantly used when projects are being 
examined. The regional office aims to ensure that the 
relationships between particular projects and the aims of 
the RDP are clearly stated in the application (interview 
with official of DoE in Bristol). 
The third element of the assessment of applications 
carried out by the regional office is to ensure that the 
crucial "economic justification" section of the application 
form provides the information required on economic impact, 
job creation and so on, which the European Commission will 
eventually use to judge the projects' "Community interest" 
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and thereby to make decisions on the award of assistance to 
individual applications. 
The autonomy of the regional office has increased 
significantly in recent years. Before about 1984 its role 
was simply as a source of information about the Fund and a 
1, post-box" for applications en-route to the head office of 
the DoE in London. Since then, it effectively makes the 
final decisions on whether to forward small ERDF 
applications to Brussels. 
On average around 80% of submitted schemes require 
changes following the initial scrutiny (interview with 
official of DoE in Bristol). These enquiries are the result 
of the very variable quality of applications. The larger 
local authorities generally submit the applications which 
require least amendment. The smaller organisations, on the 
other hand, which lack the experience which comes from 
submitting large numbers of applications, are less expert at 
putting applications together and hence these schemes 
require more information and more amendment (interview in 
regional office in Bristol). 
4.3.2. The Role of the London Office of the DoE. 
The Department of Environment's main office in 
Marsham Street, London is the co-ordinating department for 
all ERDF applications emanating from the English regions. 
Applications from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are 
handled by the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish offices 
respectively. At the DoE in London responsibility for ERDF 
applications rests with a section in the Department's 
Regional Policy Division (RPD). The participation of 
the DoE's London Office is in three stages: 
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a. arrival of applications; 
b. checking of basic eligibility criteria; 
c. taking the final decision to forward applications 
to Brussels; 
a) Arrival of applications. 
Potential applications arrive at the RPD from three 
sources. Firstly they are forwarded by the regional 
offices. Secondly, they are submitted by other divisions of 
the DoE which handle applications from public utilities. For 
example, the Water Division handles applications from Water 
Authorities and the Ports Division deals initially with 
schemes from Port Authorities. The third source of 
applications is the Department of Transport which has 
received a number of large grants in recent years for major 
Trunk roads. 
b) Checking the basic eligibility criteria. 
The first task of the RPD once the applications have 
arrived from these various sources is to ensure that the 
projects meet the formal eligibility criteria. This task is 
normally a checking of the work already carried out by the 
regional offices and the other sections of the DoE. At this 
stage only a small proportion of applications are referred 
back to the regions. This process results in some 
re-drafting of applications after extra information has been 
extracted from the applicant organisation. 
c) The final decision to forward applications to Brussels. 
The final decision to forward applications to 
Brussels is based on the eligibility criteria alone and the 
Department forwards all projects which it considers meet 
these criteria (interview with official of DoE in London) 
The major role of the DoE is to maximise the country's 
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receipts from the ERDF and therefore it is in the 
department's interests to submit all applications which 
stand a chance of being funded. Nevertheless, complaints 
are occasionally heard from local authorities, albeit in a 
somewhat anecdotal fashion, that the major obstacle to 
winning a grant is the DoE rather than the Commission in 
Brussels. It is however difficult to judge the validity of 
these complaints or to imagine why the DoE would be 
deliberately obstructive given the need to maximise ERDF 
receipts. Indeed, Commission officials in Brussels remark, 
again based on experience and impressions rather than 
statistical evidence, that the quality of applications 
received from the DoE is of a generally higher standard than 
those received from other member states (interview with 
official of DGXVI in Brussels). 
The DoEls task of maximising ERDF receipts is 
becoming increasingly difficult in view of increasing 
constraints on local-government capital spending. The 
Government's interpretation of the principle of 
additionality means that local authorities can only submit 
schemes which they have planned to carry out in any case. 
Consequently, further reductions in capital expenditure have 
resulted in a 10% drop in the number of local authority 
applications between 1985 and 1986 (interview with 
official of DoE). This meant that in 1986 the UK barely 
reached its minimum level of assistance guaranteed by the 
indicative range system for dividing up ERDF assistance. In 
response to this, the DoE relaxed a previous rule that all 
ERDF applications must be fully guaranteed to go ahead 
before they can be forwarded to Brussels. Furthermore, 
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privatisation and the abolition of the Metropolitan County 
Councils, which were major recipients, have also reduced the 
UK's take up of ERDF grant-aid. The need to maintain ERDF 
receipts may also explain why the 1988 Government white 
paper on regional policy reform did not reduce the extent of 
the assisted area map to which ERDF assistance is tied. 
These points illustrate how the implementation of a 
Community policy is inextricably linked to national 
government policies. 
4.3.3. The role of the offices for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. 
The Department of the Environment and the Department 
of Trade and Industry in London have responsibility for ERDF 
applications from English regions only. Schemes submitted 
from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are dealt with by 
the government departments representing these countries 
based in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast respectively. These 
offices forward applications to the DTI en-route to 
Brussels. 
These three offices have two functions. The first is 
to select applications for industrial, craft and service 
sector projects from those schemes which already receive 
national regional aid. In Scotland, the Industrial 
Department for Scotland (part of the Scottish Office) 
performs this task. In Wales it is the responsibility of 
the Industrial Policy and Development Division of the Welsh 
Office and in Northern Ireland the Department of Industry 
for Northern Ireland is responsible. 
The second role of these offices is to administer 
Scottish, Welsh and Irish applications for infrastructure 
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projects. The three offices act as the major source of 
information and advice for potential ERDF applicants. Each 
provides periodic documentary information similar to the 
"Notes for Guidance" produced by the DoE in London. The 
industrial Department for Scotland, for example, is praised 
as being particularly helpful in this way (Keating and 
Waters, 1985; Aitken, 1986a), as is the European Division of 
the Welsh Office (Jones, 1985). Applicants from Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland are potentially favoured in 
relation to regions like South West England, because of 
their more direct contact with central government through 
their respective offices. For example, one purpose of these 
offices is to lobby on behalf of Scottish, Welsh and Irish 
issues. Indeed, the respective Secretaries of State for 
the three countries have seats in the Cabinet. Moreover, 
the three are also occasionally represented on the UK 
delegation to the ERDF Committee. Hence, ERDF applicants 
from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland may have an 
advantage over English counterparts who are in contact only 
with regional offices of the DoE (McGee, 1983; Keating and 
Waters, 1985; Jones, 1985). 
Apart from providing advice on and scrutinising 
applications from local authorities and other organisations, 
the three offices are also involved in submitting their own 
ERDF applications, particularly in Northern Ireland where 
responsibility for infrastructure provision rests with the 
Department for Economic Development rather than local 
authorities and public utilities. Furthermore, the Scottish 
Development Department submits applications for its trunk 
road scheme in the same way as the Department of Transport 
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in England. Again the question of "additionality" can be 
raised in this context. Keating and Waters point out that 
"in the case of grants awarded to the Scottish Office itself 
the money stays in the (UK] Treasury and is deducted from 
the Secretary of State's block allocation" (Keating and 
Waters, 1985, p75). from central government. The Government 
adopts the now familiar position that likely ERDF grants are 
taken into account and allow the Scottish Office and others' 
spending allocations from national government to be higher 
than would otherwise be possible. 
4.3.4. The role of the Department of Trade and Industry. 
The Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) role in 
administering UK applications to the ERDF for 
infrastructure projects is marginal. It acts as a "postbox" 
for applications forwarded by the DoE, Welsh, Scottish and 
Northern Ireland Offices and it has no influence over the 
submission of these applications (House of Lords, 1988). 
However, the DTI is closely involved with a number of other 
aspects of the UK's involvement with the ERDF. These are: 
a. submitting applications for industrial, craft and 
service sector projects; 
b. involvement with programmes, Integrated 
Development Operations and Article 15 measures; 
c. negotiations with the Commission and participation 
on the ERDF Committee. 
a) Industrial, craft and service sector any)lications. 
The DTI's main involvement with ERDF applications is 
with English industrial, craft and sevice sector projects. 
The private companies which are nominally the recipients of 
these grants are not themselves involved in applying for 
ERDF assistance. Instead, the DTI selects those 
applications for national regional aid (Regional Development 
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Grants and Regional Selective Assistance) which are likely 
to conform to the ERDF Regulation and makes the appropriate 
applications to forward to the Commission. As we have seen, 
the DTI argues that the resulting receipts from the ERDF 
enable it to increase its regional aid budget above the 
level that would otherwise be possible. 
In the UK since 1975,22.4% of ERDF receipts have 
been for these industrial projects. However, this proportion 
has fallen to approximately 15.5% in 1985 and 1986. The 
proposed changes to regional aid put forward in the 1988 
White Paper on regional policy may restrict the DTI's 
ability to submit these kinds of applications since they 
will no longer be able to make use of the mandatory Regional 
Development Grants which are to be abolished. The 
discretionary "Selective Assistance" will still be eligible 
for aid, but the total volume of eligible projects may fall 
(interview with official of Department of Trade and 
Industry). This will serve to exacerbate the serious 
difficulties the Government is having in maximising its 
ERDF applications. 
b) Involvement with programmes, Integrated Development 
Operations and Article 15. 
The DTI is also concerned with preparing the UK's 
response to the Community Programmes which were devised by 
the Commission under the new ERDF Regulation and approved by 
the Council of Ministers in 1987 (STAR and VALOREN). 
Furthermore, the Department also participates in the 
development of NPCIs and Integrated Development Operations. 
However, the degree of involvement depends on the 
contribution to these schemes of industrial measures such as 
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aid schemes to industry (Article 15) as opposed to 
infrastructure projects, the responsibility for which rests 
with the DoE. 
The DTI also participates in more strategic, 
long-term issues of Community regional policy. It has the 
major responsibility in conjunction with local authorities, 
the regional office of the DoE and other public 
organisations for- preparing the UK's Regional Development 
Programme which is forwarded to the Commission every four 
years, forming the basis of ERDF investment in the UK 
(Department of Trade and Industry, RDP, 1986-90). 
c) Negotiations with the Commission and participation on 
the ERDF Committee. 
Although the DTI is peripheral to the process of 
preparing applications for infrastructure projects and 
programmes, it nevertheless acts as the lead Department for 
the whole of the UK in negotiations with the Commission. 
These discussions concern both the long-term development of 
EC regional policy and the eligibility of large applications 
such as NPCIs and Integrated Operations. In these cases, 
officials of the Department actually responsible for 
submitting the applications (e. g. DoE, Northern Ireland or 
Scottish Office) will also be represented. These 
negotiations take place either in direct meetings between 
national civil servants and Commission officials, or in the 
more formal setting of the ERDF Committee. The negotiation 
process enables UK representatives to argue the case for 
particular schemes. Inevitably, compromise decisions are 
reached which mean that programmes reflect both ideas 
suggested by the Commission and the views of the national 
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departments. In this way, national representatives are 
closely involved in the allocation of Community grants. 
The decision-making process is not a strict hierarchy from 
national applicants to Community decision-makers. On the 
contrary, in many respects the allocation of grants (to 
large schemes in particular) is a process based on 
co-operation and consensus between Commission and national 
representatives. 
4.4. CONCLUSIONS: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND 
INFLUENCE. 
This chapter has continued the theme of how policy 
makers (in this case the UK central government) can 
structure and control the implementation process. We have 
seen that, as far as the ERDF is concerned, the government 
in the UK has a pivotal role in the process of putting 
policy into effect. By its involvement in the submission of 
applications and in the payment of assistance the government 
is able to use the ERDF to subsidise expenditure already 
being carried out at national level. Of course, the 
government argues that ERDF assistance is indeed adding to 
Public expenditure in problem regions. Unfortunately, we 
must take their word for it since no empirical evidence 
exists to resolve the matter either way. Nevertheless, we 
can be more certain that the government view of the ERDF is 
that it is a means of winning back a share of what it 
perceives to be an excessive contribution to the overall 
Community budget. It appears that the UK government's major 
objective as far as the ERDF is concerned has little to do 
with the aims of regional policy and those cherished by 
the European Commission. 
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Apart from control over the financial aspects of ERDF 
aid, central-government authority over the process of policy 
implementation is also evident in other ways. Firstly, 
before the 1984 reforms there was some evidence that the 
Department of Trade and Industry was able to control very 
closely the geographical patern of ERDF spending in the UK, 
albeit empirical evidence was not conclusive. Nevertheless, 
the existing quota system clearly provided a mechanism by 
which it could have controlled the allocation of assistance 
in this way. Furthermore, continuing close participation in 
the ERDF's decision-making processes has allowed the 
Government to block the submission of Article 15 
applications and thus hinder the implementation of a 
Community objective. In addition, national civil servants 
are closely involved in negotiations with the Commission 
about the eligibilty of schemes submitted by the UK, 
enabling compromise deals to be struck which take account of 
both national interests as defined by government and the 
aims pursued by the Commission. 
Until this point the thesis has concentrated on the 
"top-down" aspects of the policy-implementation process. It 
has focused on how policy makers (the European Commission 
and the UK government) can influence the implementation 
process in order to further what they perceive as the aims 
Of the Fund. These perceptions, it should be emphasised, are 
often very different. The following Chapter provides a more 
"bottom-up" perspective on the operation of the ERDF by 
focusing on the viewpoint of the applicants for and 
recipients of Fund assistance in South West England. Despite 
the control exerted by central government and the 
IAn 
Commission, local initiative may also play an important role 
in putting policy into practice. After all, no ERDF grants 
can be allocated unless they are first applied for. Thus it 
is necessary to examine closely the factors which lead 
organisations in problem regions to apply for the available 
assistance. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ERDF IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM: A CASE-STUDY OF LOCAL INITIATIVE IN SOUTH WEST 
ENGLAND. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION.. 
This Chapter provides a case-study of the 
involvement with the ERDF of organisations in South West 
England and is based on a series of interviews carried out 
with representatives of organisations which have received 
Regional Fund assistance and on data on the allocation of 
ERDF grants provided by the Department of the 
Environment. The analysis concerns only ERDF grants for 
infrastructure projects because it is only in these cases 
that applications are initiated by the beneficiaries 
themselves. As was shown earlier, applications for 
industrial, craft and service sector projects are formulated 
by the Department of Trade and Industry from applications 
for national regional aid. In the South West, receipts 
for infrastructure projects account for 94% of the total 
assistance earmarked for the region since 1975. 
The discussion is divided into three sections. The 
first outlines the nature and geography of ERDF assistance 
in the South West and assesses whether the Funds' 
operational objectives are achieved in the region. The 
second examines the recipients of grant-aid. The final 
section analyses the factors which explain varying 
organisational involvement with the ERDF. 
At this juncture it is appropriate to provide some 
background on the economic geography of the South West in 
order to place the discussion in its overall context. The 
South West is one of eleven standard UK regions. It 
IS2 
comprises the counties of Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Avon, 
Somerset, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall (Figure 5.1). The 
latter two are sometimes referred to as the "far South 
West". 
The region as a whole can be regarded as relatively 
prosperous. Table 5.1 places the South West in its national 
context and it is apparent that unemployment is relatively 
low and that mean household income is similar to the UK 
average. In terms of per capita GDP, the region ranks sixth 
out of eleven UK regions. However, as far as unemployment 
is concerned the South West region in 1986 had the third 
lowest rate in the country. According to the data on 
household income the South West again compares favourably, 
ranking second out of all UK regions. 
TABLE 5.1. THE SOUTH WEST ECONOMY IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT. 
GDP per Unemployment Average weekly (, ý, ) 
Region head(1985) October1986 % household income 83/84 
South East 114.8 9.5 230.7 
East Anglia 100.8 10.1 181.0 
Scotland 97.3 15.6 176.0 
North West 96.0 15.5 177.7 
East Midlands 95.7 12.2 188.3 
South West 93.8 11.6 191.0 
North 92.9 18.0 163.8 
West Midlands 92.3 15.0 180.1 
Yorks & Humb. 91.8 15.1 167.9 
Wales 88.8 16.1 164.8 
N. Ireland 74.8 22.4 153.0 
United Kingdom 100.0 13.1 191.9 
Source: Regional Trends, 1987; Employment Gazette, Dec. 
1986. 
The relative prosperity of the South West region as a 
whole hides the fact that there are very substantial 
intraregional variations in economic welfare. Most 
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indicators point to a relatively prosperous northern and 
eastern part of the region and a much more depressed "far 
South West". Table 5.2 provides a number of measures of the 
disparities between the counties which make up the South 
West region. It is immediately apparent that Cornwall and 
Devon suffer in comparison with the rest of region. The "far 
South West", (Cornwall in particular), has lower average 
earnings, much higher unemployment, lower GDP per capita 
and, according to Gripaios (1987), lower rates of new firm 
formation than the counties in the eastern part of the 
region. 
These indicators suggest that there is a dual economy 
in the Region. In the relatively prosperous "near South 
West", comprising Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Dorset 
and Somerset, economic development is fuelled by high-grade 
defence expenditure, the growth of services and hi-tech 
industries centred on Bristol and the so-called "M4 
corridor" in Wiltshire. This area is related economically to 
the prosperous South East and to South Wales and the 
Midlands. On the other hand, the "far South West", 
comprising Devon and Cornwall, has lower wage levels, 
relatively high unemployment and inadequate economic 
infrastructure (DTI, Regional Devlopment Programme, 
1986-90). This area is peripheral to the national and 
European economy and has never developed a strong industrial 
base. it is dependent on small firms, tourism, 
agriculture and public services. Moreover, Cornwall suffers 
from particularly severe economic problems because of 
remoteness, poor infrastructure and the decline of 
industries such as tin mining. 
116 ý.! 
TABLE 5.2. SUB-REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
WELFARE IN SOUTH WEST ENGLAND. 
Average gross 
weekly earnings Unemployment GDP per 
County (full time male) January 1987 % capita 1981. 
Avon 107.5 10.8 109.9 
Gloucestershire 102.3 9.1 108.3 
Wiltshire 101.5 9.9 104.8 
Dorset 100.7 11.4 95.6 
Somerset 96.0 10.8 98.9 
Cornwall 87.7 20.0 81.9 
Devon 93.5 13.9 94.7 
South West 100.0 12.0 100.0 
Sources: Regional Trends, 1987; Department of Trade and 
Industry, UK Regional Devlopment Programme 1986-90. 
The economic disparities affecting this part of the 
South West region are recognised by the UK Government on the 
map of assisted areas designated for the purposes of 
national and Community regional aid by the Department of 
Trade and Industry. (Figure 5.2). Nonetheless, in common 
with other parts of the country the South West has witnessed 
a reduction in assisted areas since 1979. 
In Cornwall, unemployment reached 20% in October 
1986, averaging 21.6% in the Development Areas and 15.2% in 
the Intermediate Areas (see Figure 5.2). The county is 
relatively sparsely populated and heavily dependent on 
Plymouth in West Devon, the major city in the "far South 
West". However, in Plymouth itself it is estimated that the 
privatisation of the Royal Naval Dockyard, the City's major 
employer, will eventually lead to the loss of 2000 jobs. 
This will have far-reaching effects on the Plymouth 
sub-region and on the assisted areas of east Cornwall (DTI, 
RDP 1986-90). 
The South West section of the UK's Regional 
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Development Programme for the period from 1986 to 1990 which 
was submitted to the Commission as the basis for ERDF 
support in the region, identified lack of infrastructure as 
a major economic problem. In particular, the assisted areas 
lack sufficient serviced industrial land with which to 
attract new firms into the area. Moreover, the assisted 
areas are deficient in terms of a road network suitable for 
increased economic growth and adequate water services for 
industrial development. 
5.2. THE NATURE AND GEOGRAPHY OF ERDF SPENDING IN SOUTH 
WEST ENGLAND. 
Over the 1975 to 1987 period the ERDF channelled 
grants for infrastructure projects into South West England 
totalling J, 107.4 Million. Table 5.3 shows the historical 
development of South West England's involvement with the 
ERDF. The Table and Figure illustrate that the region's 
activity has increased substantially in both actual terms 
and as a proportion of the UK total. Between 1975 and 1980 
the South West's share of total ERDF receipts averaged 1.9% 
compared with 4.8% between 1981 and 1987. 
The distribution of ERDF assistance is shown by 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 which illustrate for each district the 
total and per capita allocations respectively. The data 
refer to overall ERDF expenditure in each area and not just 
to that received by the local authorities themselves. The 
largest proportion of ERDF assistance for infrastructure has 
been directed to Plymouth (Figure 5.3). Indeed, the city 
has received almost 45% of the region's total. This is not 
surprising given Plymouth's role as the major centre of 
population and economic activity in the assisted part 
is 9 
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of the region which enables it to generate, from a variety 
of organisa tions, a la rge number of grant applications. 
However, abo ut a quarter of the City' s receipts have been 
allocated to the A38 Park way from Mars h Mills to the Tamar 
Bridge (50% funded by the Department of Transport) which 
is intended to allo w easier a ccess into Cornwall, 
particularly during the tourist se ason, and hence is of 
benefit to a far larger a rea than just Plymouth itself. 
TABLE 5.3. THE DEVELOPMEN T OF ERDF INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH 
WEST ENGLAND , 1975-1987. 
(excluding industrial, craft and Ser vice sector projects) 
Number of Value of (40 00s) % of UK 
Year Grants (1) Commitments total 
1975 6 88.8 1.7 
1976 6 232.5 1.4 
1977 2 72.2 0.8 
1978 12 4459.9 1.3 
1979 10 5009.5 5.2 
1980 13 5126.6 1.2 
1981 9 1410.0 3.4 
1982 32 6287.4 3.0 
1983 24 11 002.6 4.5 
1984 59 30 586.8 8.1 
1985 33 12 821.8 2.7 
1986 19 18 203.4 6.8 
1987 12 12 114.5 5.8 
Totals 237 107 416.0 5.3 
Source: Data provided by the Department of the Environment. 
The second largest proportion of grant aid has been 
directed to Caradon District which has received . 61,14.9 
million. However, the bulk of this money was allocated to 
two particularly large schemes which distort the figures 
somewhat. The Department of Transport was awarded 47.8 
Million for the Saltash by-pass and the South West Water 
Authority (SWWA) has received a total of A4.81 Million for 
Colliford Resevoir, near Liskeard. In both these cases the 
17 1 
projects clearly serve more than just the districts in which 
they are located. The third largest recipient district is 
Penwith on the western tip of Cornwall which has been 
allocated approximately J-7 million. 
Both Torbay and the Isles of Scilly have received 
shares of assistance comparable to that of Penwith. In 
these cases large individual projects again distort the 
figures. The South Western Electricity Board was allocated 
a grant of f-4.46 million for a new electricity cable link to 
the Isles of Scilly from the mainland. In Torbay, the local 
Borough Council obtainedk3.16 million for the "Rose Tor" 
Conference Centre 
The remainder of the ERDF aid to the region has been 
spread relatively evenly among all the assisted districts. 
Penwith, Kerrier, Carrick, North Cornwall, North Devon, 
Torridge, South Hams and Torbay have all received 
between. (2 million and J-4 million. Furthermore, about 15.8 
million has been allocated to projects sponsored by 
organisations such as British Gas, British Telecom and 
Cornwall County Council which cover more than one district. 
On a per capita basis (Figure 5.4) the picture is not 
greatly different. According to this measure the most 
successful district is the Isles of Scilly for which the 
figures are skewed by the islands' very small population. 
Otherwise, the largest beneficiary is Caradon, followed by 
flymouth and, some way behind, Penwith. Of the other areas, 
Carrick, Restormel, Kerrier, North Cornwall, Torridge, North 
Devon, Torbay and South Hams have all received similar per 
capita shares. 
The ERDF's objective of concentrating spending in the 
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neediest areas can also be examined at this intra-regional 
level. One common measure of "need" is unemployment and, on 
this basis, it seems that at the sub-regional level ERDF 
spending is not being concentrated on the areas which are 
most in need. The areas with the highest unemployment in the 
South West are those designated as Development Areas (and 
Special Development Areas prior to the 1984 changes to the 
assisted area map - Figure 5.2). Moreover, these areas are 
also given priority by the ERDF Regulation. However, 
between 1985 and 1987,22% of the region's ERDF grants were 
allocated to the Development Areas and 78% to the 
Intermediate Areas. In comparison, in 1986 more than 34% of 
the region's unemployed were located in Development areas 
and 66% in the Intermediate Areas (Employment Gazette, 
December 1986). On the other hand, Penwith, which has a 
comparatively high unemployment rate, (more than 21% in the 
Penzance and St. Ives Travel to Work Area in 1986), has 
received more assistance than all other districts in the 
region except Plymouth and Cornwall. 
Notwithstanding the example of Penwith, the areas 
with the highest unemployment rates are receiving less 
assistance in both actual and per capita terms than areas 
such as Plymouth and East Cornwall where unemployment is 
less severe. One reason for this is that the implementation 
of the Fund and hence the achi evement of its objectives is 
to a large extent dependent on the initiative of the areas 
themselves. If applications are not submitted for projects 
located in the development areas then no assistance can be 
directed there. However, this kind of micro-scale analysis 
is not necessarily very meaningful. For example, Caradon has 
17 4 
received a relatively large per capita allocation from the 
Fund, but this is due to the distorting effect of 
particularly large projects which often serve more than 
just the particular district in which they are located. For 
this reason, it is appropriate to consider in the next 
section variations in the response of individual 
organisations to the ERDF opportunity. 
5.3. THE RECIPIENTS OF ERDF ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH WEST 
ENGLAND. 
Table 5.4 shows the ERDF recipients in the South West 
and divides them up into the following four basic 
categories: 
1. Public Utilities - X41.7 million (38.8%); 
2. Local Authorities -,, f, 37.8 million (35.2%); 
3. Department of Transport - X24.7 million (23.0%); 
4. Other recipients - (3.4 million (3.0%); 
5.3.1. The Public Utilities. 
The largest proportion of ERDF aid in the region has 
gone to the major public utilities. Table 5.5 and 
Figure 5.5 show the developing involvement of public 
utilities with the Fund. In the six year period from 1975 
to 1980 only 11 arants were allocated to these 
organisations. In comparison, from 1981 to 1987 the same 
authorities received 49 grants totalling --31.41 million. 
This reflects both the increasing size of the Fund and a 
crrowing awareness on the part of the public utilities of its 
usefulness for assisting the capital investment schemes they 
are carrying out. 
The South West Water Authority (SWWA) alone has 
received over J-26 million and is the largest single ERDF 
recipient in the region. Water supplies are a vital aspect 
of infrastructure provision in a region which is 
17 5 
TABLE 5.4: ERDF RECIPIENTS IN SOUTH WEST ENGLAND, 
1975-1987. 
Value of grants 
Organisation no. of grants Million) % 
Public Utilities 62 41.68 38.8 
South West Water Authority 35 26.45 
South Western Electricity 10 6.75 
Board 
British Telecom (pre- 8 6.53 
privatisation) 
British Gas (pre- 7 1.52 
privatisation) 
Severn Trent Water 1 0.29 
Authority 
British Railways Board 1 0.14 
Local Authorities 156 37.78 35.2 
Cornwall County Council 39 11.08 
Devon County Council 39 10.75 
Plymouth City Council 14 7.72 
Torbay Borough Council 3 3.31 
South Hams District Council 9 2.15 
Penwith District Council 8 0.48 
Carrick District Council 7 0.48 
Torridge District Council 6 0.38 
Gloucestershire County 4 0.34 
Council 
Forest of Dean District 3 0.22 
Teignbridge District 3 0.20 
Council 
Restormel District Council 2 0.19 
Kerrier District Council 8 0.17 
North Cornwall District 5 0.17 
Council 
Council of Isles of Scilly 3 0.09 
Caradon District Council 1 0.02 
North Devon District Counci l1 0.02 
West Somerset District 1 0.01 
Council 
Department of Transport 6 24.67 23.0 
Other recipients 12 3.27 3.0 
Associated British Ports 3 2.60 
Falmouth Docks and Eng. Co. 5 0.37 
Landmark Trust 1 0.18 
Falmouth Harbour 1 0.07 
Commissioners 
National Trust 1 0.04 
British Transport Docks 1 0.01 
Board 
Totals 236 107.40 100.0 
Source: Data provided by the Department of the Environment 
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characterised by a deficit of infrastructure for industrial 
development. SWWA has a comparatively large capital 
programme to improve water supplies and therefore has a 
relatively large variety of potentially eligible projects 
for which it can seek ERDF grants. For example, Colliford 
Res--tvoir, near Liskeard, received a total of -S-4.81 million 
in 1978/79. Furthermore, improvements to the Plymouth water 
supply between 1979 and 1986 attracted k7.94 million. 
Indeed, the Fund now accounts for about 10% of SWWA's annual 
capital Programme (interview with SWWA Finance Officer). 
The second largest public utility recipient has been 
the South Western Electricity Board (SWEB) which has 
received a total of J6.75 million. This sum includes a 
single grant of J, 6.5 million for an electricity link to the 
Isles of Scilly. 
British Telecom, prior to privatisation in 1985, was 
the next largest public-authority recipient. It received 8 
grants totalling : (6.5 Million for major improvements to the 
telecommunications network in Cornwall and West Devon. 
British Gas has also obtained assistance for a variety of 
projects concerned with improving gas supplies in the 
assisted areas. 
The major issue affecting the continuation of funding 
from the ERDF for the Public Utilities in the South West is 
privatisation. Before British Telecom and British Gas were 
privatised, these organisations received a total of J8.1 
million in the South West region. However, in the 
intervening period they have not received any grants from 
the ERDF anywhere in the country. The European Commission's 
position is that applications from privatised utilities will 
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TABLE 5.5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE 
EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDj 1976-19137 
Public Utility (1) 
SWWA BT SWEB BG STWA BR 
Year no. ZOOO no. 000 no. ZOOO no. ZOOO no. ZOOO no. LOOO 
1976 1 165.0 
1977 - -- 
1978 2 892.5 - 
1979 3 4542.1 - 
1980 2 1059.2 2 1206.0 1 796.5 - 
1981 3 952.5 - - 1 84.6 - 
1982 3 1802.1 2 395.4 3 380.4 - 
1983 9 4858.6 2 2985.9 - -1 137.1 
1984 6 4962.9 2 1943.4 4 368.9 1 88.5 
1985 3 595.5 - - 3 1784. o - - 
1986 4 6706.0 - - 1 19.0 - 1 285.5 
1987 - -- - 2 4579.0 - -- 
Total 
Note. 1) Key to public utilities 
SWWA - South West Water Authority 
BT - British Telecom 
SWEB - South Western Electricity Board 
BG - British Gas 
STWA - Severn Trent Water Authority 
BR - British Rail 
Source: Data provided by the Department of Environment. 
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be accepted only if a number of conditions are met 
(interview with official of DoE in London); namely that: 
1. There is a remaining statutory control of the 
privatised company; 
2. The projects must be in line with the statutory 
responsibilities of the company; 
3. The infrastructure must remain in public use; 
4. The ERDF money must really be needed to ensure 
that the project goes ahead. 
The last point is possibly the most problematic. How 
will large private companies such as British Telecom or 
British Gas prove that ERDF assistance is vital? In order 
for a privatised company to receive a grant it must convince 
the Commission that the project is additional to what could 
be undertaken in any case. In other words, there must be 
It additionality" at the local, individual project level, 
since there is no national government funding for which 
11 additionality" can be secured at the "global" level (House 
of Lords, 1988). 
The Water Authorities are now also on the 
privatisation agenda and this may have serious repurcussions 
for the flow of ERDF funds into the South West. However, 
there are precedents for private companies to receive ERDF 
grants for infrastructure projects. A number of port 
authorities which have also recently been privatised, such 
as Mersey Docks and Harbour Company and Larne Harbour Ltd 
have both received assistance on the basis of having a 
statutory requirement for the particular port-related 
infrastructure for which assistance was awarded. 
Nevertheless, the likely effect of the sale of the 
remaining public utilities on infrastructure provision 
ERDF receipts in the region cannot be judged since it is 
intimately related to the whole privatisation debate. 
18 .3 
Furthermore, it illustrates again how difficult it is to 
divorce the ERDF from wider national issues and policies. 
5.3.2. Local Authorities.. 
The local-authority share of the region's receipts 
from the ERDF accounts for about a third of the total and, 
despite the additionality problem, the Fund is a very 
important source of finance. Although local authorities, are 
unable to increase their capital programme by the amount of 
ERDF assistance received, the savings made on interest 
payments are deemed sufficient to make the task of applying 
for ERDF grants worthwhile (various interview sources). 
One measure of the importance of the ERDF grants to 
local authorities is the proportion of an authority's annual 
capital spending programme accounted for by ERDF receipts. 
It is, however, very difficult to arrive at any kind of 
meaningful measure for two reasons. In the first place, at 
least half of an authority's capital programme is generally 
spent on housing which is not eligible for ERDF assistance. 
Furthermore, other types of infrastructure such as shoppers' 
car parks, plant and vehicles and administrative buildings 
are ineligible. Furthermore, no project costing less than 
about J30,000 can be considered for the ERDF. Finally, 
direct comparisons between local authority capital spending 
and ERDF receipts are not possible because the UK financial 
year lasts from April to April, whereas the EC operates on 
the basis of calendar years. 
Despite these caveats, it is possible to give a 
general idea of the relative value of ERDF awards. For 
example, Penwith District Council's capital Programme for 
the financial year 1986/1987 totalled approximately. ý3-3 
16 1 
million. In 1985, the ERDF committed 40.13 million to 
Penwith. As another example, the Forest of Dean District 
Council's 1986/87 capital budget totalled 13.73 million 
compared wth ERDF commitments in 1985 and 1986 combined of 
JO. 22 million. Calculations such as these, together with 
information obtained in interviews, suggest that ERDF 
commitments commonly account for between 5% and 10% of an 
authority's capital spending programme. 
However, Government interpretation of the 
additionality principle means that the actual financial 
benefits of ERDF grants are not as large as these 
calculation imply. Moreover, as Chapter Four demonstrated, 
the savings which do accrue are felt on the revenue side of 
local government spending and thus serve to reduce the 
burden felt by rate-payers. 
The local authorities in the South West cannot 
compare with many in the industrial areas of Northern 
England, Scotland and South Wales, which spend significantly 
more money on capital projects and are therefore able to 
attract substantially more ERDF assistance in absolute 
terms. The local authorities in the assisted areas of the 
South West are mainly rural in nature and are traditionally 
low spenders (interview sources). Nevertheless, the two 
eligible county authorities, Devon and Cornwall, together 
with Plymouth City Council, have all made significant use of 
the Fund. In addition, all eligible district councils have 
been active, to greater or lesser extents, in applying for 
ERDF grants. In fact, as the previous Chapter 
demonstrated, on a per capita basis the South West begion 
has been relatively successful. Involvement with the ERDF, 
18 It. 
however, is not spread equally among all comparable, 
eligible local authorities in the region. Table 5.4 reveals 
substantial variations in the levels of assistance 
allocated to local councils in the South West. Among the 
most active districts councils have been South Hams (9 
grants), Penwith (8) and Carrick (7). At the other end of 
the scale is Caradon District Council which has received 
only one ERDF grant. Table 5.6 and Figure 5.6 shows the 
development of local-authority involvement with the Fund 
since 1975. This involvement peaked in 1984 when 
authorities in the region received a total of forty-one 
grants. Since then the reductions in the assisted areas in 
particular have constrained the potential of South West 
local authorities to attract ERDF grants. 
As far as the sectoral distribution of ERDF aid to 
local authorities is concerned, three types of project, 
namely roads, industrial estates and tourism projects, 
account for about 87% of commitments (Table 5.7 and Figure 
5-7), -. The first two groups are the "bread and butter" ERDF 
applications. The County authorities, which have primary 
responsibility for the road network (except trunk roads) are 
able each year to identify the aspects of their road 
programme which will be eligible for the ERDF. The provision 
of industrial units and estates is generally the 
responsibility of district councils. 
Local authorities in the South West have recently 
become more aware of the potential of the ERDF for aiding 
tourism infrastructure projects (interview with officer in 
Chief Executive's Department, Plymouth City Council). This 
is in common with a similar growing awareness on the part of 
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TABLE 5.7. LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF ERDF 
ASSISTANCE. 
Type of project (, 4000's) 
roads industrial harbour others 
Loc. Auth. (1) tourism units/estat. /ports (2) total % 
Cornwall 9208.7 83.4 111.5 1614.6 11078.2 29.3 
C. C. 
Devon C. C. 8802.8 15.9 929.2 1004.4 10752.3 28.4 
Ply-mouth 3785.4 3217.2 720.2 7722.8 20.4 
City 
Gloucest. 338.0 --- 338.0 0.9 
C. C. (3) 
Torbay B. C. - 3156.6 154.8 -- 3311.4 8.8 
Devon - 961.0 521.0 983.4 275.4 2740.8 7.2 
districts 
Cornwall 44.0 669.5 670.2 203.7 48.3 1635.7 4.3 
districts 
other(4) -- 204.0 - 24.0 228.0 0.6 
districts 
Totals 18393.5 8588.4 5779.8 1298.6 3686.9 37747.2 100 
% 48.7 22.8 15.3 3.4 9.8 100.0 
Notes. 
1) Access roads for industrial estates are not included in this 
category. They come under the industrial estate heading. 
2) e. g. Waste Disposal plant for Plymouth City council; 
Telecommunications for Cornwall County Council, education 
buildings and other transport. 
3. Gloucestersire C. C. became eligible from 1985 onwards when the 
Cinderford/Ross-on-Wye TTWA was designated as an Intermediate 
assisted area. 
4. West Somerset and the Forest of Dean District Councils. 
Source: Data provided by the Department of the Environment. 
1a 
authorities in other parts of the UK (Williams, 1986; 
Pearce, 1988). In the South West, this reflects the 
importance of the tourism sector in the region's economy. 
Both Devon and Cornwall are attempting to develop and 
encourage this sector in order to generate extra income and 
employment (interviews in Devon County Council, Plymouth 
City Council and Cornwall County Council). 
In Plymouth in particular a number of major 
tourism-related projects have received substantial ERDF 
grants. The Council sees tourism as an integral part of its 
efforts to diversify the City's economy and to create 
employment in the wake of the privatisation of the dockyard 
and the resulting large-scale job losses (interview in 
Treasury of Plymouth City Council). Among the major 
schemes which have been assisted are: the Theatre Royal 
which received an ERDF grant of J-1.91 million; Central 
Park Leisure Centre which obtained JO. 52 Million; and the 
Queen Anne Battery sea sport complex which received X1.34 
Million. In other districts tourism schemes have attracted 
similar sums. South Hams District Council received 40.93 
Million for the South Dartmoor Leisure Centre in Ivybridge 
and Torbay Borough Council was allocated two grants 
totalling (3.16 Million for the Rose Tor Conference Centre. 
A major stumbling block for applications to the ERDF 
for these kinds of projects can be the necessity to prove 
the scheme is for external visitor use rather than a leisure 
facility for local people. The European Commission has 
judged that at least 50% of the usage of particular 
facilities must be by overnight visitors from outside the 
assisted area. In this respect, Plymouth City Council 
18 8 
appears fortunate to have obtained an ERDF grant of-i515 
thousand in 1984 for an extension to Central Park swimming 
pool. The application submitted for this scheme needed very 
careful wording to convince the Commission that the "Leisure 
Pool" (as it was called) was for tourist use as much as a 
facility for the local population (interview with officer in 
Chief Executive's Department of Plymouth City Council). 
5.3.3. The Department of Transport. 
The Department of Transport has been allocated 23% of 
the South West's ERDF receipts for a number of expensive 
trunk road schemes. It is in cases such as these that the 
to additionality" issue is at its most contentious. Schemes 
such as the A38 Plymouth by-pass from Marsh Mills to the 
Tamar Bridge (. (9.57 million ERDF contribution) and the 
Saltash by-pass (J7.8 million from ERDF) were guaranteed to 
go ahead with or without assistance from Europe (interview 
with official of DoE in London). Thus ERDF money goes 
straight into the public purse as a rebate for expenditure 
that would have taken place in any case. Although the Fund 
may be saving taxpayers' money and clawing back a valuable 
proportion of the UK's share of the overall Community 
budget, it is difficult to sustain the argument that the 
ERDF contribution is making an important "additional" 
contribution to regional development. 
5.3-4. Other orianisations. 
There are six other organisations in the South West 
which have received grants from the ERDF. Four of these 
recipients are port authorities based at Millbay Docks in 
Plymouth or Falmouth Docks in Cornwall. Organisations of 
this kind are common recipients of Fund assistance. Examples 
Ia9 
of similar recipients from other parts of the country 
include the Port of Sunderland Authority, Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Company and Larne Harbour Ltd in Northern Ireland. 
The remaining two organisations which have been 
succesSful in obtaining assistance are particularly 
interesting because they are very different from all other 
ERDF beneficiaries. Grants have been awarded to two 
registered charities; namely, the National Trust for a 
wind-powered electricity generator on Lundy Island, and the 
Landmark Trust for a ferry linking the Island with Bideford 
on the mainland. At present, however, there is clearly a 
lack of adequate information being circulated to such 
organisations concerning the possible availability of grants 
from the EPDF. For example, could developments at tourist 
sites run by private trusts such as abbeys or ancient 
monuments qualify. It seems likely, and this point was 
confirmed by an interviewee at the Bristol office of the 
DOE, that other private and voluntary organisations could 
benefit from the ERDF in the same way, particularly for 
projects concerned with tourism. 
5.4. FACTORS EXPLAINING INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ERDF. 
_ 
Using the material derived from the series of 
ineterviews carried out during this research, it was 
possible to identify why some organisations within the 
region have been more strongly involved with the ERDF than 
others (also Croxford, 1987). It is helpful to divide these 
factors into the following two groups: 
1. those factors which determine the extent of the 
ERDF opportunity presented to each organisation; 
I ý; 0 
2. those factors which determine whether individual 
organisations take up this opportunity. 
5.4.1. The extent of the ERDF opportunity. 
These factors set limits on the volumes of ERDF 
assistance which organisations are able to obtain. As such 
they are outside the control of the authorities themselves. 
a) Assisted area status. 
The major constraint on the location of ERDF spending 
is the map of nationally designated assisted areas in the 
region. Figure 5.2 showe4 the location of assisted areas over 
the 1975 to 1986 period. The 1984 reform of government 
regional policy resulted in the loss of assisted area status 
for Teignbridge and Torbay Districts. Furthermore, other 
districts lost assisted areas, notably Carrick, South Hams, 
Restormel, North Cornwall and Torridge. On the other hand, 
the Cinderford and Ross on Wye Travel to Work Area, part of 
which is in Gloucestershire, was upgraded to Intermediate 
Area status for the first time because of a worsening of 
local unemployment. The precise status of assisted areas 
(Development Areas or Intermediate Areas) appears to have 
made little difference to the potential for attracting ERDF 
grants. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that either 
the UK government or the European Commission has given 
particular priority to projects located in Development 
Areas, despite the fact that the ERDF Regulation gives 
priority to these areas. Preston (1986) came to similar 
conclusions in her study of the ERDF in Humberside. One 
reason for this is that the national government now submits 
as many applications as possible in order to maximise UK 
receipts. To hold back applications from non-priority areas 
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would be inconsistent with such a policy. 
Unemployment in some of the areas which have lost 
assisted area status remains high. Torbay, for example, had 
an unemployment rate in October 1986 of 16.6%. In 
comparison, Plymouth, which retained Intermediate area 
status, had a rate of 15.0%. Clearly, subsequent 
privatisation of the Royal Naval Dockyards and resulting job 
losses from Plymouth's major employer, as well as Plymouth's 
status as the major city of the region had much to do with 
the Government decision to keep the city's assisted status 
(interview in Chief Executive's Department of Plymouth City 
Council). Again this illustrates how Community and 
national policies are closely inter-related. 
b) Government imposed capital spending limits and 
to additionality". 
A second factor that affects the extent of the ERDF 
opportunity faced by particular organisations is the 
impact of capital spending limits imposed by central 
government and its interpretation of the additionality 
principle. Each financial year local authorities are set 
limits by central government on the amounts they are 
allowed to spend on capital projects and the maximum amounts 
they may borrow to finance their capital programmes. 
The inability of local authorities to use ERDF money 
as a way of increasing planned expenditure means that the 
number and size of ERDF applications from individual 
authorities is limited by the scale of capital expenditure 
that would take place in any case. Table 5.8 illustrates the 
volumes of capital spending carried out by local authorities 
in the assisted parts of South West England in the 1985/86 
19 2 
financial year. It also provides indicators, estimated 
from the 1986/87 local-authority capital budgets, of the 
proportion of expenditure which may be eligible for ERDF 
assistance. It is very difficult to estimate eligible 
expenditure in this way without knowing the details of 
particular projects. However, the figures exclude capital 
schemes which are obviously ineligible such as expenditure 
on housing and education. In the many cases where there was 
doubt about likely eligibility then the expenditure was 
included in the calculations. As a result, the estimates are 
certainly exaggerated. Nevertheless, they provide 
approximate measures of the relative ability of particular 
local authorities to generate ERDF applications. The degree 
of eligible expenditure depends on the kinds of projects 
upon which a local authority decides to spend its available 
capital. For example, authorities may be committed to 
spending their capital allocations on programmes such as 
council housing, which is not eligible for ERDF assistance. 
In 1985/86, for example, the proportions of capital 
expenditure directed towards housing ranged from 91% in West 
Devon and 86% in Caradon to 45% in Kerrier (Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, 1987). Clearly, 
with relatively high levels of expenditure on housing, there 
is very little finance available to fund eligible projects. 
Table 5.8 shows that the local authorities which have 
received most ERDF assistance, such as Plymouth, South Hams 
and Kerrier, are those which are spending the largest 
volumes on eligible infrastructure in assisted areas. 
Moreover, authorities such as Restormel, West Devon and 
Caradon have very low volumes of eligible capital spending 
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and hence are unable to generate ERDF applications. The 
rankings of local authorities in this Table according to 
volumes of eligible expenditure undertaken broadly match the 
relative shares of ERDF assistance received (Table 5.4). 
A number of interview respondents did point to the 
influence of the ERDF on the nature rather than the volume 
of capital expenditure undertaken by local authorities. 
Interviewees from Cornwall County Council, Devon County 
Council, Penwith and South Hams District Councils all 
suggested that the likely availability of ERDF assistance 
for a particular project may serve to give that scheme 
priority in the local authority's planning process over 
projects which are not eligible for aid of this kind. An 
interviewee at Devon County Council suggested a hypothetical 
example in which an industrial estate in the assisted part 
of South Devon is given priority over a by-pass in 
non-assisted North Devon on the grounds that it is likely to 
receive ERDF aid. In a case such as this what are the 
criteria for assessing the impact of the ERDF? Should the 
ERDF be judged a success because it enabled one scheme to go 
ahead in an assisted area and produced a level of grant 
income, or a failure because it hindered or delayed the 
implementation of important economic infrastructure in a 
nearby non-assisted area? It is very difficult to answer 
this kind of question. However, it does not necessarily 
follow that the industrial estate was a more desirable item 
of investment solely because it was located in an assisted 
area and therefore eligible for ERDF aid. There is a 
danger in a case such ds this that the ERDF is influencing 
decisions that are best left to those at the local level 
19 5 
better placed to compare the merits of particular schemes. 
As far as public utilities are concerned, Central 
Government controls on capital expenditure operate somewhat 
differently to local authorities and the "additionality" 
issue is less clear-cut. In the case of the Water 
Authorities, "additionality" of a sort does seem to exist. 
These authorities have three sources of finance, namely: 
rate charges, which policy dictates should be kept down; 
ERDF grants; and External finance sources, including 
borrowing and central government grants from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Department of Environment. 
The last of these sources is controlled by a national 
External Finance Limit (EFL) imposed by the government, 
which restricts the volume of borrowing the Water industry 
as a whole can carry out. This EFL is divided up among the 
regional Water Authorities of which SWWA is one. The overall 
national EFL is set with likely ERDF receipts taken into 
account. However, each individual Water Authority is 
permitted to increase its capital programme by the amount of 
ERDF grants it receives. In other words, if the Water 
Industry is able to win a larger amount of ERDF support than 
the amount considered likely by the DoE when setting the 
EFL, then ERDF receipts do permit them to increase the 
volume of capital spending which would take place in any 
case (interview with Finance Officer of SWWA). 
. 
5-4.2. The take-up of the ERDF opportunity. 
The discussion above has demonstrated that 
organisations are presented with a particular ERDF 
opportunity based on the extent of assisted areas and the 
volume of capital spending they are able to carry out. 
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Nevertheless, we have also established that apparently 
similar organisations have received shares of Fund 
assistance that vary substantially. It therefore follows 
that the take-up of this opportunity also varies. The 
following section attempts to discover why organisations 
have received differing shares of assistance. A variety of 
factors can be identified, which can themselves be divided 
up into two groups. The first two factors are those which 
are entirely controlled within the particular organisation 
and are especially important in explaining changes in 
organisational involvement over time. These are: 
organisational response to the ERDF and the presence of key 
individuals. The final two factors are those which are 
derived from external sources, but are made use of to 
varying degrees by the various organisations, namely the 
availability of information and of other external sources of 
finance. 
a) Organisational Response. 
In order to take up the opportunity presented by the 
ERDF those organisations having schemes which are 
potentially eligible must be organised to apply for the 
available assistance. This section focuses on the 
organisational structure involved in putting together ERDF 
bids, in order to assess whether there is any relationship 
between ERDF success and the ways in which applicants go 
about winning this assistance. It begins by examining which 
particular departments within active organisations have 
responsibility for grant applications. Table 5.9 shows this 
for all the authorities which were interviewed. The 
organisational situation in the South West parallels the 
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TABLE 5.9: ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ERDF IN LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
AND PUBLIC UTILITIES SOUTH WEST ENGLAND. 
_ 
Local Authority Departments involved (lead dept. in bold) (1) 
Devon County Council 
Plymouth City Council 
Cornwall County Council 
South Hams D. C. 
Carrick D. C. 
Torridge D. C. 
Penwith D. C. 
Gloucestershire C. C. 
Forest of Dean D. C. 
Teignbridge D. C. (2) 
Kerrier D. C. 
North Cornwall D. C. 
Caradon D. C. 
Restormel Borough Council 
Torbay Borough Council(3) 
North Devon D. C. (3) 
West Somerset D. C. (3) 
Public Utilities 
Chief Executive, Property, Treasury, 
Planning 
Chief Executive, Treasury, Planning, 
Engineers, Tourism 
Planning, County Surveyors, Treasury 
Treasury, Technical Services, Planning 
Planning, Treasury, Engineers 
Treasury, Planning, Technical Services 
Chief Executives, Treasury, Planning 
Treasury, Planning, County Surveyors 
Treasury, Planning 
Chief Executives, Treasury 
Chief Executives, Treasury 
Planning, Treasury 
Planning, Treasury 
Planning 
Treasury 
Planning 
Treasury 
South West W. A. Finance, Planning 
South Western Finance 
Electricity Board 
Notes. (1) The information was derived from a question in the 
interviews. 
(2) Teignbridge D. C. lost assisted area status in November 1984. 
(3) These authorities also lost assisted status in 1984 and the 
relevant personnel had since departed. Consequently no interviews were 
possible. 
Sources: Interviews. 
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findings of Glasson and McGee (1984) for the UK as a whole. 
They also found that Chief Executive, Treasury and Planning 
Departments were the most common lead departments on EC 
grants. 
The three largest local authorities in the region, 
namely Devon County Council, Cornwall County Council and 
Plymouth City Council, have all delegated to particular 
departments the task* of handling EC matters. These 
departments have overall responsibility for identifying 
eligible projects and for disseminating information about 
the Community throughout the authority. At Devon County 
Council, the Chief Executive's Department persuaded the 
other departments concerned with ERDF eligible projects 
(Table 5.9) to nominate a particular officer to liaise with 
the Chief Executive's Department on ERDF applications. The 
resulting small network of Council officers became 
completely self-contained, developing a well-established 
system for identifying eligible projects in the County's 
annual capital programme and making the applications. 
The organisational structure in the public utilities 
which were interviewed was very similar to a number of the 
local authorities. In both SWWA and SWEB the Finance 
departments had overall responsibility for Fund 
applications. Of the other ERDF recipients that were 
interviewed only four said that one particular department 
took the lead in applying for ERDF grants, although it is 
noticeable that South Hams, Penwith and Torridge, three of 
the most active districts did identify a department or 
departments which were understood within the authority to 
have some responsibility for ERDF applications. In all 
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the local authorities which were interviewed'the Treasurer's 
department was identified as having some involvement with 
the applications. Often this was only in providing detailed 
project costings or in assisting with final claims for 
payments. In some cases, notably South Hams D. C., Torridge 
D. C. and Gloucestershire C. C., the Treasury acted as the 
authority's lead department on ERDF applications. The nature 
of the particular department involved seemed to make little 
difference, except that it is important for the 
co-ordinating department to have an overview of all 
local-authority schemes which may be eligible for ERDF. The 
Treasury, Chief Executives and Planning Departments can all 
view the authorities' activities in this way. 
In terms of personnel involved, once again only the 
three largest and most active authorities had particular 
staff members delegated responsibility for co-ordinating 
all the authority's ERDF applications. In the other smaller 
authorities a rather more complex picture emerged. It was 
possible to identify in each department in each authority a 
particular person who was responsible for all applications 
from that department. However, this reflected the logic that 
in each department one person should deal with a task that 
takes up only a small proportion of the department's time. 
However, in very few cases, other than the three largest 
authorities, did one such person have overall 
responsibility for all that particular council's ERDF 
applications. Instead, a number of people from a variety of 
departments contributed to ERDF applications with no-one 
pre-eminent. 
All interviewees in district councils, with the 
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exception of Plymouth City Council, agreed that it was not 
cost effective to use a large amount of resources, in terms 
of time and personnel, on the ERDF, which was only a minor 
part of the local authority's activities. 
The procedures by which likely projects are 
identified are best seen in the form of a spectrum. At one 
end are what can be termed "formal" selection processes and 
at the other end are more "informal" or "ad hoc" methods of 
identifying potemntially eligible schemes. Some authorities, 
notably Plymouth, Devon and Cornwall underwent a formal 
evaluation of their capital spending programme in order to 
identify those projects which may be eligible for ERDF aid. 
A number of the other more succesful districts such as 
South Hams and Carrick carried out similar evaluations of 
projects to assess all possibilities for grant-aid, 
including the ERDF. However, other local authorities such as 
North Cornwall and Kerrier identified ERDF applications in 
far more ad hoc ways, potentially eligible schemes were 
identified by individual officers who happened to be 
interested (interview sources). 
The importance of organisational factors in 
explaining recent variations in ERDF involvement is 
questionable. Although the largest recipients of ERDF 
assistance (Plymouth City Council and Devon and Cornwall 
County Councils) have what appear to be the most efficient 
organisational arrangements, this is due to the fact that 
their larger capital budgets give them more opportunity to 
apply for grants. Thus, organisational efficiency is a 
rational response to a greater opportunity and not by itself 
necessarily the reason for increased success in obtaining 
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assistance. As far as smaller districts are concerned 
similar conclusions can be drawn. The very limited 
opportunity to win ERDF aid means that a high level of 
organisational efficiency is not required to win those few 
grants which are available. 
However, organisational processes are more important 
in explaining variations in ERDF involvement over time. For 
example, the relatively early decision of the Chief 
Executive of Devon County Council to delegate responsibility 
for all European Community matters to an officer in his 
department enabled Devon to make greater use of the ERDF in 
the Fund's early days than Cornwall County Council or 
Plymouth City Council. (Table 5.6) (interview with officer 
in Chief Executive's Department of Devon County Council). In 
this case, however, the authority's successful response to 
the ERDF opportunity was precipitated by the action of one 
particular individual. 
b) The role of key individuals. 
In the Humberside study, Preston found that the 
influence of particular individuals was "crucial in the ... 
successful response to the ERDF opportunity" (Preston, 
1985, p3l). In this research, initial involvement and the 
subsequent development of local authorities' ERDF 
involvement often appears to have been the result of some 
initiative by a key personality in the organisation. In 
South Hams D. C., Kerrier D. C. and Torridge D. C a particular 
person took on the role of informal ERDF co-ordinator. In 
each case this was the result of an interest on the part of 
that particular person rather than any explicit delegation 
of the task to him. In some cases, such as Torridge District 
20ý, , 
Council and Devon County Council, this person had initiated 
the authority's early involvement with the ERDF and had kept 
the responsibility for the task ever since. Apart from the 
example of Devon County Council, a personal initiative on 
behalf of an individual officer has provided the catalyst 
for increased awareness of the availability of Community 
assistance at Torridge District Council. The authority's 
Finance Officer revealed in an interview that securing the 
district's first ERDF grant became a "personal crusade". 
c) Information sources used. 
The importance of the level of information available 
to potential ERDF applicants has been identified by Preston 
(1985,1986), Glasson and McGee (1984) as an important 
factor affecting the application rate for ERDF grants. In 
this study of South West England, interviewees were asked 
what sources of information they used regularly. Table 5.10 
shows the wide variety of sources employed by local 
authorities in the region. The interviewees were not 
prompted in any way and consequently there are inevitably 
omissions from the list because the interviewee would not 
necessarily have remembered all sources. Nevertheless the 
list does at least show the variety of information sources 
available, as well as those which are most commonly used. 
All interviewees, in organisations which have 
received grants, mentioned the DoE's "Notes for Guidance" as 
the most important source of information. This information 
pack is sent out by the Bristol Office of the Department to 
any organisation which shows an interest in the ERDF and 
therefore not surprisingly is the most quoted source. Of the 
other sources the monthly "European Information Service" 
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(EIS), produced by the British Section of the International 
Union of Local Authorities, is widely read and praised for 
its usefulness. The publication is aimed specifically at 
local-authority practitioners and provides up-to-date 
information on all Community issues of local-government 
concern. As far as the ERDF is concerned, EIS informs 
authorities about new interpretations of the Regulation or 
new rules imposed by the DoE, drawn from Commission news 
releases or meetings between local authorities and the DoE 
or the Commission. 
There was, however, a considerable variation in the 
number of sources mentioned by each interviewee. Table 
5.11 gives an indication of which local authorities are 
particularly well-informed and those which are not. From 
this Table it can be seen that the three most successful 
local authorities, together with Goucestershire - the third 
eligible County Council - all receive information 
from a 
wide variety of sources. These findings conform with those 
of Glasson and Mcgee (1984) who found in a survey of local 
authorities in the UK as a whole that in general counties in 
assisted areas were the best informed on Community matters. 
All districts, except North Cornwall, Caradon and Restormel, 
received at least two sources including the DoE's "Notes for 
Guidance". However, all interviewees were aware despite 
varying levels of information of the basic features of the 
Fund and of the kinds of projects which normally receive 
assistance, such as roads and industrial estates. It is 
perhaps the more marginally eligible projects, such as in 
the tourism sector, which may have been missed because of 
poor information or inadequate selection procedures. 
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TABLE 5.11: VARIATIONS IN ORGANISATIONAL ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION. 
Number of Organisations 
sources mentioned 
1 Caradon D. C., Restormel D. C. 
2/3 Carrick D. C., North Cornwall D. C., 
SWEB. 
4/5 Kerrier D. C., Torridge D. C., 
South Hams D. C., Forest of Dean D. C., 
SWWA. 
>5 Plymouth C. C., Cornwall C. C., 
Devon C. C. Penwith D. C., 
Gloucestershire C. C. 
Source: Interviews 
The importance of information in determining ERDF 
success for local authorities and public utilities 
appears to have become marginalised in comparison with 
other factors related to the volume of spending authorities 
are able to carry out. There has been a convergence of 
awareness about the ERDF in recent years. However, in the 
period before about 1982, information appears to have been a 
much more important factor. The availability of information, 
as well as the initiative of particular individuals, is 
likely to have been instrumental in stimulating the 
relatively early response to the ERDF of authorities such as 
North Cornwall, Kerrier, Torridge, Penwith and Devon County. 
Furthermore, lack of information may explain the failure of 
North Devon, Torbay and Teignbridge among others to apply 
for assistance until after 1982. 
d) Other external sources of assistance. 
Another factor affecting the volume of ERDF 
20 6 
applications is the availability of other external sources 
to fund industrial estates and other infrastructure 
projects. The existence of more advantageous sources of 
finance was also noted by Preston (1986) in a study of 
Humberside's involvement with the ERDF: "the aim of any 
local authority is to obtain the most efficient cocktail of 
loans and grants with which its economic objectives can 
be achieved" (Preston, 1985, p36). A number of authorities 
in Devon and Cornwall, for instance, are eligible for 100% 
funding by English Estates and the Development Commission 
for industrial estates in designated Rural Development 
Areas. Complete funding in this way is clearly preferable to 
providing the 50% of capital costs needed to part-finance an 
ERDF eligible project. Interviewees in North Cornwall and 
Caradon District Councils agreed that Development Commission 
money had been sought for schemes which may otherwise have 
been the subject of ERDF applications. Furthermore, Plymouth 
has recently been designated as eligible for Urban aid, 
which may be a more advantageous source of assistance for 
infrastructure projects than the ERDF (interview with 
officer in City Treasury, Plymouth City Council). 
5.5. CONCLUSIONS.. 
We have seen that "bottom-up" initiative plays an 
important part in the implementation process. In the main 
this is because the Fund obviously cannot provide assistance 
unless it is first applied for. However, it is clear that 
processes operating at the local level which determine 
whether assistance is sought are highly complex phenomena. 
There is a large "pool of organisations" (Hjern and 
20 7 
Porter, 1981). In fact, no fewer than 31 organisations have 
received grants for infrastructure projects in the region. 
A variety of factors determine the degree of activity 
of each of these organisations. These are illustrated by 
Figure 5.8. The question arises whether awareness of the 
Fund and organisational response are most important in 
determining organisational involvement, or whether 
ERDF success is simply a result of a greater opportunity to 
attract assistance. It is very difficult to judge which 
factors are most important in determining organisational 
responses to varying ERDF opportunities. No clear picture 
emerges from the interviews. However, over time there has 
clearly been a diffusion of awareness and knowledge of the 
ERDF. In the Fund's early years, grant seeking activity was 
not universal. Some local authorities and other 
organisations were quick to see t4he opportunity presented by 
the Fund whereas others took some time to realise the 
potential benefits. Lately however, many organisations are 
aware of the availability of ERDF assistance and it seems 
that most opportunities for assistance from the Fund are 
being utilised. In other words, factors such as assisted 
area status and government spending limits are what 
primarily determines authorities' ERDF involvement. 
Given the problems of securing genuine additionality 
it may be surprising that local authorities and others seek 
ERDF assistance at all. However, some increase in resources 
is in fact perceived and achieved in that interest payments 
on loans are reduced and a small benefit is won for the 
rate-payer. Moreover, the grants may also serve to improve 
public awareness of the activities of the European 
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Community. In fact, a memorandum from the British sections 
of IULA/CEMR to the recent House of Lords enquiry stated 
that: 
at a time of increasingly severe constraints on the 
capital and revenue expenditure of local authorities, 
these grants have played a valuable role in assisting 
the regeneration of local economies in the eligible 
areas and they have also contributed significantly to 
the progressive improvement of the public's 
perception of the European Community (House of Lords, 
1988, p84). 
Moreover, there is also some evidence that the ERDF also 
affects the nature if not the volume of expenditure within 
problem regions. In fact, given the problem of 
additionality this is perhaps all the ERDF can hope to 
achieve at the local level. Therefore, its main role should 
be to act as a catalyst for the concentration of other forms 
of expenditure on particular problems and problem areas. 
Christopher Beazley, the MEP for Plymouth and Cornwall, has 
suggested that: 
by themselves the individual Funds (including the 
ERDF) or the Funds co-ordinated into programmes 
cannot possibly overcome regional difficulties ... 
if the Community is playing a role in a particular 
region this is an encouragement to other industries 
and perhaps to government to add their own funding 
(House of Lords, 1988, p8l). 
This brings our analysis of the ERDF to a 
conclusion, although we shall return to it again in the 
final Chapter. The study now concentrates on the 
implementation of the European Social Fund. It begins by 
outlining a number of the Fund's "operational" objectives 
and the role of the European Commission. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE OBJECTIVES OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND AND 
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN IMPLEMENTATION. 
6.1. INTRODUCTION. 
The previous three chapters have considered the 
implementation of the European Regional Development Fund, 
examining the roles of DG XVI at the Commission, the UK 
national government and the applicants for ERDF grants at 
local level. In Chapters Six, Seven and Eight we turn to a 
parallel examination of the European Social Fund (ESF). The 
present Chapter outlines the major "operational" objectives 
of the ESF. It then concentrates on the role of the 
Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs (DG V) 
of the European Commission. Subsequently, Chapter Seven 
examines the role of the UK Government in policy 
implementation and assesses whether the objectives of the 
ESF are achieved in the UK. Finally, Chapter Eight provides 
" "bottom-up" view of the implementation process by means of 
" case-study of the activities of the ESF in South West 
England. 
This study focuse5 on the Fund's role as a further 
instrument of Community regional policy. It should be 
emphasised at the outset that the ESF's major purpose is 
to create jobs and provide vocational training throughout 
the Community. However, as Chapter Two demonstrated, the 
Fund has also become an important element of the Community's 
regional development efforts. This Chapter begins by 
outlining the objectives of the ESF and follows this with an 
examination of how the European Commission attempts to 
ensure that these objectives are delivered. 
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6.2. THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF THE ESF. 
This study concentrates on the objectives of the Fund 
between the most recent reform in 1983 and the end of 1987. 
This period coincides with the period in which data on the 
allocation of grants are available on a regional basis in 
the United Kingdom. The discussion considers the following 
four "operational objectives": 
1. the geographical concentration of ESF assistance; 
2. the concentration of assistance on young people 
under 25; 
3. the aim of helping small and medium-sized 
enterprises; 
4. the objective of encouraging innovatory vocational 
training projects; 
6.2.1. The geosýranhical concentration of ESF assistance. 
The concentration of ESF grants in the regions with 
the highest rates of unemployment and lowest per capita GDPs 
is an explicit aim of the ESF. The Council Decision setting 
out the tasks of the Fund (Council Decision 83/516/EEC) 
allocated 40% of available resources to what are known as 
the "absolute priority regions" or "least-favoured areas"; 
namely Greece, the French Overseas Departments, Ireland, the 
Mezzogiorno of Southern Italy, Northern Ireland and 
Greenland (until it left the Community in 1985). These 
areas are characterised by high unemployment and/or GDP 
less than 70% of the Community average. Following the 
accession to the Community of the two Iberian countries in 
1986 the list was extended to include parts of Spain and all 
of Portugal and the proportion of Fund resources guaranteed 
to the absolute priority areas was increased to 44.5% 
(Council Decision 85/568/EEC). 
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Apart from this concentration on designated 
less-favoured areas, the Council Decision also gives 
priority to certain areas experiencing industrial and 
sectoral restructuring and other regions of high and/or 
long-term unemployment. The former are those assisted 
under either the old non-quota section of the ERDF or 
Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty (Treaty of Paris, 1953). The 
latter were defined according to a statistical index based 
on low per capita GDPs and high overall and youth 
unemployment rates. However, no attempt has been made to 
quantify the proportion of assistance which the Fund should 
direct towards these areas. The main reason for this is 
that both the Commission and the member governments have 
preferred to maintain the spatial flexibility of the 
sectorally-orientated ESF. 
The Commission suggests a number of reasons why a 
concentration of spending on these regions is desirable. 
Firstly, the spatial concentration of assistance is likely 
to increase the effectiveness of Fund assistance. Grants 
spread thinly over a large area of the Community are likely 
to be less beneficial than resources which are focussed 
explicitly on the regions with the highest rates of 
unemployment. Secondly, spatial concentration is 
justifiable on the grounds of "Community solidarity" towards 
those regions where the problems of unemployment are most 
severe. Finally, focussing of resources is appropriate 
because the areas with lower unemployment and high GDP are 
not actually in need of Fund assistance. Sufficient 
resources are available in these areas to fund adequately 
the necessary training and job creation measures 
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(Commission, 1986c). 
The European Parliament has on occasions expressed 
its support for this objective. For example, a 1987 
Parliamentary report suggested that: 
unless both the ESF budget as a whole and the 
percentage earmarked for the absolute priority areas 
are substantially increased, thereby enabling the 
less-developed regions to put their limited resources 
to far more effective use, the Fund will not fulfill 
its potential as a major instrument in the fight 
against unemployment" (European Parliament, 1987, 
p8). 
The main mechanisms for effecting this geographical 
concentration are the annual Commission Guidelines. Many of 
the schemes to which the Commission will give priority under 
these Guidelines are limited to either the absolute priority 
regions or the other designated priority areas. However, it 
should be emphasised that other Guidelines have no regional 
limitations and any part of the Community is able to receive 
ESF assistance. 
6.2.2 The concentration of assistance on young people under 
25. 
A second explicit objective of the ESF is that 
resources should be concentrated on schemes which are likely 
to help young people under the age of 25 to find permanent 
employment. In fact the Council Decision controlling the 
Fund states that in any one year at least 75% of aid should 
be directed to people in this age group. This 
quantification of an objective is to be welcomed from the 
point of view of measuring the effectiveness of the Fund in 
achieving its objectives. In particular, the ESF aims to 
assist those young people "whose chances of employment are 
especially poor, in particular because of a lack of 
2Y4 
vocational training or inadequate training and those who are 
long-term unemployed" (Council Decision 83/516/EEC, Article 
4). 
This concentration on young people reflects the 
particularly high rates of unemployment among those in this 
age-group, especially in many of the least-favoured areas. 
The overall unemployment rate among Young People under 25 in 
1986 was 23%, more than double that of the workforce as a 
whole. The most severe rates of youth unemployment are 
found in Spain where the rate in 1986 was 46.9% in the 
country as a whole and Italy, where it was 33%. In 
certain regions these rates were substantially higher. In 
Andalucia in Southern Spain, for example, 61.8% of people in 
this age group were unemployed. In Calabria in Italy the 
rate was 53.8% and in Northern Ireland it reached 29.6% 
(Commission, 1987b). 
In consequence, the Guidelines published annually by 
the Commission have placed emphasis on the need to train 
Young people, particularly those under 18 seeking employment 
for the first time and others either without qualifications 
or whose qualifications have proved to be inadequate. The 
Guidelines prioritise schemes which train young people for 
jobs involving new technology. 
6.2-3. The aim of helping small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
The objective of encouraging 
and medium-sized businesses is a 
FSF. This is linked particularly 
these organisations of new tech 
Decision on the "tasks of the 
25 
the development of small 
further overt aim of the 
to the introduction in 
nologies. The Council 
European Social Fund" 
indicates that: 
the Fund must make a special effort to develop 
employment, particularly in small and medium-sized 
undertakings, with a view to modernising management 
or production or applying new technologies (Council 
Decision, 83/516/EEC, Preamble). 
The emphasis on small and medium-sized firms reflects 
the wider Community objective of assisting this growing 
sector of the European economy. Moreover, this aim has 
clear regional implications related to the current 
priority of EC and other regional policies of promoting 
"indigenous development" within problem regions and 
particularly the potential of the small-firm sector. For 
example, we have already seen how Article 15 of the 1984 
ERDF Regulation attempts to encourage small businesses. 
Furthermore, in 1984 the Commission formed a Task-Force 
within the Directorate General for the Internal Market and 
Industrial Affairs (DG III) in order to promote the 
development of small and medium-sized enterprises. In this 
case, there is no quantification of the proportion of the 
ESF which should assist small firms, reflecting that this 
particular aim is more peripheral to the activities of the 
Fund than those outlined above. 
6.2.4. The aim of encouraging innovatory projects. 
A further aim of the ESF is that it should encourage 
the dissemination of new and original methods of vocational 
training and the Council Decision sets aside up to 5% of 
Fund resources for encouraging innovatory projects. Thus, 
in this case, we do have a bench-mark against which to 
measure the effectiveness of the Fund in achieving its aims. 
The Commission Guidelines have stated that these schemes 
should "test new approaches to content, methods or 
2 16 
organisation of operations eligible for Fund assistance" 
(Commission, Decision 86/221/EEC, Article 5). 
6.3. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 
6.3.1. Organisational structure of DG V. 
The administration of the ESF in the Commission is 
the responsibility of the Directorate General for Employment 
and Social Affairs (DG V). This DG is concerned with a 
variety of policy areas related to education, employment and 
training. One of its functions is the administration of the 
ESF. Figure 6.1 illustrates the overall structure of DG V at 
the time of the current research and of the particular 
Directorate concerned with the ESF, which was itself divided 
into four divisions. These were: young people under 25; 
adults over 25; innovatory projects; and administration. In 
the course of this research, interviews were carried out 
with the three British officials working in this ESF 
section, one from each of the first three Divisions listed 
above. Each Division follows the same basic procedure for 
examining submitted applications. 
6.3.2. Decision-making processes.. 
The process by which applications are examined and 
judged by the Social Fund Directorate of DG V can be divided 
up into the following seven basic stages: 
a. arrival of applications (by 21st October); 
b. initial examination of applications; 
c. divisional meetings; 
d. production of "blue note" - the provisional 
Commission decision (December); 
e. ESF Advisory Committee meeting (February); 
f. application of linear reduction; 
g. the formal Commission decision (by 31st March). 
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a) Applications. 
The European Social Fund, unlike the ERDF, has a 
single annual deadline for applications from the member 
states. All schemes must be received by the Commission by 
the 21st October. In recent years the number and volume of 
applications has been increasing substantially (see Figure 
6.2), reflecting both a generally worsening employment 
situation throughout the Community as well as increasing 
awareness of the opportunity presented by the ESF 
(Commission, 1986g). 
Both the very large numbers of individual 
applications and the substantial overbids for ESF 
assistance are causing the Commission a number of 
problems. Firstly, the number of applications which must be 
examined in a comparatively short time between October 21st 
and late December, when the Commission takes the provisional 
decisions on the award of grants, means that individual 
projects can only be given a very brief assessment. For 
example, an interviewee in the Young Persons Division 
estimated that in 1986 he examined about 800 applications in 
this two month period. Inevitably, the staff of DG V make 
mistakes during this hectic period (interview with official 
of Young Persons Division of ESF Directorate). Consequently, 
the Commission encourages member governments to ensure that 
submitted applications are concise and clearly worded. A 
second problem results from the large disparities between 
the amounts of Fund assistance requested and the relativel-y 
meagre resources available. The task of choosing between a 
large number of eligible applications to enable total grants 
awarded to match the money available is extremely 
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problematic. 
In order partially to overcome these problems, the 
Commission decided in 1983 that all applications classified 
as priority schemes under the Guidelines would be funded 
even if the volume of assistance requested by these schemes 
exceeded the available finance. This has been achieved by 
applying a linear reduction to the amounts allocated. In 
other words, all priority applications are funded but the 
amount they receive is reduced by a uniform proportion (the 
calculation of the linear reduction is explained in more 
detail below). Furthermore, the Commission has also 
attempted to effect a reduction in the number of 
applications by making the annual Guidelines more 
exclusive. For example, the Guidelines for 1986 introduced 
a number of stricter interpretations of the conditions which 
determine the priority status of particular schemes 
(Commission Decision 85/261/EEC). These included a greater 
emphasis on whether training schemes offered "substantial 
prospects of employment". Secondly, recent Guidelines have 
progressively reduced the extent of priority areas from 64% 
of the working population in 1987 to 50% in 1988 (Table 
6.1). 
Despite the extra applications resulting from the 
arrival of Spain and Portugal in 1986, these amendments to 
the Guidelines served to limit the increase in the volume 
of applications between 1985 and 1986 to just 4.4%. Indeed, 
the amount of money applied for by the other ten member 
states actually decreased by 14%. However, in 1987 the 
increase in assistance requested was again substantial 
(Figure 6.2). In fact, available funds now accounted for 
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less than 50% of the amounts applied for. As a result, the 
1988 Guidelines have become still more exclusive and the 
regional concentration of the Fund is now focussed on 50% of 
the Community's working population. Moreover, some guideline 
points have been dropped altogether and other criteria have 
been made more strict. 
TABLE 6.1. REDUCTIONS IN THE EXTENT OF ESF PRIORITY AREAS; 
1984-1988. 
% of working population in 
Year Abs. priority other pri- 
regions ority regions Total 
1984 11 53 64 
1985 11 53 64 
1986 (1 17 40 57 
1987 17 39.5 56.5 
1988 17 33 50 
Note: 1) Spain and Portugal joined the Community in 1986. 
Source: Commission (19863,1988a); Department of Employment 
Guidance notes. 
As applications are received by DG V they are filed 
on computer according to the Guideline point under which 
they are submitted and then divided up into particular 
Divisions (Young People, Adults and Innovatory). The 
examination of projects is then begun by the various 
divisional officials. 
b) Examination of applications. 
The initial examination of submitted applications by 
the staff of DG V is in three basic stages. The first is to 
ensure that applications are admissible under the rules 
controlling the Fund, which provide that a number of formal 
conditions. must be met as regards the drafting and 
presentation of applications (Commission, 1988a). These 
include the necessity that every section of the application 
222 
form should be answered and that the scheme should apply to 
a single calendc&r year (the Community's financial year). 
Despite the apparent simplicity of these rules, some 
applications are regularly jud. ced as inadmissible. In 1986, 
for instance, 60 applications (0.8% of the total) were not 
accepted by the Commission for this reason (Commission, 
1988a). 
The second stage of the project examination process 
ensures that applications are eligible under the Council 
Decision and Regulation which govern the Fund. In order 
to be eligible for assistance, applications must relate 
to categories of persons listed in the Council Regulation 
(see Chapter 2). In addition, the expenditure covered by 
the application must relate to the particular costs outlined 
in the Regulation, such as the incomes of the persons 
undergoing training, the preparation and administration of 
the training schemes and the subsistence expenses of the 
trainees. 
The vast majority of ESF applications are formally 
classified as eligible once these criteria have been 
examined. Indeed, in 1985 and 1986 only 8.5% and 3.9% 
respectively of all applications were judged ineligible 
(Commission, 1986g, 1988a). This reflects the expertise 
built up in the national ministries responsible for 
administering ESF applications, ensuring that submiited 
applications are formally eligible under the ESF rules. 
The final stage of DG V's initial assessment of 
projects is to assess whether the schemes should be accorded 
priority status under the annual GuideLines. Table 6.2 
summarises the Guidelines which applied to applications for 
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training schemes being carried out during 1987. Because the 
ESF is heavily over-subscribed this stage is the most 
crucial. Only applications classified as priority are 
guaranteed to receive assistance. Each particular Guideline 
point has a number of quantitative criteria which must be 
met. For example, schemes submitted under Guideline 2.1 
must meet the following conditions: 
Guideline 2.1: - vocational training; 
- under 18's; 
- at least 800 hours; 
- work experience of between 200 and 
400 hours; 
- substantial prospects of employment 
(Commission, 1987d). 
Some of these criteria are relatively easy to assess 
and to quantify. Failure to meet any one of them will mean 
the scheme will not be awarded priority status. On the other 
hand, it is very difficult to quantify the extent to which a 
particular training scheme offers "substantial prospects of 
employment" to its trainees. Even the term "vocational 
training" is open to varying interpretations. The Court of 
Auditors-has criticised this vaguenesss, pointing out that: 
there is no common definition of a whole series of 
concepts which are fundamental to the management of 
the Fund (in particular the concepts of "threat to 
employment", "under-employment", "small and 
medium-sized undertaking", "vocational training" and 
It substantial prospects of employment" (Court of 
Auditors, 1988, p6). 
However, from the Commission's point of view it is important 
that these criteria are worded in this vague fashion in 
order to allow the Commission officials some discretion to 
choose between competing applications for an over-subscribed 
Fund. 
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TABLE 6.2: SUMMARY OF ESF GUIDELINES 1987-1989. 
LIMITED TO 
PARAGRAPH GROUP TYPE OF SCHEME PRIORITY REGIONS 
2.1 Under 18 Vocational training (800 Yes 
hours) incl. work experience 
(200-400 hours). 
2.2 Under 25 Vocational training for No 
with inadequate skilled jobs with new 
or unsuitable tecnology 
qualifications. 
2.3 Under 25 Recruitment to additional Yes 
jobs. 
2.4 Under 25 Vocational training by local No 
groups in context of expansion 
local employment opportunities. 
3.1 People in Vocational Training in new Yes 
firms under 500 technology 
needing retrain- 
ing because of 
new technology. 
3.2 Long-term Recruitment to additional Absolute 
unemployed jobs Priority 
Areas. 
3.3 Over 25 Vocational training by local Yes 
groups in contect of expansion 
of local employment opportunities. 
4.1 Operations part of integrated No 
programme involving more than 
one Community financial 
instrument. 
4.2 Operations involving bodies in No 
more than one member state. 
4.3 Workers in Vocational Training linked to Yes 
industrial restructuring of industrial 
undertakings undertakings because of techn o- 
requiring logical changes. 
retraining. 
4.4 Workers in Vocational training for No 
firms under application of new technology 
500 which is the subject of 
Community Programmes of Resea rch 
and Development. 
4.5 Long-term Vocational training geared to Yes 
unemployed needs and offering substantial 
prospects of employment. 
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1.6 Women Vocational training or recruitment No 
jobs in which they are 
under-represented. 
4.7.1 Migrant Vocational training and lanauage No 
workers and training. 
families 
4.7.2 As Maintain kr%owledge of mother No 
above tongue (Community nationals only) 
4.8 Disabled Vocational training or job Yes 
people creation. 
capable of 
working in open 
labour market. 
4.9 Instructors Vocational training Absolute 
priority 
Areas 
Innovatory operations less No 
than 100 persons 
Source: Commission Decision 86/221/EEC. 
c) Divisional meetings. 
Once the various officials have formed an initial 
opinion on the eligibility status of the submitted 
applications all officials meet at a Divisional meeting to 
discuss in general terms the applications submitted to that 
particular Division. The aim of this meeting is to ensure 
that officials within the Division are taking a common 
aýproach to applying the Guidelines and to discuss any 
recurring problems arising out of the project examination 
process (interview with official of Young Persons Division). 
The divisional meeting then leads to DG V's provisional 
classification of applications as priority, non-priority or 
ineligible. 
d) Provisional Commission Decision ("blue note"). 
This list of project classifications is then sent in 
December to all member states in the form of a "blue 
note", so-called because it is always printed on blue paper 
M. The relevant member state departments, such as the 
Department of Employment (DE) in the UK, are then able to 
comment on these provisional classifications and to request 
amendments. These suggested changes may result from genuine 
errors made by the Commission officials or they may draw 
attention to alternative interpretations of the Guidelines. 
This consultation generally results in changes to a number 
of classifications from non-priority to priority. Moreover, 
it illustrates that national governments are closely 
involved in the decision-making process. 
e) ESF Advisory Committee. 
In February, the ESF Advisory Committee, which is 
composed of representatives of national governments, 
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trade unions and employers, meets to discuss the 
provisional Commission decisions. Unlike the ERDF 
Committee, the ESF Committee has no formal authority to 
block the decisions of the Commission. Before the full 
Committee meeting a working party examines the Commission's 
initial classifications and only a small number of marginal 
cases are presented to the Committee itself. Delegations at 
this meeting are entitled to request changes to the 
classifications. However, in the last five years only three 
or four such requests have been made and in each case the 
request has been refused by the Commission (interview with 
official of Young Persons Division). Thus the Committee's 
ability formally to influence decision-making is minimal. 
On the other hand, the Committee does form an 
important function. Laffan (1983) argues that "the 
relationship between the ESF Directorate and the Committee 
is crucial to the operation of the European Social Fund. It 
provides the Commission with essential information to 
enable it to administer the Fund". The findings above 
suggest that this view is an exaggeration of the Committee's 
importance, but it is certainly true that members of the 
Committee are generally more familiar than the staff of DG V 
with national training systems and are better able to judge 
the applicability in particular countries of the Fund 
guidelines (on which it is also consulted). The Commission 
regards it as important to develop agreement and consensus 
among the delegations on the Committee reflecting that, 
despite the scope to exercise decision-making power which 
the Commission clearly possesses, it is dependent 
nonetheless on member states for the submission of 
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applications and the implementation of particular schemes. 
Moreover, the Commission is careful not to pursue a course 
of action that would lead to strong opposition in the member 
states. 
f) The linear reduction. 
Once the ESF Advisory Committee has met to discuss 
applications and all amendments to project classifications 
have been made by the Commission, the linear reduction is 
applied. This is basically a simple process which enables 
all applications given priority status by the Commission to 
receive some assistance even if their total value exceeds 
the assistance available. The ESF's budget is divided into 
five sections and the linear reduction applied to each 
section depends on the volume of applications and the 
assistance available in each category. These are: 
1. Young people under 25 in the absolute priority 
regions; 
2. Young People under 25 in all other regions; 
3. Adults over 25 in absolute priority regions; 
4. Adults over 25 in all other regions; 
5. Innovatory projects. 
The following example illustrates how the linear 
reduction works. if the total value of priority 
applications for projects training young people outside the 
absolute priority regions is 1000 Million ECU and the 
available assistance under this budget heading is 900 
Million ECU then each member state will have its allocation 
under this budget heading reduced by 10%. However, the 
reduction is not applied uniformly to all priority schemes. 
Certain projects are exempted from a reduction by the ESF 
Regulation. For example, schemes forminiz part of an 
Integrated Development Operation involving more than one 
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Community financial instrument are automatically exempted. 
Furthermore, projects which are "particularly dependent on 
Fund support" are also excluded. However, the Commission 
allows the member Governments to decide which schemes fall 
into this category. In the UK, grants to voluntary and 
charitable organisations have generally been exempted. As a 
result, the linear reduction for other schemes will, in the 
hypothetical case above, be slightly more than 10%. Other 
member states, notably France and Italy, apply the linear 
reduction equally to every scheme (interview in ESF unit of 
DE) . 
Table 6.3 illustrates that in 1985 and 1986 the 
budget headings concerned with young people were generally 
not nearly so over-subscribed as those concerned with 
adults. For example, in 1986 a linear reduction of 60% was 
applied to priority schemes aimed at the over 25s outside 
the absolute priority areas. On the other hand, the linear 
reduction applied to young people in all areas amounted to 
just 7%. In both 1985 and 1986 all eligible applications 
for innovatory projects were funded and indeed allocations 
committed failed to meet the 5% of the ESF set aside for 
schemes of this kind. This reflects the difficulties 
involved, from the point of view of authorities within 
member states, in formulating schemes of this nature (see 
Chapter 7). 
9) The formal decision. 
Once these reductions have been applied the formal 
decision on the allocation of assistance is taken by the 
Commissioners. Normally this is simply a rubber-stamping 
exercise of decisions taken by the officials of DG V. 
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Over the period from 1980 until 1987, the ESF awarded 
a total of 15091.2 million ECU to the various Community 
member states. As Table 6.4 and Figure 6.3 shows, the 
largest absolute amounts have gone to Italy, the United 
Kingdom, France and, since 1986, Spain. The largest 
per-capita shares, however, have gone to small member states 
such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal which are all 
classified as absolute priority areas (Figure 6.4). 
Ireland's per capita share of the Fund over the 1984 to 1987 
period was more than four times that of any other member 
state. This very generous allocation reflects, firstly, 
Ireland's very small population (3.5 million in 1984) and, 
secondly, the country's designation as an absolute priority 
area, which gives it very wide terms of eligibility. 
Clearly, the designation of Southern Italy, parts of 
Spain, all of Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Northern Ireland 
and the French Overseas Departments as absolute priority 
areas is a major factor influencing the spatial pattern of 
spending. Together they receive 44.5 per cent of the ESF. 
In the absence of formal quotas of assistance, the 
distribution also reflects the volume of applications being 
submitted by each member state. However, what other 
factors affect the amounts received by member states in 
particular years? 
6.3.3. Informal quotas. 
Unlike the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 
the ESF is not divided up among the member states according 
to pre-determined national quotas. However, there is some 
evidence that the Commission, when selecting priority 
projects, operates a system of politically acceptable 
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FIGURE 6.3. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ESF ASSISTANCE 
IN THE EC, 1984-1987. 
TOTAL: --9683.6 MILLION ECU 
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informal quotas (interviews with official of DE in London 
and representative of young persons Division of ESF 
Directorate in Brussels). The shares of the Fund shown in 
Table 6.4 offer partial support for this view. The rank 
order of recipient countries has generally been: Italy, UK, 
Spain (since 1986), France, Ireland or Portugal and then 
Greece, albeit there are one or two exceptions. Member 
states obviously have a view on what a "fair" share of the 
Fund may be and serious questions would be raised, either 
formally in the ESF Advisory Committee or informally in 
discussions between national governments and the Commission, 
if countries received unusually high or low shares. For 
example, the Department of Employment in the United Kingdom 
believes Britain's "fair" share to be between 19% and 20% 
(interview with official of DE). 
However, empirical evidence on the existence of 
informal quotas is not conclusive. Table 6.5 shows that in 
1985 and 1986 at least, the member states submitting the 
most applications generally received the highest shares of 
the Fund. On the other hand, the proportions of 
applications accepted for each member state do vary 
substantially (Table 6.5). In 1986, for example, the 
proportion of assistance received ranged from 34.8% of 
amounts applied for in the UK, to 64.8% in Greece. It is 
difficult to see why success rates should vary so 
substantially from country to country and there is perhaps 
some support here for the notion of informal quotas. 
The Commission's main weapon for manipulating the 
amounts member states receive is the annual Guidelines. 
These are sufficiently imprecise in order to allow the staff 
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of DG V discretion over which projects to award priority 
status and hence maintain when necessary allocations at 
politically acceptable levels (Croxford and Wise, 1988). 
6.3.4. The role of the Commissioner. 
A further factor that seems to be important in 
determining who gets what from the ESF is the nationality of 
the Commissioner with responsibility for the Directorate 
General for Social Affairs and Employment (DG V), which 
includes the ESF. This is a contentious point since the 
Commissioners, although nominated by national governments, 
are required to be servants of the Community rather than the 
national interest. Nevertheless, the shares of the Fund 
shown in Table 6.4 do point to a certain degree of 
influence. The recent Commissioners have been: 
Ivor Richard (UK), 1981-1984; 
Peter Sutherland (Ireland), 1985; 
Manuel Marin (Spain), 1986 onwards. 
During the period in which Ivor Richard was the 
responsible Commissioner, the UK's share of the Fund 
consistently exceeded 29 per cent. Indeed in 1983 and 1984, 
Britain's share surpassed that of Italy as it has done 
neither before nor since. In 1985, when Peter Sutherland, 
the Irish Commissioner, was in temporary control of DG V, 
Ireland received its highest ever share of the EgF. 
Finally, the influence of the latest Commissioner, Manuel 
Marin of Spain, can be seen in the 1988 Commission 
Guidelines. A change in the statistical index used to 
calculate the normal priority regions for E9F grants led to 
a number of Spanish regions being added to the list. On the 
other hand, regions in all the other member states lost 
pririty status in that year. In the UK, for example, parts 
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of Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire and Lancashire were 
among the areas deleted from the list (Commission, 1987e). 
Exactly how the nationality of the Commissioner 
responsible for the ESF may influence the pattern of 
spending is not easy to say. However, Commissioners are, in 
the final analysis, national politicians who will normally 
resume political careers in their own countries and evidence 
of having promoted their own member states' interests in the 
Community may be of use to them in these future careers. On 
the other hand, the Commissioners work as a team, making 
decisions by consensus. Therefore the generous allocations 
to the Commissioners' home countries may simply reflect a 
conscious or unconscious feeling on the part of the 
Commission staff controlling the ESF that the Commissioner 
would like to see his own country benefitting from the Fund 
(Croxford and Wise, 1988). 
6.4. CONCLUSIONS: ELEMENTS OF TOP-DOWN CONTROL. 
Having examined the decision-making processes with 
which the Commission attempts to Put the Fund's objectives 
into operation, the discussion concludes by concentrating on 
some conceptual implications of the Commission's role in the 
implementation of the ESF. Proponents of a "top-down" 
approach to studying implementation are concerned to 
identify those elements of the implementation system which 
allow policy makers who wish to achieve certain objectives 
to control the activities of other actors involved in 
putting policy into effect. This Chapter, in common with 
Chapter Three, has adopted just such a view of the 
implementation process. Consequently, the discussion now 
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goes on to detail the elements of control which the European 
Commission is able to exert in the implementation of the 
ESF. In subsequent chapters, the discussion will focus on 
aspects of the implementation process which are not 
controlled by the Commission, but are the subject of 
negotiation and bargaining between the Commission and the 
national governments. 
Laffan argues that the administrative control 
exercised by DG V goes beyond the mere technical 
distribution of resources based on policy criteria developed 
elsewhere" (Laffan, 1983, p407). This control takes a number 
of forms. Firstly, it is represented by the ability of the 
Commission to determine the annual Guidelines on the basis 
of which projects are classified as priority or 
non-priority. This represents a concession to the Commission 
by the Council (Council Decision 83/516/EEC) that has not 
occurred in the case of the ERDF. The Guidelines enable the 
Commission (in consultation with the ESF Advisory Committee) 
to define the types of scheme and the particular areas which 
it will favour. Furthermore, the absence of formal quotas 
in the allocation of the ESF means that the Commission plays 
a crucial role in judging, on the basis of its own 
Guidelines, the relative merits of competing applications. 
On the other hand, as we have seen, this authority is 
constrained by the need to allocate "fair shares" to the 
various member states. 
The Commission's ability to exercise control over the 
financial aspects of the ESF is somewhat less apparent. The 
Commission undeniably has a degree of control over the 
payment of grants to successful applications. Claims for 
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payment of the 50% of committed expenditure which is not 
paid when the Decision to award assistance is made must be 
claimed within ten months of the completion of the project. 
These payment claims are scrutinised closely by DG V to 
ensure that the scheme has gone ahead as originally planned 
in the original application. Moreover, the Commission is 
entitled to carry out "spot-checks" and audits in the member 
states to ensure that ESF money has been spent as intended. 
However, these audits are comparatively few. Indeed, in 1986 
only 174 projects out of 5087 which were submitted were 
examined in this way by DG V (Commission, 1988a). However, 
other audits are carried out by the Directorate General for 
Financial Comtrol (DG XX) which also examines a sample of 
applications in order to identify financial irregularities. 
Moreover, the Commission can withhold the payment of 
assistance or claim back payments which have previously been 
made if any of this scrutiny reveals irregularities. 
However, national authorities also play an important role in 
controlling ESF finance (see Chapter 7). A number of member 
states, notably the United Kingdom, ensure that ESF aid is 
paid initially to the national treasuries in order that 
Community finance can be monitored and controlled in the 
same fashion as normal public expenditure. Moreover, large 
proportions of aid are directed to national government 
schemes. 
Furthermore, the Commission does not operate in a 
political vacuum when putting policy into effect. Despite 
the apparent ability of the Commission to control the 
operation of the Fund, it is nevertheless in frequent close 
consultation with the member stateso either formally in the 
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ESF Committee or informally in discussions with the 
national ministries during the decision- making process. 
The pervasive influence of the member states is felt in the 
allocation of Fund resources among the countries of the 
Community according to what appear to be "informal" quotas 
and, arguably, in the influence of national politics on the 
nationally appointed Commissioners. At all stages of 
implementation, negotiations between Commission and national 
officials are crucial to the operation of the Fund. 
Moreover, both national and Commission representatives place 
strong emphasis on the need to work towards consensus and 
compromise on how the Fund operates and on the nature of the 
assistance which it provides. 
The next Chapter examines in more detail the role of 
the UK national Government in the process of implementation. 
The discussion will focus on the control exerted by the 
Government over the operation of the Fund and provide a 
national perspective on the negotiations and consensus 
building that takes place between national and Community 
levels in the ESFIs implementation structure. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ESF IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. 
7.1. INTRODUCTION. 
This Chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first assesses the extent to which the operational 
objectives of the ESF are achieved in the UK. The second 
examines the role of the UK government in the ESF's 
implementation structure and hence in the delivery of these 
objectives. It is directly comparable with Chapter Four 
which carried out a similar analysis of national government 
involvement in the implemenfation of the ERDF. 
7.2. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ESF OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE 
UK. 
Chapter Six identified a number of clear objectives 
of the Fund and these are examined below: 
1. The geographical concentration of Fund assistance; 
2. The concentration of assistance on Young People 
under 25; 
3. The aim of helping small and medium-sized 
enterprises; 
4. The aim of encouraging innovatory projects. 
7.2.1. The geogranhical concentration of ESF assistance. 
-In order both to focus resources more precisely on 
the neediest areas and to reduce the numbers of priority 
applications, the Commission has altered in recent years 
the threshold beneath which areas must fall in order to be 
classified as priority areas. Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
reductions to the priority areas map since 1984 in the UK. 
However, no specific proportion of the Fund has been set 
aside for projects in these areas. 
Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2 show the broad geographical 
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pattern of ESF assistance among the UK reaions from 1984 
until 1987 and the assistance allocated to national schemes. 
The first point to make is that approximately 61% of 
assistance to the UK has been directed towards schemes run 
by central government agencies such as the Manpower Services 
Commission, the Industrial Training Boards and the 
Nationalised Industries. These grants are in many cases 
awarded for the proportion of spending taking place in 
priority areas. In reality, however, although the schemes 
themselves are providing training in the areas with the 
highest unemployment rates (as well as in the rest of the 
country), the ESF assistance contributes to the overall 
costs of national schemes in a spatially unspecific way and 
the impact of the ESF aid on the priority areas is diluted. 
Moreover, the high level of ESF assistance to 
national government schemes, such as those of the MSC, 
raises, in the ESF context, the vexed question of 
whether there is "additionality" at the national level. In 
general, those involved with the ESF are less concerned with 
this issue than those dealing with the ERDF. However, the 
question should be asked whether the ESF is really serving 
to expand the activities of schemes such as the YTS. It is 
again very difficult to reach firm conclusions on this 
issue. The Government argues that the ESF spending enables 
more money to be spent in a period of financial stringency 
on these schemes than would otherwise be possible 
(interview with Official of DE). A DE official 
responding to a question at a recent House of Lords 
Committee enquiry, suggested that when subsidies such as the 
ESF are provided then inevitably: 
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TABLE 7.1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERN OF ESF ASSISTANCE IN THE UK: 
1984-1987. 
_ 
Region 
Total aid 
AMillion 
Per Capita per unemp- 
loyed pers, ý 
Unemployment 
rates % (1) 
North West 51.73 (21.1) 8.0 116.5 15.5 
Scotland 48.06 (19.6) 9.3 126.5 15.6 
Yorks/Humb 35.42 (14.5) 7.2 112.1 15.1 
W. Midlands 30.68 (12.5) 5.9 89.7 15.0 
South East 28.60 (11.7) 1.7 37.0 9.5 
North 25.38 (10.4) 8.2 108.9 18.0 
Wales 14.21 (5.8) 5.1 80.3 16.1 
South West 7.55 (3.1) 1.7 36.1 11.6 
E. Midlands 2.53 (1.0) 0.7 12.3 12.2 
East Anglia 0.55 (0.2) 0.3 6.5 10.1 
Total Brit. Reg. 244.71 (100) 4.3 74.2 13.0 
(% of UK total) (24.0) 
National Schemes (GB only) 
Central Government 594.20 
e. g. MSC, DE 
Industrial Training 11.19 
Boards 
Nationalised 19.47 
Industries 
Total National schemes 624.86 
(% of UK Total) (61.2) 
N. Ireland 151.23 96.5 1154.4 22.4 
(% of UK total) (14.8) 
UK Total 1020.8 18.1 309.6 13.1 
Note. (1) October 1986 Unemployment Figures 
Sources: Unpublished data provided by the Department of Employment; 
Employment Gazette, December 1986. 
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FIGURE 7.2. 
ALLOCATION OF ESF TO NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SCHEMES, 
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people would to a certain extent have done what they 
are subsidised to do anyway, so one is looking for an 
effect at the margins. I would assert that there is 
an effect at the margins both for central government 
programmes and for programmes run by others (House of 
Lords, 1988, p46). 
However, suspicion exists that ESF assistance is simply 
replacing government expenditure that would take place in 
any case. 
Turning to examine the remainder of the ESF 
assistance directed to the UK from 1984 until 1987, it can 
be seen that approximately 15% has been allocated to 
Northern Ireland. As a designated absolute priority area 
Northern Ireland has an advantage over other parts of 
the UK. For example, some aspects of the Guidelines are 
entirely restricted to these areas. Normally this means 
that particular guidelines are made less exclusive by 
dropping criteria such as the need for a certain number of 
hours of work experience. Mloreover, schemes from Northern 
Ireland are likely to receive more sympathetic treatment 
from the Commission because of the requirement to direct 
44.5% of the ESF to the absolute priority areas. The data 
for Northern Ireland include schemes run by the Department 
of Manpower Services of the Northern Ireland Office. These 
schemes are equivalent to those operated by the MSC in the 
rest of the UK which could not be included in the regional 
breakdown to the other regions. Therefore, the calculations 
for Northern Ireland are not comparable with the other 
regional data shown in Table 7.1. 
The proportion of ESF assistance to the UK which has 
74q 
not been spent either in Northern Ireland or on 
nationally-based shemes in the rest of Britain, has 
been directed to projects which can be identified at a 
regional level throughout England, Scotland and Wales. This 
aid, which accounts for 24% of the national total, is 
directed towards local authorities, private firms, the 
voluntary sector and a variety of other public and private 
organisations carrying out vocational training and job 
creation schemes (see Chapter 8). 
The largest beneficiary regions from the ESF in 
absolute terms have been North West England, which received 
21.1% of the total, followed by Scotland (19.6%), Yorkshire 
and Humberside (14.5%) and the West Midlands (12.5%). 
Further down the list are South East England (11.7%) and 
South West England (3.1%). If the pattern of ESF spending 
among the UK regions is examined on a per capita basis then 
a similar picture emerges. The most successful areas are 
Scotland, the North West, the North and 
Yorkshire/Humberside. Towards the bottom of the list are 
again South West England, South East and the East Midlands. 
A number of factors explain this broad pattern of 
spending. The first is that regions such as Scotland, 
Northern England, the North West and Yorkshire/Humberside 
have more extensive priority areas than regions such as the 
South East, East Midlands and South West (Figure 7.1), which 
gives organisations in these areas greater opportunity to 
apply for training schemes which will be awarded priority 
status tinder the Guidelines. 
Secondly, the most successful regions have more large 
local authorities with the financial and administrational 
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resources necessary both to fund and apply for ESF projects. 
According to Aitken (1986b), the six largest 
regionally-based recipients of ESF assistance in 1985 were 
all located in Scotland, Yorkshire Humberside and North 
West England. For example, Strathclyde Regional Council 
(Scotland) received J8.73 Million. In the same year 
Manchester City Council (North West) obtained ý3.66 Million. 
In comparison, in 1985 the two largest beneficiaries in 
South West England - Bristol City Council and Devon County 
Council received 10.81 Million and ; --'0.57 Million 
respectively. Thirdly, organisational factors may be 
important in determining spatial variations in receipts 
from the ESF. Local authorities situated in parts of the 
country which have been eligible for ERDF assistance have 
developed the expertise necessary to apply successfully for 
ESF aid. In contrast, authorities in the South East, East 
Midlands and non-assisted parts of the South West have been 
slower to realise the potential of the European Community as 
a source of financial assistance. This ERDF-led explanation 
of varying ESF involvement is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Eight in the context of South West England. 
We can now examine how far this broad pattern of ESF 
spending has been directed to the most needy regions. 
Because the ESF aims primarily to increase employment 
opportunities, the most appropriate measure of the 1. need" of 
particular regions for Fund aid is unemployment. Table 7.1 
compares the distribution of Fund assistance with regional 
unemployment rates and provides a measure of the success of 
particular regions in securing aid according to a per 
unemployed person basis. On this measure, the most 
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successFul regions are once again Scotland, the North West, 
Yorkshire/Humberside and the North. It seems clear that 
there has been a concentration of spending on the regions 
with the highest unemployment rates and with the largest 
numbers of unemployed people. In fact, 84% of funds to 
projects located in the British regions have been directed 
to regions with above average unemployment rates. 
In conclusion, although the bulk of ESF assistance 
which has been directed to schemes based in the regions has 
gone to those areas with the highest rates of unemployment, 
this represents a relatively small volume of assistance 
compared with the amounts spent on national schemes. Of 
course, it should be emphasised again that the ESF is 
primarily an instrument of employment rather than regional 
policy. Consequently, the large proportion of funds 
allocated to national as opposed to regional schemes does 
not as such give cause for concern. However, greater doubts 
can be expressed as to whether the Fund is really 
contributing "additional" assistance to national projects 
such as the Youth Training Scheme. 
7.2.2. The concentration of assistance on Young People 
Under 25. 
The rules governing the ESF set aside 75% of the 
total Fund for projects aimed at young people under the age 
of 25. In the UK, there are clear regional implications of 
such a concentration. In general, the areas with the highest 
overall rates of unemployment are also those with the highest 
rates among the under 25s. Table 7.2 shows the rates of 
tinemployment in 1986 within this age group in the various 
regions. We can see that youth unemployment is particularlý, 
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severe in Northern Ireland, Wales, the North and North West 
of England. 
TABLE 7.2. OVERALL AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN UK REGIONS. 
Unemploment Unemploym. <25s 
Region % 1986 % 1986 
Northern Ireland 22.4 28.5 
North 18.0 27.5 
Wales 16.1 27.0 
Scotland 15.6 24.7 
North West 15.5 26.1 
Yorkshire/Humb. 15.1 22.5 
West Midlands 15.0 25.4 
East Midlands 12.2 19.7 
South West 11.6 18.0 
East Anglia 10.1 15.9 
South East 9.5 15.8 
Total 13.1 21.8 
Sources: Eurostat, 1987; Employment Gazette, December 1986. 
Table 7.3 illustrates the proportion of ESF 
spending on this age group in the UK. It is apparent that 
spending is much more explicitly concentrated on young 
people in the UK than in the Community as a whole. In 
Britain, approximately 84% of assistance was directed 
towards the Under 25s between 1985 and 1986, in comparison 
with the 75% which has been allocated to this age group in 
the rest of the Community. Of the other member states, only 
Ireland has a concentration on young people which exceeds 
80% (Commission, 1986g). 
One reason for this high concentration is the success 
of the Manpower Services Commission in attracting assistance 
for a number of schemes aimed at the under 25s. In fact in 
1986,92.2% of MSC receipts came into this category. The 
most important scheme in this respect is the Youth Training 
Scheme (YTS) which attracted 75% of all MSC receipts in 
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1986. 
TABLE 7.3. THE CONCENTRATION OF ESF ASgISTANCE ON YOUNG 
PEOPLE UNDER 25. 
Age group 
UK m 
Total 85/86 
MECU (%) 
791.8 (83.6) 
127.1 (13.4) 
28.2 (3.0) 
illion ECU (1) 
EC Total 
MECU M 
3596.0 (75.2) 
1019.0 (21.3) 
167.6 (3.5) 
Young People <25 
Adults >25 
Innovatory schemes 
Totals 947.1 (100) 4782.6 (100) 
Notes. (1) Million European Currency Units. The source used 
for these data was available in ECU only. 
Source: Commission (1986g, 1988a). 
The UK is particularly well placed to benefit from 
the particular Commission Guidelines concened with Young 
People. Firstly, the Guideline under which YTS is funded is 
aimed at people under 18, an age group in which the UK has 
proportionately more people in the employment market than 
most other member states. In other countries, such as 
France, compulsory school-leaving ages are higher. 
Furthermore, in countries such as FR Germany apprenticeship 
schemes which involve "on-the-job" training and therefore 
are not eligible for ESF aid (Representative of DE in House 
of Lords, 1988). Between the ages of 18 and 25 there are 
also relatively more people in search of full-time 
employment in the UK than in many other member states. For 
example, all Community countries with the exception of 
Ireland, the UK and Luxembourg have compulsory national 
service for young people. Finally, the numbers of people in 
full-time further and higher education in the UK are also 
relatively low. These factors mean that the UK has 
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significantly more people in need of vocational training 
under the age of 25 than other member states and is 
therefore able to benefit substantially from the Guidelines 
aimed at young people. It seems clear that in the UK the 
objective of concentrating spending on young people is being 
achieved. 
, 
7.2.3. The Objective of helping small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
The Commission Guidelines give priority to vocational 
training projects aimed at training people employed in firms 
of this kind and particularly in the use of new technologies 
and management techniques. However, in the UK, over the 
1985 to 1986 period, only 0.8% of total receipts were 
allocated specifically to workers in these firms. In 
comparison, in the EC as a whole, this figure was 2%. 
(Commission, 1986,9,1988a). 
Because the ESF does not set aside an explicit 
proportion of available resources to this particular 
objective, it is difficult to judge whether this objective 
has been achieved. However, this research points to a 
number of factors which tend to limit in the UK at least 
the amount of ESF funding which is devoted to small and 
medium-sized businesses. 
Firstly, the complexity of the application procedures 
required to secure ESF assistance means that many smaller 
firms are discouraged from applying. These companies are 
unlikely to possess the experience and expertise necessary 
to complete satisfactorily the long and complex application 
form. Moreover, small firms are less likely to have the 
administrative capacity to keep the very detailed records 
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which are required to make final payment claims and to 
present to Commission officials in the case of audit checks. 
The complex administrative procedures mean that firms must 
often employ private consultants to secure assistance and, 
for the smaller companies_, the resulting costs may be 
prohibitive (interviews with private consultant advising 
firms on ESF applications and official of EITB). 
A second factor which operates to the detriment of 
small firms is the financial procedures operated by the 
Commission and the UK government for the payment of grants. 
For example, only 50% of the assistance awarded is paid when 
it is first committed. The other half of the grant can 
be claimed only when the scheme has finished. Once the claim 
for payment has been processed by the Commission and been 
channelled through the UK Treasury as much as a year may 
have elapsed since the completion of the project. Finally 
the application of the linear reduction serves to reduce by 
as much as 50% what for a small firm may only have been a 
relatively modest application. As a result of these complex 
and arguably inefficient procedures firms can not rely on 
ESF aid and must be able to finance the scheme themselves 
until assistance is forthcoming. 
These factors mean that the Fund operates to the 
detriment of the small and medium-sized firm sector which, 
paradoxically, it particularly aims to assist. Moreover, as 
Chapter Eight will show, areas such as Cornwall, which lack 
many large firms and depend heavily on the small-firm 
sector, are relatively disadvantaged. The majority of small 
companies which do succeed in obtaining assistance do not 
re-apply, having been put off by the complexity of 
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procedures and the problems caused by the Fund's system of 
providing finance (interview with official of EITB). In 
consequence, it is the larger firms, often multi-nationals, 
with the largest applications and the greatest resources 
which are most able to benefit from the Fund. They are able 
to employ consultants with the expertise required to win 
assistance and have the necessary economies of scale not to 
be put off- by the perceived bureaucracy and complexity of 
the Fund's application system. 
7.2.4. The objective of encouraging innovatory training 
Projects. 
In the Community as a whole the 5% of the ESF budget 
set aside for innovatory projects has been consistently 
underspent. In 1986, for example, only 3.5% of the Fund was 
committed to projects in this category. However, the 
Commission justified the continuing allocation of 5% of 
total resources to these schemes on the grounds that the 
number of applications in this category rose by 28% over 
1985 (Commission, 1988a). In the UK similar figures are 
apparent. In 1986,3.2% of UK receipts were allocated to 
innovatory projects, in comparison with 2.8% in 1985. 
Clearly, therefore, the objective of concentrating 5% 
of funds on these schemes is not being achieved either in 
the Community as a whole or in the UK. One problem is the 
difficulty of clearly defining the nature of an "innovatory" 
project. The term implies that such a scheme has never been 
done before in terms of either method or content. Therefore 
it is very difficult for potential applicants to use 
previous submissions as models for their own applications. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether ideas applied successfully 
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in one member state are then innovatory when applied in 
another. If not, potential applicants are faced with the 
problem of assessing whether a particular type of scheme has 
been carried out before in any of the other member 
countries. These problems mean that likely applicants are 
either discouraged from applying by the difficulty of 
determining whether projects are innovatory, or their 
projects are judged to be non-priority by the Commission. 
A second factor influencing the volume of 
applications in this category is the lack of dissemination 
of information on developments in the methods and content of 
training schemes (interview with official in ESF unit of 
DE). Since an explicit aim of this aspect of ESF activities 
is to circulate new ideas on vocational training, then the 
perceived lack of effective dissemination clearly gives 
cause for concern. The Commission does provide a 
retrospective view of innovatory schemes which have been 
funded in each ESF Annual Report, but by their very nature 
these schemes are no longer innovative. One reason for the 
lack of adequate dissemination of ideas arising out of the 
innovatory schemes which are funded is that the section of 
DG V in the Commission which handles innovatory projects 
does not have the time or capacity needed to provide regular 
and comprehensive information on schemes of this kind. 
Moreover, the section of DG V concerned with policy and 
administration is not sufficiently well co-ordinated with 
the innovatory projects section to be able to perform this 
task (interview with official of Innovatory Projects 
Division of DG V). 
In this case the Commission is unable to exert any 
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top-down control over the allocation process. Rather it is 
largely dependent on initiative within member states to 
devise training programmes and to submit applications to 
which DG V can then react. 
7.3. THE ROLE OF THE UK GOVERNMENT. 
The UK government's position in the ESFs 
implementation structure is complex because it is involved 
in both administering ESF applications from a wide variety 
of organisations and in applying for assistance on its own 
behalf. Responsibility for managing UK applications for ESF 
assistance rests with the Department of Employment (DE) in 
London. There is no involvement of regional offices of the 
DE, nor do the offices for Scotland and Wales participate in 
examinte%. 5 ESF applications. However, the Scottish and Welsh 
Offices do assist the Department of Employment by providing 
advice to potential applicants and by publicising the 
activities of the ESF (Jones, 1985). On the other hand, 
Northern Ireland as an absolute priority area is treated as 
a special case. An ESF Branch of the Department of 
Economic Development for Northern Ireland has an 
autonomous role in the application process and is not 
subordinate to the DE in London. The Northern Ireland Office 
decides which applications to forward to Brussels and these 
are sent to the DE which includes them in the final package 
of applications it sends to the Commission. 
As well as managing UK applications for ESF grants, 
the Government, in the shape of the Manpower Services 
Commission, the various Industrial Training Boards, a number 
of nationalised industries and the DE itself, is also a 
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major applicant for ESF assistance. Indeed, the UK's largest 
recipient of ESF grants is the Manpower Services Commission 
(MSC). The MSC, which has now been replaced by the Training 
Commission, was a quango directly funded by the national 
Treasury and was responsible, in conjunction with the 
Department of Employment, for a wide variety of training and 
employment creation schemes carried out nationally and 
locally. Among the MSC's (and now the Training Commission's) 
major ESF applications are the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) 
and the Community Programme. Figure 7.3 shows the position 
of the central-government agencies in the ESF's formal 
framework for implementation. 
Much of the information in this section of the 
Chapter is derived from interviews carried out in the DE in 
London, together with meetings at the Manpower Services 
Commission in Sheffield and the Engineering Industry 
Training Board in Watford. The discussion is divided into 
three parts. The first focusG5 on the role of the 
Department of Employment in the management of the ESF. The 
next section examines the role of the M9C in securing ESF 
assistance for the UK. The third part assesses the similar 
role of the various Industrial Training Boards. 
7.3-1. The role of the Department of Employment. 
Responsibility for handling all British applications 
(not including Northern Ireland) for ESF aid rests with the 
ESF section of the DE in London. The participation of the 
department can be divided into five stages: 
a. Advice and consultation with potential applicants; 
b. Examination of submitted applications; 
2 0" 0 
V. 
a) U 
S- 
a) 
V) a 
S- 
(L) (A 
3: w 
C 
ro 
4- CA 
(0 r_ 
EE tu 
CL 
(L) SE 
-i-) 
S- CL 
co C75 
.- z3 
S- S- 
+i ms 
vi 0 
-0 IA 
4-3 
to \ 
eo 0 
r- . - 
0 4J 
. - 
4-3 
S- 
S- 
o 
4-) 
CD 
(0 1 (L) 41 u 
> 
4- 0 (L) 11) 
4- r: 
CD 0 
(0 4- 0 
0 4-3 Q 
a) c: c: 
4) 
C) A- 
r-' 0 
m (cs > 4-) 
4.1 c2.0 r. 
S-. (L) M (L) 
0 4-) 
Co 
Co 
lä 
4.1 
4-) 02 
r. 94 
10 Co 0 
CL -i 
CL Ci. cö 0. ý 
CD 
LU 
CL. 
CD 
LU 
C: ) 
LU 
cý 
ZD 
CY- 
c: c 
LU 
Z: 
LU 
fl- 
LLI 
LL- 
26 1 
c. Negotiations with the Commission about provisional 
decisions; 
d. Particiption in the ESF Advisory Committee; 
e. Application of linear reduction. 
a) Advice and consultation. 
The first stage of DE involvement begins before 
applications are actually submitted. In the period between 
the publication of the Commission Guidelines in April of 
each year and the August deadline set by the Department for 
the receipt of applications, there is extensive consultation 
between potential applicants and the DE. The Department 
issues a comprehensive package of "Notes for Guidance" and 
advice on how to make applications. Furthermore, the DE is 
involved in extensive discussions with local 
authorities, the MSC and other central government 
departments and agencies. These include consultations over 
the likely eligibility of particular schemes and a variety 
of meetings and seminars at which DE officials provide 
advice about changes in the Guidelines and pass on any 
comments made by Commission officials about the content of 
applications. A particularly instructive seminar about the 
ESF is organised each June by the School for Advanced Urban 
Studies (SAUS) in Bristol. This meeting is attended by many 
local-authority representatives from all parts of the UK and 
is addressed by officials of the DE, the European Commission 
and others. 
The information provided by the DE at this stage is 
crucial to the successful implementation of the Fund in the 
UK. The officials of the DE are the most closely involved in 
discussions with the Commission. Hence it is vital that they 
pass on all relevant information to potential applicants. 
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Seminars such as that organised by SAUS are considered by 
many local-authority representatives to be the most 
effective medium for this kind of communication 
(interview source). This emphasises the importance of 
national government as a source of advice and information 
which allows the ESF to operate effectively. 
b) Examination of applications. 
In order to allow sufficient time for the processing 
of all submissions before the Commission's deadline on 21st 
October, the DE requests that all applications arrive at the 
Department's ESF unit by August 14th. This allows the 
Department two months to ensure that as many applications as 
possible correspond to the ESF's eligibility criteria and to 
the Commission's Guidelines. 
Each application is examined by the staff of the 
ESF unit to ensure that it is admissible and eligible under 
the Fund rules (Council Regulation 2950/83). Officials of 
the DE then assess whether applications meet the criteria 
used by the Commission to judge the priority status of 
submitted schemes. This stage is the most crucial because 
only schemes classified as priority according to the 
Guidelines are likely to receive assistance. At this stage 
virtually all applications submitted to the DE require some 
amendment or "fine-tuning" in order to increase their 
chances of success. This process results in the rejection of 
only about 5% or 6% of applications as definitely ineligible 
(interview with Official of DE). 
In order to maximise potential UK receipts from the 
Fund, the DE's task is to ensure that as many applications 
as possible are forwarded to Brussels in a form which is 
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likely to attract assistance. To achieve this the DE 
attempts to interpret the Guidelines in the same fashion as 
the officials of DG V at the Commission. However, as Chapter 
Six pointed out the Commission Guidelines are phrased in a 
sufficiently vague fashion to allow these officials scope to 
apply the Guidelines in different ways according to the 
number and quality of applications in particular years. As 
Aitken (1986b) points out: 
although the Department of Employment advises as best 
it can on the available information, both formal and 
informal, experience has shown that the Commission 
may adopt a different interpretation of the 
Guidelines (Aitken, 1986b , p1l). 
The Guidelines allow the Commission to keep the upper hand 
in the allocation process and in this respect the role of 
the DE is subordinate to that of DG V. 
As it attempts to maximise UK receipts from the ESF, 
the DE is faced by something of a dilemma. On the one hand, 
it must attempt to generate as many applications as possible 
in order to increase the UK's potential share of the Fund. 
On the other hand, there is clearly a limit to the total 
amount of money the UK can obtain. Firstly, the Fund is 
already greatly oversubscribed and, secondly, the perceived 
"informal quotas" (see Chapter 6) restrict the proportion of 
total assistance which the UK can hope to win. Furthermore, 
increases in priority applications will lead to larger 
linear reductions. If these reductions become too great 
(they have already reached 50% for projects aimed at the 
over 25s) then there may be little point in applying for 
assistance in the first place (interview with official of 
DE). For this reason the DE is content to advise and assist 
regular applicants such as local authorities and the MSC 
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rather than attempt to broaden the range of applicants. In 
the long term, the doubling of Structural Fund resources 
agreed at the Brussels summit in February 1988 may ease 
these problems and force the DE to publicise the Fund more 
widely. 
c) Negotiations with the Commission. 
Once the Commission has reached the stage of issuing 
a provisional decision on the allocation of grants (the 
"blue note") and before the ESF Advisory Committee meets in 
Brussels, the DE is consulted by DG V on any grant decisions 
with which it may disagree. The Department is most concerned 
to ensure that the large national schemes are funded as 
fully as possible. In particular, it concentrates on those 
schemes run by the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) such 
as the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) which receive the largest 
grants (interview with Officer in ESF unit of DE). This 
demonstrates how the national government is closely involved 
at all stages of the decision-making process. The Commission 
is careful to allow the national governments the opportunity 
to monitor closely the decision-making activities of DG V. 
Thus, the input of national government into the 
decision-making process also takes place away from the 
formal channels of communication such as the ESF Advisory 
Committee. 
d) The ESF Advisory Committee meetina. 
The formal government representatives on this 
Committee (see Chapter 6) are the Head of the DE's European 
Communities Section and the Head of the Department's ESF 
Unit. These officials are joined by other British delegates 
representing the Trade Union Council (TUC) and the 
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Confederation of British Industry (CBI). As Chapter 
Six demonstrated this Committee possesses few formal powers. 
As far as officials of the DE are concerned, the meeting's 
main purpose is to permit general views to be aired on the 
operation and priorities of the Fund, rather than to debate 
individual schemes (interview with Chief Adviser at DE). The 
Committee is important for canvassing the views of other 
member states on particular issues and for formally 
pressurising the Commission to adopt particular srategies 
which coincide with the interests of the UK. For example, in 
the 1987 ESF Advisory Commitee meeting, the UK Government 
opposed the reduction in priority areas to account for 50% 
rather than 53% of the Community population. However, the 
Commission, supported by other member states such as Spain 
and Italy which favoured this increased concentration, was 
able to resist this pressure and the reductions in priority 
areas were made to the Guidelines which apply to 1988. This 
illustrates that the Commission does have significant powers 
to act against the will of some countries on particular 
issues. However, the Commission requires alliances of other 
member states to support its views and would be unlikely to 
decide against the wishes of a majority of national 
delegations (interview with official of DG V). 
e) Application of the linear reduction. 
The final participation of the DE in the annual cycle 
of decision-making leading to the award of ESF grants in 
late March is in the application of linear reductions. The 
Commission Guidelines list categories of schemes which are 
exempt from this reduction. The first category includes 
operations forming part of an Integrated Development 
26 6 
Operation. The second concerns schemes "particularly 
dependent on Fund assistance". Projects in the first 
category are self-evident. The latter, on the other hand, 
are much more difficult to define. Consequently, the 
Commission allows national governments to make this 
essentially subjective judgement. 
In the UK, the DE has normally exempted projects run 
by voluntary and charitable organisations. However, in 1987 
a decision was taken by Employment Ministers not to exempt 
fully organisations such as these from the reduction. 
Instead, grants to such organisations for projects involving 
people over 25 were reduced by 20% (as opposed to 50% for 
the country as a whole) (interview with official of DE). 
This decision had, as Chapter Eight will show, a major 
impact on schemes run by voluntary organisations who are 
indeed dependent upon ESF assistance for the implementation 
of training schemes for groups such as women, the disabled 
or ethnic minorities. These organisations often find it 
difficult to secure funding from other sources to allow 
their schemes to go ahead without ESF aid. The problem faced 
by the DE is that only a small number of schemes can 
realistically be exempted because the remaining schemes have 
to share the cost and therefore receive a reduction which is 
slightly greater than that applied to the country as a 
whole. In this context the ministerial decision to reduce 
awards to voluntary and charitable organisations by 20% in 
1987 becomes easier to understand. The imposed overall 
reduction of 50% was already intolerably high for many 
applicants and any further reduction caused by the full 
exemption of voluntary organisations would reduce still 
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further the already marginal benefits of applying for ESF 
aid in the first place. This point illustrates once again 
the close involvement of the UK government in the 
implementation process and the importance of political 
decisions taken at national level. 
7.3.2. The role of the Manpower Services Commission. 
Apart from managing UK applications, the government 
is also involved in applying for aid from the Fund in its 
own right. The extensive contribution of the Manpower 
Services Commission (MSC) to vocational training and 
employment creation measures ensures that it is ideally 
placed to benefit substantially from the ESF. The work of 
the MSC is closely co-ordinated with the Department of 
Employment to which the MSC is politically subordinate. 
MSC receipts from the ESF are very substantial. In 
1986, for example, the MSC received 4149.7 Million from 
the Fund (Manpower Services Commission, 1987). This sum 
accounted for 51% of all UK receipts in that year. However, 
the proportion of UK receipts allocated to the MSC has been 
falling in recent years. In 1984,66% of receipts were 
allocated to the MSC. This sum fell to 53% in 1985 (Aitken, 
1986b). The particularly large figure for 1984 was partly 
responsible for the fact that, in that year, the UK received 
a larger share of the ESF than any of the other member 
states. A large proportion of this assistance was spent on 
the MSC's Community Programme scheme, which was accorded 
priority status in its entirety. However, in subsequent 
years the Commission altered its interpretation of the 
Guidelines regarding this scheme, resulting in the 
classification of most of the programmme as non-priority. 
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Consequently, both the MSC's share of total assistance and 
Britain's overall receipts from the Fund were reduced 
substantially. Table 7.4 and Figure 7.4 illustrate the 
volumes of assistance allocated in 1985 and 1986 to 
particular MSC programmes and compares these data with the 
overall costs of the programmes. ESF receipts in 1985 and 
1986 accounted for approximately 7% and 4.9% respectively of 
the overall MSC budget (Manpower Services Commission, 1986, 
1987). 
The largest single submission for ESF assistance from 
any of the twelve member states is the MSC's application for 
the Youth Training Scheme (YTS). Indeed in 1986 the money 
allocated to YTS CLmounted to X108 Million (Manpower 
Services Commission, 1987). This represented 38.4% of the UK 
share of the ESF and 6.8% of the entire Fund in that year 
(Commission, 1988). 
The YTS was instituted in 1983 with the intention of 
increasing the ability of school leavers to obtain secure 
employment by providing them with occupational skills and 
specific recognised qualifications. In the first few years 
of the scheme young people participated for one year only. 
However, in 1986 the sceme was extended to two years. The 
MSC first applied for ESF assistance towards the cost of YTS 
in 1983. Since then the EC's contribution to the scheme has 
been substantial. In the UK financial year 1986/87 YTS cost 
a total of jE875.1 Million (Manpower Services Commission, 
1987). Therefore, the ESF provided approximately 12% of the 
scheme's entire cost. 
Only that part of YTS expenditure which is carried 
out in the ESF priority areas has priority status for ESF 
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ALLOCATION OF ESF TO MANPOWER 
SERVICES COMMISSION SCHEMES 1986 
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FIGURE 7.4 ALLOCATION OF ESF CRANTS TO MANPOWER SERVICES 
COMMISSION SCHEMES, 1986. 
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aid. In 1986, eligible expenditure which was accorded 
priority status qmounted toJ, 398 Million. Consequently, the 
MSC applied for, 4193 Million (50% of eligible spending) 
(interview with representative of the MSC). In the event the 
European Commission committedf, 108 Million to the scheme. 
This final figure was for two reasons considerably less than 
the amount sought. Firstly, a linear reduction of 4% was 
applied to schemes for young people because of the 
oversubscription of the Fund. Secondly, assistance was 
reduced by a further 39% because the Commission judged that 
the scheme did not offer "substantial prospects of 
employment" to all trainees (interview with official of 
MSC). This calculation was based on statistics supplied by 
the DE which showed that only 60% of YTS trainees obtain 
full-time employment after participation in the scheme. 
However, this figure represents the national placement rate 
for YTS participants. It is probable that placement rates in 
the priority areas, which are those to which assistance for 
YTS is in theory directed, will be mu. ch lower (interview 
with official of MSC), because overall unemployment rates in 
these areas are higher than for the UK as a whole. If the 
Commission used the priority area placement rate to measure 
ff substantial prospects of employment" then the overall 
reduction to the YTS grant might be considerably greater. 
However, since the ESF assistance is aimed at priority areas 
(those places with the highest unemployment rates) the logic 
of having an even greater reduction in these areas would be 
highly dubious. 
it is apparent that a conflict exists 
between, firstly, ensuring that schemes funded by the ESF 
77,09, 
are providing trainees with a real possibility of finding 
a job and, secondly, directing money to priority areas 
where, by definition, it is much more difficult to find 
employment. 
Apart from these problems of interpreting the Fund's 
eligibili6y criteria, the allocation of ESF aid to the YTS 
is also influenced by political factors. The receipts from 
the Fund for YTS make the single most important 
contribution to the UK's overall share of the ESF. The 
Government exerts considerable pressure on the Commission 
both informally in the discussions which continue throughout 
the decision-making process and formally in the ESF 
Committee, to continue funding of the YTS at its present 
high level (interview with official of DE). Indeed, 
evidence from interviews at both the MSC and DG V illustrate 
how Commission officials deflect criticism from other 
Governments about the YTS funding. The 1986 submission for 
YTS included an application for a further $_162.2 Million of 
assistance for expenditure on YTS taking place in 
non-priority areas. This funding was classified as 
non-priority by the Commission and no further assistance was 
provided for the UK. However, it is suggested that this 
application had been requested informally by an official of 
DG V precisely so that it could subsequently be refused 
(interviews with officials of MSC and DG V). In this way DG 
V could justify to other member states the relatively high 
levels of assistance allocated to YTS by pointing to the 
large sums which had been refused. 
The final sum allocated to the YTS represents a 
compromise between the interests of the UK government, the 
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Commission and the other member states based on negotiations 
carried out between the DE and DG V. Once again we see the 
importance of national government in the implementation 
process operating at an informal level outside of the 
formalised structures such as the Council of Ministers and 
the ESF Advisory Committee. 
Although the MSC is essentially a branch of national 
Government, it has its own ESF unit, based at MSC 
headquarters in Sheffield which is responsible for 
formulating MSC applications for ESF grants. Moreover, its 
final applications are formally dealt with by the DE in the 
same fashion as any other applications. On the other hand, 
the MSC's ESF unit works closely with the DE in formulating 
applications, reflecting the close involvement of central 
government in applying for, as well as administering ESF 
assistance. In fact, the DE effectively controls MSC 
applications by having the final say on which schemes are 
forwarded to Brussels (interview with official of MSC). 
Again we see how the national government is closely involved 
at all levels of the implementation process. 
The overall aim of the MSC's ESF section, in 
conjunction with the DE, is to maximise the MSC's receipts 
and hence the UK's share of assistance from the Fund. The 
unit's three Higher Executive Officers scrutinise the 
Commission Guidelines when these are issued each April in 
order to identify those MSC schemes which are likely to gain 
priority status under the Guidelines. The Department of 
Employment's "Action for Jobs" leaflet (Department of 
Employment, 1986) sets out the various training and 
employment schemes organised by both the MSC and the DE and 
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is the starting point for the identification of eligible 
projects. Invariably, however, very few schemes are 
consistent in their entirety with the Guidelines. Instead, 
only certain aspects of the MSC's programmes will be 
accorded priority status under the Guidelines. For example, 
only the women or disabled persons undergoing training may 
be eligible, or only the part of a scheme which takes place 
in the priority areas may be included in the application. In 
a number of cases, the priority elements of particular 
schemes have changed over time. Apart from the Community 
Programme, the whole of the MSC's Enterprise Allowance 
Scheme, which provides grants to persons setting up their 
own businesses, also attained priority status under the 
Guidelines. However, in 1985 changes in the Guidelines 
introduced by the Commission, which were designed to reduce 
the volume of priority applications, meant that only female 
participants in the scheme were eligible for assistance, 
providing they were setting up a business in a particular 
economic sector in which they are under-represented. As 
Chapter Eight will show, the annual shifting of the "goal 
posts" which determine the priority status of particular 
schemes can cause problems for applicants at the regional 
level. 
7.3.3. The role of the Industrial Training Boards. 
The Industrial Training Boards (ITBs) were created by 
the 1964 Employment and Training Act with the aim of 
encouraging and monitoring training being carried out in the 
private sector and of setting training standards for 
companies to follow. The ITBs are partly funded by central 
government and partly by a levy totalling 1% of the payroll 
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of firms over a certain size. The ITBs use this income to 
finance training schemes of their own in sectors which they 
consider to be under provided. Although the ITBs are 
partially independent from central government they are 
nevertheless classified as public authorities from the point 
of view of the ESF. There are a variety of ITBs in existence 
concerned with different industrial sectors. These include 
the Plastics Processing ITB, Construction ITB, Offshore 
Training Board ITB and the Engineering ITB (EITB). In the 
ESF arena, the EITB is quantitatively the most important. 
The following discussion is therefore based on interviews 
carried out in the Head Office of the EITB in Watford and at 
the ESF Unit of the DE in London. 
The main function of the ITBs, as far as the ESF is 
concerned, is to provide the public authority contribution 
necessary to allow schemes run by private companies to 
receive ESF assistance. This contribution is derived from 
exemptions to the 1% levy which the ITBs impose The EITB, 
for example, has the discretion to exempt firms from this 
levy up to the level of training being carried out which is 
eligible for ESF assistance. This exemption is accepted by 
both the DE and the Commission as a satisfactory 
public-authority contribution. 
The second task of the ITBs is to act as 
intermediaries between the companies submitting applications 
and the ESF unit at the DE. The EITB, for example, provides 
an information pack to any firms enquiring about potential 
sources of funding for vocational training schemes. This 
pack includes an application form and notes on the types of 
schemes which will be eligible for the ESF and advice on how 
?76 
C, j to a -Idd 00 V-4 LO t- to CII 010 
po 
U 
c1 
:D 
cn 
tý 
N 
0, - 
a, 
00 
'41.6 -, 4 
4-) 
03 
lz 0 
D: ., I 
0 M-4 
04 
E- 
0 (Z 
E-4 ; -4 to 
(n 
V4 
10 
m *r-4 
m 4J 
Q 
0 
DI 
P4 
4-4 cd 
0 
r-4 
0z 
Z C. 
P 
Ln to CD lt: r (7) co q-. 4 lt: r co ledq 0 t- 
o t- 0 t- mm (M qtr 00 CD 0 
C, j CQ mr C4 LO P-4 0M tO LO 00 C) 
T-4 " L- to t- LO C14 Cf) 
0 
C4-4 
4-) 
m cr) M LO (D 0 0) Cd 
: ; Cý tý 1 4 C; Cý 0) q: r cli co It: r 00 a t- 
CO 9-4 co to to C-3 Cj CD 
9-4 7-4 IF-4 CD 
pq 
E-4 
.0 4J 
C-1 Lo C -tr cn co N mr 7-4 N0 ý4 It 
1 1) Lý tý cý 4 q; c4 Lý c; Lý c; (ý ' 0 0 t- 0 t- 4: 11 U) to Lo to CIJ CD CV) ., q N C-13 IRr N co 0 cla C14 a) N C. 0 C14 > 9-4 to mr LO LO 
N t- 0 1-4 cr) $4 
P4 
Cc 
4. ) 
lz 
r-4 1-4 m to m0 0) Q0 N IR: r to LO r-I 
ý4 M LO 0 to LO q144 
a 
LO :3 
04 
r. 
t- co m0 CV) " LO CD E- 
t- t- t- 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4-; :3 
mm cr) a) M (M m a) CD (M (M 0 0 r-4 T--4 7-4 T-q ". 4 V-4 ". 4 1-. 4 r-4 T--q T-4 E- m 
277 
to complete the application form. Submissions from firms are 
forwarded to the EITB in Watford which attempts to ensure 
that they correspond with the Fund's admissibility, 
eligibility and priority criteria. This process ensures that 
all applications from firms reach the DE as well-prepared as 
possible, serving to reduce the workload of the DE and 
increase the speed with which it can process applications. 
There have been substantial increases in the number 
and volume of applications handled by the EITB in recent 
years. Table 7.5 and Figure 7.5 demonstrates this by showing 
that the total number of successful applications dealt with 
by the EITB rose from 29 in the period frorn 1977 and 1982, 
to 155 in 1987 alone. An interview respondent at the EITB 
attributed this rise primarily to the Board's own promotion 
of the ESF as an important source of assistance. 
Furthermore, since 1982 the EITB has also been very 
successful in attracting assistance for its own schemes. 
This involvement peaked in 1984 when the Board received -, 41.7 
Million from the Fund. The assistance allocated to ITBs is 
retained by the UK Treasury and used to offset the total 
government funding provided for Training Boards. Again the 
issue of "additionality" is in question in the context of 
the ESF. 
7.4. CONCLUSIONS: IMPLEMENTATION AS NEGOTIATION AND 
BARGAINING. 
The role of the UK government in the implementation 
of the ESF is complex. Firstly, the DE is a manager of 
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applications from the UK. In this respect its main task is 
to maximise UK receipts. DE officials place a high priority 
on this objective because the Fund, together with the ERDF, 
represents a significant proportion of the direct financial 
benefits obtained by Britain from the overall Community 
budget. As a result, the DE has developed relationships with 
both the Commission and applicants for assistance based on 
co-operation and consensus. Officials of DG V praise the DE 
for the high standard of applications which arrive at the 
Commission from the UK. Moreover,, ESF applicants point to 
the high degrees of help provided by DE officials. 
The second role of central government is as an 
applicant for ESF aid in its own right. The submissions 
presented by the MSC, Industrial Training Boards and 
various other government agencies are the major 
contributions to the UK's share of the ESF. However, there 
is apparently little conflict in practice between these two 
roles. The need to secure high levels of finance for 
national schemes does not appear to disadvantage 
applications from the regions in any way because the ESF 
unit ensures that as many applications as possible are 
forwarded to Brussels. 
As the previous Chapter showed, the Commission has a 
degree of control over certain aspects of the allocation of 
the ESF. However, there are clearly definite limits to how 
far it can impose hierarchical control over the 
implementation process. In fact the national government is 
central to the implementation process and should not be 
r; garded as hierarchically subordinate to the Commission, 
which is heavily dependent on governments to operationalise 
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the Fund. Moreover, national bureaucracies are involved at 
all stages of decision-making in a process of constant 
negotiation and bargaining with the Commission. These 
discussions take place not only in formal situations such as 
the ESF Advisory Committee, but also through informal 
channels of communication which are arguably more important. 
These include the on-going discussion between member states 
and the Commission following the production of the 
Commission's provisional decision on ESF grants. The 
Commission always canvasses the views of governments before 
making decisions. After all, any powers which the Commission 
posesses have been devolved to it by the Council of 
Ministers which retains the ability to remove these powers. 
As a result, negotiations and compromises constantly take 
place. An example of this is the funding of the YTS where 
negotiations ensure that the UK obtains a substantial level 
of assistance. 
This chapter has also examined whether the 
operational objectives of the ESF have been achieved in the 
UK. Of the four aims which were singled out in Chapter 
Six only that of concentrating spending on Young People 
under 25 has unquestionably been achieved in the UK. As far 
as the other three are concerned, some doubts exist. The 
largest proportion of ESF aid to the UK has been directed to 
large schemes operating on a national basis. Despite the 
fact that assistance to these projects is in many cases 
allocated on the basis of eligible expenditure being carried 
out in the priority areas, it is difficult to sustain the 
argument that the ESF is really being concentrated in the 
neediest areas since this assistance supports overall 
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national spending. On the other hand, the smaller proportion 
of assistance which can be identified at the regional level 
has been allocated largely to the regions with the highest 
unemployment rates. The main problem is that the degree of 
concentration is only partially specified in the rules 
governing the Fund. The Council Decision sets aside 44.5% of 
resources to the absolute priority areas, which include 
Northern Ireland. However, there is no corresponding Figure 
for the amount that should be directed towards the other 
priority areas. Hence it is difficult to judge accurately 
whether the Fund has achieved this objective during 
implementation. 
It is possible to be less equivocal when examining 
the objectives of encouraging innovatory projects and 
assisting small and medium-sized enterprises. The aim of 
directing 5% of the ESF budget to innovatory schemes has 
clearly not been delivered either in the UK or in the 
Community as a whole because of problems in the 
implementation process which mean it is difficult 
satisfactorily to define what is meant by innovatory. 
Moreover, the Comiission has been unable to disseminate 
information on new training methods which may have been 
generated by this particular part of the ESF. The 
implementation process has also caused problems for the 
small and medium-sized firm sector which the Fund also aims 
to assist. These firms are often unable to cope with the 
complexity of application procedures and the problems 
created by the Fund's system of paying grants. All these 
problems are felt most severely in those regions where 
unemployment rates are highest and where job creation is 
already very difficult. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ESF IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM: A CASE-STUDY OF LOCAL INITIATIVE IN SOUTH WEST 
ENGLAND. 
8.1. INTRODUCTION. 
The previous two Chapters have examined the 
operational" objectives of the ESF and the degree of 
top-down" control exerted by the UK Government and the 
European Commission over the implementation process. Chapter 
Eight now focuse-, ý_ on the operation of the ESF in South West 
England and on the role of local applicants in implementing 
the Fund. As we have already seen, the provision of EC 
financial aid is highly dependent on the submission of grant 
applications by organisations within member states. In the 
case of the ESF, about 40% of assistance to the UK is 
directed to applicants based in the regions. Hence it is 
necessary to examine how and why local applicants go about 
applying for ESF aid as well as the problems faced by these 
actors in the implementation process. 
This discussion is based on two primary sources. 
Firstly, use is made of a series of interviews carried out 
with representatives of local authorities involved in making 
applications and with representatives of the National 
Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) and, two 
consultancy companies, Binder Hamlyn Ltd and J and AB 
Associates, involved in advising organisations thinking of 
applying for ESF assistance. Secondly, it uses information 
obtained from two short postal questionnaires aimed at Fund 
applicants in the private and voluntary sectors (Appendix 
4). 
The Chapter is divided into four parts. The first 
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examines the nature and geography of ESF assistance in 
South West England in order to assess whether the ESF's 
main operational objectives are achieved at the regional 
level. The second part focuses on the local-authority 
recipients of ESF grants and outlines the factors which 
affect varying local-government involvement with the Fund. 
The final two sections concentrate on the private 
manufacturing and voluntary sectors respectively, explaining 
the varying involvement of these organisations with the ESF. 
The emphasis throughout is on the ESF's regional objectives 
and implications. 
Chapter Five provided a general review of the 
economic context within which Community Funds operate in the 
region. However, at this juncture, since the major aim of 
the Fund is to improve or safeguard employment prospects, it 
is worth elaborating on the unemployment situation in South 
West England. Table 8.1 shows the substantial variations in 
unemployment rates throughout the region. In October 1986 
these ranged from 18.3% for Cornwall as a whole, to 9.3% 
for Gloucestershire. Moreover, at the Travel to Work 
Area level unemployment reached 23.4% in Newquay 
(Cornwall) and at the other extreme was just 7.3% in 
Cirencester (Gloucestershire) (Employment Gazette, December 
1986). These variations are reflected in the fact that only 
Cornwall is designated as a priority area under the ESF 
Guidelines. 
Although the above figures suggest that the most 
needy area in terms of overall unemployment rates is 
Cornwall, a different picture emerges if we examine figures 
for long-term unemployment: the highest proportion of 
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long-term unemployment is to be found in Avon and 
Gloucestershire rather than the areas with the highest 
overall rates. In terms of unemployment among the Under 25 
age group, which the ESF aims particularly to assist, fewer 
data are available at the sub-regional level. However, 
according to EC statistics unemployment among the Under 25s 
in South West England was just 15.1% in 1985. In comparison, 
the national average is 19.8% (Eurostat, 1987). Clearly 
long-term and youth unemployment rates in the South West 
are not as serious as in other areas of the UK. 
Nevertheless, parts of South West England, notably the 
County of Cornwall, have relatively high overall 
unemployment rates, making them the major focus of the ESF's 
regional ambitions. 
TABLE 8.1. THE UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN SOUTH WEST 
ENGLAND. 
% long- Variations in 
Unemployment term unem- unemployment 
County Oct 1986 (%) polyment(l) low/high(2) 
Cornwall 18.3 29.5 Newquay 23.4% 
Truro 12.2% 
Devon 13.2 32.5 Bideford 18.0% 
Exeter 9.8% 
Dorset 10.9 31.0 Bournemouth 11.6% 
Shaftesbury 8.8% 
Avon 10.7 36.7 Weston S. M. 14.0% 
Bath 9.1% 
Somerset 10.6 32.5 Bridgewater 13.7% 
Wells 9.0% 
Wiltshire 9.6 30.1 Swindon 11.2% 
Devizes 7.9% 
Gloucestershire 9.3 35.0 Cinderford 16.0% 
Cirencester 7.3% 
South West 12.0 32.7 Newquay 23.4% 
Average 
UK Average 13.1 40.5 Cirencester 7.3% 
Note: 1) Long-term unemployment (1987) is defined as without 
work and claiming benefit for at least one year. 
2) At Travel to Work Area level. 
Source: Employment Gazette, Dec. 1986; Regional Trends, 1987. 
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We can now examine whether the distribution of ESF 
aid in the region reflects this pattern of unemployment, 
given that one objective of the ESF is to concentrate 
spending on the areas most in need. 
8.2. THE NATURE AND GEOGRAPHY OF ESF SPENDING IN SOUTH WEST 
ENGLAND. 
The absence of any regionally-based data prior to 
1984 means that this section is based on data for the 
period from 1984 to 1987 inclusive. However, this time-span 
coincides with the four years in which the most recently 
reformed ESF has been in operation (Council Decision 
83/516/EEC and Council Regulation (EEC) 2950/83). Moreover, 
in 1983 there were only three successful applications from 
organisations based in the region (interview with official 
of DE). Thus the study period commences at the time when the 
ESF first became a major source of assistance for local 
labour-market training policies. 
Since 1984, the Fund has channelled grants totalling 
. 
J7.86 Million to projects in South West England. This 
figure represents a 50% contribution to training and 
employment measures and therefore the ESF has participated 
in public investment on local employment policies totalling 
X15.7 Million. Moreover, this assistance has been restricted 
to certain types of priority scheme which favour projects 
being carried out in the area with the highest unemployment 
rates, namely Cornwall. For example, schemes aimed 
specifically at the over 25s are limited to priority areas 
only. It is evident, therefore, that the ESF is a 
significant actor in the provision of employment and 
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training related schemes operating at the local level. 
It should of course be emphasised that these figures 
are relatively small in relation to the volume of ESF aid 
which is nominally directed towards MSC programmes operating 
in the region. Indeed, from 1984 until 1986 the ESF 
assistance allocated to MSC schemes, on the basis of the 
share of expenditure being carried out in the South West, 
amounted to 119.27 Million (unpublished data provided by the 
MSC). Apart from the MSC programmes operating in the 
region, other national organisations such as the 
Department of Trade and Industry, British Shipbuilders, 
Industrial Training Boards and Water Authorities, also 
operate nationwide schemes which are funded by the ESF on 
the basis of the share of expenditure taking place in 
priority areas. However, as Chapter Seven demonstrated, in 
reality this money goes to the overall support of national 
schemes and it is impossible to identify the particular 
beneficiaries of this aid in any particular region. 
Therefore, these schemes are not included in this analysis. 
Of course, that is not to say that the schemes themselves 
are not of benefit to young and unemployed people in the 
region. 
The beneficiaries of the assistance to schemes 
located in South West England are described in Table 8.2 
and Figure 8.1. It is noticeable that assistance to locally 
based projects is spread across a wider range of provision 
than the national profile outlined in Chapter 7. In the UK 
as a whole 89% of ESF receipts have gone to train young 
people under 25 and particularly those under 18 on the YTS 
scheme, whereas in the South West region the Under 25s 
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FTMIRP A-1- 
THE BENEFICIARIES OF ESF-FUNDED TRAINING 
IN SOUTH WEST ENGLAND, 1984-1987 
BY POINT IN GUIDEUNES 
WOMEN 
134% 
TOTAL =J-7.858 MILLION 
UNDER 25s 
52-9% 
>1 MEMBER STATE 
6-0% 
INNOVATORY SCHEMES 
12-8% 
SMALLIMEDIUM FIRMS 
08% 
RESTRUCTURING 
0.9% 
DISADVANTAGED GROUPS 
3-6% 
DISABLED 
42% 
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account for only 52.6% of assistance. This reflects the fact 
that overall national receipts are dominated by the YTS 
which is aimed at the under 18 age group. 
TABLE 8.2. THE BENEFICIARIES OF ESF GRANTS IN SOUTH WEST 
ENGLAND, 1984-87. 
Recipient group A000's % 
Under 18s 427.7 5.4 
Under 25s 3711.0 47.2 
Women 1046.0 13.3 
Schemes in 2 or more 467.6 6.0 
member state (1) 
Migrants 418.1 5.3 
Disabled 328.7 4.2 
Disadvantaged groups(2) 284.5 3.6 
Restructuring 73.4 0.9 
Small/medium enterprise 60.2 0.8 
Long term unemployed 42.2 0.5 
Innovatory schemes 998.5 12.7 
Regional Total 7857.9 100.0 
Note: 1) These include projects which involve exchanges 
between trainees on schemes operating in different 
countries. 
2) The Guideline aimed at disadvantaged groups, which had 
been interpreted to include ethnic minorities, was withdrawn 
after 1985. 
Source: Data provided by the Department of Employment. 
Turning to the other categories of beneficiary, we 
see that women receive approximately 12% of assistance 
in South West England. Projects aimed at the female 
proportion of the workforce are awarded grants under the 
Guideline which gives priority to schemes training women in 
occupations in which they are under-represented. A further 
12% of aid has been directed to innovatory projects. The 
remaining grants to the South West-have been divided among a 
number of categories of beneficiaries such as migrant 
workers, disabled persons, and workers in industries 
undergoing restructuring. 
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Figure 8.2 and Table 8.3 illustrate the spatial 
pattern of this ESF assistance within South West England. 
The map shows the total allocation of grants and the 
spatial variation in the involvement of local authorities, 
private manufacturing and voluntary sector organisations 
with the ESF. The Table shows the distribution of spending 
on a per capita basis. It was not possible to break down the 
data to a spatial scale smaller than the County level, 
because most of the data, particularly those schemes run by 
County Councils, are not place-specific. 
It is interesting to note that the map and Table 
indicate that the largest share of ESF aid in the region has 
gone to the County of Avon which has a relatively low 
unemployment rate. Furthermore, Avon has also won the 
largest share of ESF funds on a per capita basis. Avon has 
a local authority (Bristol City Council) with the largest 
spending budget in the South West, thus giving it greater 
potential to attract ESF resources. Moreover, it has a wider 
range of companies and other organisations carrying out 
training schemes than the less densely populated counties 
such as Cornwall and Devon. Figure 8.2 shows that in Avon 
private and voluntary sectors are involved to a much greater 
extent than in the counties of the "far South West". 
Despite the lack of priority area status, the greater volume 
of economic activity in the County is able to generate more 
applications and hence more ESF grants than the other 
counties in the region. 
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TABLE 8.3. THE PATTERN OF ESF SPENDING IN SOUTH WEST 
ENGLAND. 1984-1987. 
County 
1000's 
Totals 
per 
capita 
per (1) 
unemployed 
Avon 3245.6 3.45 72.4 
Devon 1513.8 1.55 31.5 
Cornwall 1008.0 2.30 37.6 
Wiltshire 720.8 1.34 35.7 
Somerset 621.7 1.41 35.5 
Gloucestershire 244.4 0.48 12.0 
Dorset 177.8 0.29 7.3 
more than 325.8 - - 
one county 
Total 7857.9 1.76 38.9 
Note: 1) Per unemployed person (based on unemployment in 
October 1986. 
Sources: Data provided by the Department of Employment; 
Regional Trends 1987; 
Employment Gazette, December 1986. 
The next most successful counties in both actual and 
per capita terms are Devon and Cornwall which have been 
allocated J, 1.5 Million and fl. 0 Million respectively. 
Cornwall has the highest unemployment rate in the region and 
has the advantage of priority area status. On the other 
hand, it has few large local authorities and other large 
organisations able to generate applications to the same 
degree as Avon (see Figure 8.2). The per capita share of 
assistance allocated to Cornwall, however, is the second 
highest in the region. Of the other non-priority counties, 
Wiltshire and Somerset are the most successful. These areas 
have obtained similar per capita shares to Devon, whereas 
Gloucestershire and Dorset have received the smallest per 
capita allocations (Table 8-3). In addition, a further JO-33 
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million has been awarded to individual training schemes 
involving organisations or parts of organisations in more 
than one county. 
A major overall aim of the ESF is to deal with 
employment problems. Therefore, the most appropriate measure 
of the need of particular areas for ESF aid is unemployment. 
Table 8.3 illustrates the distribution of ESF assistance on 
a per-unemployed person basis. Again it is apparent that 
Avon has been by far the largest beneficiary in the region, 
recei'ving almost twice as much aid per unemployed person as 
any other County. The share won by Cornwall, moreover, does 
not greatly exceed those of Devon, Wiltshire and Somerset. 
The two counties with the highest unemployment rates 
(Cornwall and Devon) suffer because of a heavy dependence on 
the local authority sector to submit applications. Although 
Devon and Cornwall County Councils are reasonably 
successful, as Figure 8.2 shows, the private and voluntary 
sectors have made only token use of the Fund in the "far 
South West". In Cornwall, despite priority area status, 
these sectors are almost entirely absent from the list of 
recipients. 
It is apparent that the process of allocating ESF 
grants is highly dependent on local initiative to generate 
applications. The discussion now examines the nature of 
this "bottom-up" initiative in more detail. 
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8.3. THE RECIPIENTS OF ESF ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH WEST 
ENGLAND. 
The recipient organisations can by divided into three 
categories: 
1. Local authorities -45.03 Million (64.0%); 
2. Private manufacturing firms - -41.57 Million (18.7%); 
3. Voluntary and charitable organisations - 41.26 
Million (16.1%). 
We can now examine these three categories, concentrating in 
each case on the factors which lead to involvement in the 
ESF application process and the problems experienced by 
applicants which hinder the implementation of the Fund and 
therefore the achievement of its objectives. 
8.3.1. Local Authorities. 
- 
Local authorities are involved with the ESF in three 
main ways. Firstly, they apply directly to the ESF for 
training schemes run by their own departments. Secondly, 
county authorities apply for grants for training courses run 
by local education authority-funded colleges of further and 
higher education. In these cases, the initiative for the 
application will lie either in the college itself or in a 
department of the County Council. The third aspect of 
local-government involvement with the ESF is the provision 
of the "public-authority" contribution towards schemes 
submitted by voluntary and other private organisations (this 
aspect is discussed in section 8.3.3). 
The local authorities in South West England account 
for almost two-thirds of the region's receipts from the ESF. 
The J, 5 Million of ESF aid over the study period represents 
total public investment of about J10 Million on local 
employment and training policies. Clearly the Fund is a 
29 4 
significant resource for local-government participation in 
this area of policy. 
Table 8.4 illustrates the particular authorities 
which have benefitted from ESF aid and the groups which 
have undergone training supported by the ESF. The Table 
shows that the largest local-authority recipient has been 
Bristol City Council which is not an Education Authority and 
therefore has no colleges under its financial control for 
which it can make applications. Moreover, Bristol is not 
located in a priority area and many of the Fund Guidelines 
are not open to the City Council. Nevertheless, the City has 
made substantial use of the opportunities which are 
available. 
Apart from Bristol City Council, the other 
largest beneficiaries are Devon County Council and Cornwall 
County Council. These authorities are able to benefit from 
the ESF for training schemes operated by Colleges of Further 
and Higher Education. For example, Devon has obtained 
assistance for catering courses run by Plymouth College of 
Further Education. One award to Plymouth CFE was for a 
scheme operated in conjunction with a college in France. 
Thus, Devon is the only authority in the gouth West to have 
received assistance under the Guideline which provides aid 
to schemes involving organisations in two or more member 
states. Cornwall County Council has obtained aid for 
training being carried out at colleges such as Cornwall 
College of Further Education at Falmouth. Indeed, according 
to an officer in Cornwall County Council Planning 
Department, in 1988 all vocational training going ahead at 
colleges in Cornwall is being part-funded by the ESF 
29 5 
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(interview with officer of Cornwall County Council Planning 
Department). 
The other county councils in the region have to date 
made much less use of the Fund than Devon or Cornwall. 
However, there are indications that these authorities are 
beginning to become more interested in the ESF opportunity. 
Somerset County Council, for example, received more than 
three-quarters of its total ESF receipts in 1987 alone. 
Furthermore, in the same year Dorset County Council 
received five ESF grants compared with none in previous 
years. Gloucestershire and Wiltshire are also showing more 
interest in the ESF. For example, Gloucestershire has 
recently employed a consultancy firm to assess its potential 
for attracting assistance from the Fund (interview with 
officer in Education Department, Gloucestershire County 
Council). 
The only county council in the region which has not 
received aid from the Fund is Avon. The County has preferred 
to leave ESF applications to the initiative of colleges 
under its financial control, rather than help and encourage 
colleges in the same way as Devon, Cornwall and Somerset 
(interview with Economic Development Treasurer of Avon 
County Council). A number of applications have been 
submitted by these colleges but none have been successful. 
The other local-authority recipients include two of 
the other large urban councils; namely Thamesdown Borough 
Council (Swindon) and Plymouth City Council. In 1985, the 
former received assistance for two innovatory projects and a 
scheme to train ethnic minorities, but has not submitted any 
applications since. Plymouth City Council, in contrast to 
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Bristol, has received only three ESF grants, the most recent 
of which was in 1987. Finally, two small District Councils 
have received assistance for modest projects. In 1985, 
Teignbridge District in Devon won assistance for a scheme to 
train under 25s with inadequate qualifications. In 1987, 
Kerrier in Cornwall succesfully obtained aid for a scheme to 
subsidise the wages of the Under 25s in order to encourage 
firms to take on people in this age group. 
Factors explaining local authority involvement with the 
ESF. 
The degree of local-authority involvement with the 
Fund is a product of a number of factors. In the case of the 
ESF it is not possible to make a neat distinction between 
those factors which determine the extent of opportunity and 
those which cause organisations to take up this opportunity. 
In the first place the extent of opportunity is less easy to 
define than for the ERDF, nor is it entirely determined by 
factors external to the authority. ESF applications need not 
relate to schemes which at the time of the application are 
guaranteed to take place. Consequently, it is possible, 
within certain constraints outlined below, to devise 
additional schemes on the basis of the likely availability 
of ESF aid. However, involvement with the Fund and the 
ability of authorities to devise applications is dependent 
on the following three groups of factors: 
a. existing local-authority training policies; 
b. organisational factors; 
c. the availability of information and expertise. 
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a) Local authorities' existing training policies. 
The major role of the ESF is to provide assistance 
which enables local authorities to implement their own 
policy objectives rather than money that is applied for 
simply because it exists. In short, as one local-authority 
put it, it is important to avoid a "claimant mentality" 
(in. terview with officer of Devon County Council Chief 
Executive's Department). The Fund must be tethered to 
local policy objectives developed by local authorities and 
the colleges under their control rather than vice-versa. 
Consequently, the potential to attract ESF aid is largely 
dependent on whether local authorities and colleges are 
politically and financially committed to fund vocational 
training measures of the type favoured by the ESF. 
Because the Fund provides only 50% of the cost of the 
scheme, a local authority, or local-authority college, must 
be prepared to finance half of the cost of an ESF-funded 
project. In actual fact, the authority must be prepared to 
fund the entire cost of the scheme because the Decision to 
award finance is only published in April of the year in 
which the scheme is taking place. If the grant is not 
forthcoming at this stage then the authority must either 
fund the whole cost of the scheme, or reduce it 
substantially in scope. This causes uncertainty and greatly 
complicates forward. financial planning. Clearly, an 
authority and its colleges must be prepared to direct 
substantial sums of money towards vocational training if it 
wishes to benefit from the ESF. 
Bristol City Council is an example of an authority 
which is currently committed to such a strategy. Most of 
Bristol's receipts stem from the creation in 1984 of an 
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"Employment Initiatives Division" within the Chief 
Executive's Department. This Division was intended to 
co-ordinate all the Council's training activities, the 
responsibility for which had previously been divided in a 
haphazard fashion among a number of departments. The 
Division's major function was to set up three Information 
Technology Training Centres (known as "Info-tech Centres") 
which would be partly financed by the ESF. The Division was 
given an initial budget ofil Million to provide the public 
expenditure contribution to the training programmes. As a 
result, Bristol City Council has been awarded substantial 
sums of ESF aid to finance training schemes run by the 
Employment Initiatives Division particularly for Under 25s 
and women. In the light of a perceived influx of hi-tech 
firms such as Hewlett Packard into the Bristol area, 
vocational training in the field of new technology was 
identified as a major policy goal of the City Council. 
Furthermore, a commitment of this kind required substantial 
political belief on the part of the elected council (on 
which Labour was the largest party when the Employment 
Initiatives Division was set up) that Bristol should be 
involved to such an extent in local labour market employment 
policy. The Council's view is that it is politically 
desirable to be seen to be participating actively in 
training measures to assist the unemployed (interview at 
Bristol City Council). 
At the other extreme, Avon County Council (which is 
Conservative controlled) does not run any ESF-eligible 
training schemes. This reflects the belief that the kind of 
measures favoured by the ESF are not appropriate for a 
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county council to undertake. The Council's Economic 
Development Treasurer persuaded the elected members that 
training of this kind was unlikely either to create or 
preserve additional jobs (interview with officer at Avon 
County Council). Thus Avon's lack of direct participation in 
vocational training schemes means it has no projects for 
which it can attempt to obtain ESF aid. 
b) Organisation and Personnel. 
The opportunity to win ESF aid is dependent to a 
great extent on the nature of a local authority's existing 
training policy. Unless it is politically and financially 
committed to operating schemes of the kind funded by the 
ESF, it is not in a position to apply. However, unless 
authorities are organised adequately and are well enough 
informed about the ESF they will be unable to benefit from 
the aid which it can provide. Thus organisational factors 
also play an important role in determining local-authority 
responses to the ESF. 
Table 8.5, for example, shows that the most 
successful authorities are for the most part those which 
have the most well-developed organisational structures, 
involving the designation of particular departments and 
individuals to act as ESF (and general EC) co-ordinators. 
The Employment Initiatives Division of Bristol City Council, 
for example, is responsible for all the authority's training 
activities, including the City's involvement in MSC schemes 
such as the Community Programme and YTS as well as the 
Info-tech centres which function with the help of the ESF. 
Before the creation of this Division the Council's training 
activities were carried on in a disparate fashion by various 
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TABLE 8.5. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE IN SOUTH WEST LOCAL AUTHORITIES. 
Co-ordinating Total('million) 
County/City Department Comments receipts 
Bristol Chief Executive Employment Initiatives Div. J1.83 
created in 1986. BCC also 
uses consultants. 
Cornwall Planning New member of staff appoint- JO. 99 
ed Jan. 1987 to deal with ESF. 
Devon Chief Executive 1 officer spends much of his S1.27 
on ESF matters. 
Somerset Chief Executive EEC Liaison Officer appointed ý0.14 
(was Planning) January 1987 in Economic Devel- 
opment Unit. Also use Consultants 
Wiltshire No overall co- Education Dept operates seper- ý0.29 
ordination. ately from other Depts. Uses 
Consultants. 
Dorset Chief Executive First successful applications j0.12 
in 1987. Use Consultants. 
Glouces- Education Dept. May employ consultants 0.02 
tershire no decision yet. 
Avon Does not submit ESF applications - 
Left to initiatve of Colleges 
Source: Interviews carried out during the research. 
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departments and ESF applications were formulated by the 
Treasury (interview with officer at Bristol City Council). 
Consequently, the City was much less successful in 
attracting ESF aid. 
The success of Cornwall and Devon in attracting ESF 
aid is also partly due to efficient organisational 
structures. Moreover, the designation of responsibility for 
ESF applications to a particular individual appears also to 
have been important. The Planning Department at Cornwall 
County Council and the Chief Executive's Department at Devon 
act as the co-ordinating Departments for all ESF (and ERDF) 
applications (interviews with officers at Cornwall and Devon 
County Councils). In both cases a small co-ordinating 
of team" of two people deal with the bulk of Community 
matters. In both councils one of these Officers spends 
about 70% of his time in work linked with the ESF. This 
rises to 100% when application or payment claim deadlines 
are approaching. The appointment of this second member of 
staff at Cornwall County Council in January 1986 paid 
immediate dividends when the County's receipts from the ESF 
rose from J177,000 in 1985 to 1764,000 in 1987 (interview 
with officer at Cornwall County Council). 
The ability of this officer and his counterpart at 
Devon County Council to generate applications is crucial to 
the success of the authority's ESF bids. At Devon, for 
example, the particularly enthusiastic and imaginative work 
of the Officer involved with the authority's applications 
has enabled the County, despite its lack of priority status, 
to be especially successful in attracting assistance. The 
authority's applications have made use of Guidelines 
303 
under-used by other applicants. For example, the County has 
used the Guideline which gives priority to schemes involving 
organisations in two or more member states for a catering 
course run by Plymouth College of Further Education. This 
application involved the officer in the County Council 
working very hard to identify colleges in other member 
states which could participate in an exchange scheme as part 
of the catering course. As a result, this scheme has been 
funded by the ESF in three consecutive years (interview 
with officer at Devon County Council). Devon has also 
received aid for a number of innovatory projects. This point 
illustrates the importance of not only a well-defined 
organisational structure, but also of individual initiative 
in securing ESF assistance. 
The case of Somerset County Council also illustrates 
this point. The arrival in 1984 of an Officer in the 
Planning Department with a particular interest in vocational 
training le4 to an increased emphasis on the ESF as source 
of assistance (interview with officer in Somerset County 
Council Planning Department). In 1985, the Council received 
its first grant from the Fund for a scheme to train women at 
Bridgewater College of Further Education. In 1987, the 
Council was successful with four applications for two 
schemes at Bridgewater CFE and two operated by the Council 
itself. The submission of these applications in 1986 
coincided with a report written by this particular officer 
on the future of EC funding for Somerset. In this report it 
was suggested that the County could maximise receipts from 
the ESF and become more aware of the wider implications of 
EC policies if it designated to a particular individual the 
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task of co-ordinating all involvement with the Community. 
This report eventually resulted in the appointment in 1987 
of an EEC Liaison Officer in the County's Economic 
Development Unit (interview with officer at Somerset County 
Council). This example again illustrates the importance of 
the individual initiative of local actors in the 
implementation process. 
The importance of designating particular departments 
and personnel with the task of co-ordinating ESF 
applications can also be illustrated by the case of Avon 
County Council which has received no financial assistance 
from the ESF either for its own departments or the colleges 
under its financial control. There is no department in the 
County which attempts to inform colleges of the 
availability of ESF aid or to assist with the formulation of 
applications. Instead, applications are left entirely to the 
initiative of the colleges themselves who lack the expertise 
needed to secure finance from the Fund. Colleges in Avon 
have submitted applications but all have been judged 
ineligible by the Department of Employment or withdrawn by 
the colleges because of the large amounts of administrative 
work required (interview with officer in County Treasury at 
Avon County Council). This suggests that Avon could bring 
some benefit for the colleges under its control if it were 
to revise its policy towards the ESF and provide more 
assistance and encouragement for colleges operating 
potentially eligible vocational training schemes. 
Another factor which allowed both Cornwall and Devon 
County Councils to become involved in making successful ESF 
applications was their on-going involvement with the ERDF 
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(see Chapter 5). Awareness of EC issues built up because of 
involvement with the ERDF prior to 1983 created an 
environment within the two authorities which was receptive 
to other opportunities presented by the EC. The officers in 
the Planning Department at Cornwall County Council and the 
Chief Executive's Department at Devon were already 
well-informed on European issues and opportunities and 
therefore better placed to adapt to the ESF than counties 
such as Wiltshire, Gloucestershire and Dorset which were 
ineligible for the Regional Fund and therefore less 
well-informed about the Community in general. Moreover, the 
more experienced participants have developed more contacts 
with a variety of other recipients with whom ideas can be 
shared, with officials of the DE and with staff of the ESF 
Directorate of DG V in Brussels. These findings complement 
those of Glasson and McGee (1984) who discovered that 
counties outside the assisted areas were generally less 
well-informed on EC matters than their assisted 
counterparts. Consequently, the Counties of the "near South 
West" which have until recently shown little interest in the 
field of ESF financed employment face a wide "information 
gap" which must be bridged if they aim to climb aboard what 
one local authority officer described as the increasingly 
rapid "ESF Express". 
c) The availability of information and expertise. 
There are, however, a variety of attempts to close 
this "information gap". These include the monthly European 
Information Service produced by the British Sections of 
the International Union of Local Authorities/ Council of 
European Municipalities and Regions (IULA/CEMR), which 
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provides up-to-date information on a wide range of EC 
issues, including the ESF. Furthermore, the Planning 
Exchange, which is based in Glasgow, produces a variety of 
informative documents about EC matters. 
Notwithstanding these efforts, new participants in 
the ESF application system lack the expertise required 
to interpret both the subtleties of Commission thinking 
and the complexities of EC regulations. Consequently, an 
increasing feature of the processes by which local 
authorities and other organisations secure ESF aid is the 
involvement of private consultants. Among the most widely 
used of these companies are Dateur Ltd, Binder Hamlyn Ltd 
and JCL Advisers Ltd. There are a number of reasons why some 
local authorities find it appropriate to pay for the 
services of consultants rather than make use of their own 
staff to devise applications. Firstly, many clients of 
consultancy firms are those authorities which have only 
recently become involved in attempting to secure European 
grants and are located mainly in non-priority areas. Rather 
than attempt to catch up with the more experienced 
authorities, counties outside assisted areas are tending to 
employ Consultancy companies to provide the necessary 
expertise. 
Moreover, new participants in the ESF application 
process may not have the personnel available to devote the 
necessary time to compiling information about the ESF and 
formulating applications. In addition, the Fund's 
application procedure often seem very complex and arcane to 
those unfamiliar with the Community (interview with 
representative of Binder Hamlyn Ltd). Consequently, these 
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authorities may believe it is not cost-effective to allocate 
internal resources to a process which is not guaranteed to 
secure financial benefits. However, it is not necessarily 
the newest and, to-date, least successful participants in 
the ESF application process who consider it appropriate to 
use consultants. Bristol City Council and Somerset County 
Council both employ outside expertise to assist with 
applications because of these firms' existing and 
well-developed contacts in Brussels and familiarity with 
the nuances of the Commission's interpretations of the 
Guidelines (interview with representative of Binder Hamlyn 
Ltd) . 
Finally, the decision to use consultants may be based 
on political factors. For example, a Conservative controlled 
Council is likely to be more concerned to contract work out 
rather than employ its own staff. 
8.3.2. The private manufacturing sector. 
This section is based on two sources. Firstly, 
information is derived from interviews carried with 
officials of the Department of Employment, a representative 
of the Engineering Industry Training Board (EITB) and with 
the Principal Consultant of J& AB Associates, a small 
Consultancy company which advises firms on training in 
general and assists with ESF applications in particular. 
Secondly, use is made of a short postal questionnaire which 
was directed to the manufacturing firms in South West 
England which have received ESF assistance between 1984 and 
1987. This survey resulted in 14 completed questionnaires 
from a total of 25 firms whichý have obtained aid, 
representing a response rate of 56%. 
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Manufacturing firms have received about 19% of ESF 
monies in the region and the recipient companies range 
greatly in size. At one extreme is Westland Helicopters of 
Yeovil which employs 11,000 people. The list of assisted 
companies also inludes other large companies such as 
Toshiba, Davy Mckee (UK) Ltd of Poole and Avimo (UK) Ltd of 
Taunton. At the other end of the spectrum is Helipebs Ltd of 
Gloucester which is a wholly independent firm employing just 
48. The necessary public-authority contribution to the 
schemes operated by firms in the region is provided in most 
cases by the various industrial Training Boards, 
particularly the EITB which supplied 82% of the 
contributions to manufacturing firms between 1984 and 1987. 
Table 8.6 demonstrates the kinds of scheme for which 
firms in the region have received ESF grants. The largest 
proportion has been allocated to the Under 25 age group and 
almost all of this is for schemes training young people to 
use new technology which a firm is introducing. A further 14 
% of aid has been allocated to a single scheme run by 
Westland Helicopters involving a company in another member 
state; namely Augusta of Italy. 
One objective of the ESF is to provide assistance for 
small and medium-sized enterprises. However the firms in the 
South west which have received grants are in most cases 
neither small nor medium. Of the 15 companies whose details 
could be traced (Sell's Business Directory, 1987) only three 
were entirely independent firms. Moreover, only one of these 
had less than 100 employees. The remaining 12 companies were 
all subsidiaries of much larger groups. It is clear that 
there is an "implementation gap" between a policy objective 
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and its outcome at regional level. We can now examine some 
of the reasons why this is so. 
TABLE 8.6. RECIPIENT GROUPS OF GRANTS TO PRIVATE 
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES. 
Recipient Group JOOO's % 
Under 25s 1264.0 80.6 
Schemes involving more 218.2 13.9 
than 1 member state 
Small/medium sized 54.2 3.5 
enterprises 
Women 31.1 2.0 
Totals 1567.5 100.0 
Source: Unpublished data provided by the Department of 
Employment. 
Factors explaining the level of involvement of private 
manufacturing firms. 
There are a number of factors which help to explain 
why certain private companies become involved with the 
ESF and why others do not participate. These include: 
a. the availability of information; 
b. the extent of benefits to'be gained; 
c. the problems faced by companies which apply for 
assistance. 
a) The availability of information. 
The volume of information available about the ESF is 
a very important factor explaining private-sector 
involvement with the Fund. Firms normally do not have the 
resources to keep themselves informed on EC matters, nor is 
it necessary to do so given their relatively modest 
involvement with the Community. Instead, they rely on 
external sources to inform them of the availability of 
financial assistance. 
One source of information is the Industrial Training 
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Boards. The EITB, for example, deliberately set out to 
publicise the ESF to engineering firms (interview with 
official of EITB). Four of the fifteen respondents to the 
questionnaire indicated that they were made aware of the ESF 
by the EITB. Other sources of information are the various 
consultancy companies which exist to advise firms on 
training and the availability of grants. In fact, a further 
four respondents were advised to apply for the ESF by 
consultants. One such company, JCL Advisers Ltd of Swindon, 
actively publicises its grant seeking expertise by sending 
information to potentially interested companies 
(questionnaire source). Another firm, J& AB Associates, 
relies more on its reputation among companies for providing 
expert advice not only on grant availability but also on 
training in general (interview with Principal Consultant of 
J& AB Associates). 
b) The benefits of ESF assistance. 
Once firms are aware of the existence of the ESF they 
are able to assess whether the grants available match the 
training needs of the company. Companies are unlikely to 
devise schemes which serve no economic purpose simply in 
order to attract ESF aid. Indeed, it would be unwise of them 
to do so. The importance of ESF assistance should be 
measured according to whether it enables firms to carry out 
necessary training schemes of benefit to both themselves and 
the local labour market. 
Of the 14 respondents to the questionnaire only 
three indicated that the training for which ESF aid was 
obtained would not have been carried out without this 
assistance. However, a further nine pointed out that the 
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Fund served either to extend and improve or alter the format 
of this training. 
In other words, the involvement of private 
manufacturing firms with the ESF is partly dependent on 
whether they view the Fund's priorities as consistent with 
their own training needs. If this is the case then as one 
personnel manager pointed out, "any outside source of 
assistance is most welcome". 
c) The problems of making ESF applications. 
There are a number of problems faced by firms when 
applying for assistance which may cause them either not to 
apply for a grant in the first place or not to submit 
applications for similar schemes in future years. 
The first problem identified by the respondents to 
the questionnaire was the complexity of the application 
process, which was mentioned by eight respondents. 
Applicants for ESF grants are required to keep very detailed 
records of the particular training programmes they are 
carrying out. These are needed both in the event of a 
Commission audit and when the final payment claim is 
submitted. The latter must provide evidence that the scheme 
has been carried out as intended in the original 
application. This large volume of administrative work 
prompted one questionnaire respondent to suggest that: 
the large amount of documentation required to support 
an application and the difficulty of obtaining 
information with its attendant use of resources could 
well deter applicants (questionnaire source). 
A second problem identified by the respondents in the 
questionnaire was the substantial time delays between either 
the initial commitment of assistance or the final payment 
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claim, and the arrival of the grants itself. For example, if 
a grant is awarded in March of the year in which the scheme 
is taking place then it is unlikely that the money will 
reach the firm's bank account until July or August. 
Moreover, the final payment of the remaining 50% of aid can 
often be delayed by up to 18 months after the completion of 
the scheme. These delays mean that firms must be able to 
support the training themselves until the money arrives. 
Paradoxically, this creates particular difficulties for the 
smaller firms which the Fund particularly aims to assist. As 
one personnel manager pointed out: 
the time delays involved are probably too great for 
small concerns, the very area where grants of this 
nature would show great benefit (questionnaire 
source). 
A third significant problem is the linear reduction 
which is applied to schemes prior to the final grant 
decision. The reduction for the over 25 age group reached 
50% in 1987. Again this meant that firms needed to provide a 
much larger proportion of the cost of schemes. This is not 
necessarily important for large firms with the financial 
resources available to support the training. However, it is 
of great significance for small firms who may lack the 
necessary resources to finance the schemes themselves. 
As a result of problems such as these, the financial 
gains may soon be outweighed by the difficulties which arise 
during the application process. In fact four questionnaire 
respondents indicated that they would not consider 
re-applying because of the financial and administrative 
difficulties involved. Moreover, the Principal Consultant of 
J& AB Associates indicated that small firms in particular 
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were less likely to re-apply because of these serious 
difficulties (interview with Senior Consultant of J& AB 
Associates). Indeed, the Personnel Manager of one 
independent firm indicated that it was unlikely to apply for 
any further ESF aid because the application process "is not 
worth the effort for the end result, particularly for a 
company of our size (only 110 employees) and the modest 
grant for which we apply". In summary we see that the 
implementation process mitigates against the small firms 
which the ESF particularly aims to assist. Moreover, such 
problems are particularly disadvantageous for a county such 
as Cornwall (a priority area) which is highly dependent on 
the small-firm sector. 
8.3.3. The voluntary and other private sector. 
Once again, two main sources were used to elicit 
information on the involvement of voluntary and other 
charitable organistions with the ESF. One source was the 
interviews carried out with a representative of the National 
Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) in London and 
various local authorities which provide the public authority 
contribution to schemes operated by organisations in the 
voluntary sector. The second source was a further short 
postal questionnaire to organisations of this kind which 
have received ESF assistance in the South West. However, a 
number of organisations which have received grants could not 
be traced and therefore it was not possible to include these 
in the sample. Furthermore, of the 22 which were contacted, 
five proved to be no longer in existence. The eventual 
outcome of the survey was nine completed questionnaires out 
of seventeen possible respondents. 
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The recipients included in this category are a rather 
disparate group of organisations, most of which are either 
voluntary groups or private charitable organisations. 
They range from relatively large and well-known 
institutions such as the South West branch of the Citizens' 
Advice Bureau and the Community Service Volunteers, to very 
small groups such as Bath Ethnic Minority Training Centre 
and Bristol Women's Workshop. 
Organisations of this kind have received about 16% of 
the total allocated to projects in the region. In all cases 
the public-authority contribution has been provided by local 
authorities. Although in one or two cases, local-authority 
aid was supplemented by grants from central-government 
departments. Table 8.7 illustrates the beneficiaries of 
schemes operated by organisations in this category. 
TABLE 8.7. RECIPIENT GROUPS OF ESF GRANTS TO THE VOLUNTARY 
AND PRIVATE CHARITABLE SECTORS. 
Recipient group 'TOOO's % 
Under 18s 39.2 3.1 
581.4 45.0 
Under 25s 542.2 42.9 
Disadvantaged groups 254.5 20.1 
Women 173.0 13.7 
Long term unemployed 9.3 0.7 
Innovatory schemes 246.3 19.5 
Totals 1264.5 100.0 
Source: Data provided by the Department of Employment. 
The largest proportion of assistance has as usual 
been to schemes aimed at the Under 25s. However, significant 
shares have also been directed to schemes aimed at women, 
disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities before 1986) 
and to innovatory projects. Among the schemes which have 
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been funded in the region are, firstly, Dartington Trust in 
Totnes received aid for the Trust's 'South Devon 
Microcentre'. The course here aimed to train disabled people 
under 25 to use information technology. Another ESF aided 
scheme was that run by a women's organisation in Bristol 
called Cutting and Face Edge workshops. This course was a 
six month programme to train unemployed women in 
furniture making and design and was funded under the 
Guideline which gives priority to schemes which train women 
in jobs in which they are under-represented. A third example 
of a scheme in this category is the course to train 
long-term unemployed people in the use of new technology run 
by the South West branch of the Citizen's Advice Bureaux in 
Cornwall. 
Organisations such as these face a variety of 
problems when they apply for ESF grants. These difficulties 
serve to limit the benefits which are derived from receiving 
ESF aid and help to explain the reasons why voluntary and 
private charitable organisations may or may not be involved 
with the ESF. 
Factors explaining the involvement of voluntary and 
charitable organisations. 
There are a number of factors which help explain why 
organisations of this kind become involved and may or may 
not continue to participate in the ESF application process. 
These factors also serve to highlight difficulties produced 
for such organisations by the Fund's implementation system. 
These factors include: 
a. the availability of information; 
b. the availability of a public-authority 
contribution to the cost of the scheme; 
c. a variety of other financial difficulties. 
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a) The availability of information. 
Once again the availability of information is an 
important factor affecting whether organisations apply for 
ESF grants. A variety of sources exist to advise voluntary 
organisations and bring their attention to the possibility 
of securing ESF assistance. Of the nine questionnaire 
respondents, four indicated that their own research work 
identified the ESF as a source of aid. Others became aware 
of the Fund by contact with their M. E. P. or by discussions 
with other similar organisations which have received aid. 
One other source of information not mentioned by 
respondents to this questionnaire, but which is generally of 
use to voluntary organisations on EC matters, is the 
London-based National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(NCVO). The NCVO's International Section is very active 
in providing information and advising voluntary groups on 
ESF applications and lobbying for the interests of the 
voluntary sector both in the Commission and the Department 
of Employment (interview with Head of International Section, 
NCVO). The NCVO provides an information sheet to any 
voluntary groups which profess an interest in the ESF as a 
source of aid and gives advice on the likely eligibility 
of particular schemes and how to complete the application 
form. 
The other major sources of advice and assistance used 
by organisations in this category are, firstly, the local 
authorities which provide the public contribution to the 
costs of training schemes run by these organistions and, 
secondly, the ESF section of the Department of Employment in 
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London. 
b) The availability of a Public-authority contribution. 
Because the ESF only matches the public expenditure 
element of any training scheme, it is crucial that private 
voluntary and charitable organisations secure a guaranteed 
"public-authority" contribution to the cost of the project. 
All nine respondents to the questionnaire identified local 
authorities as the source of this public money, although two 
recipients in this category had also secured aid from 
central government departments. Many of the voluntary 
organisations which apply for ESF aid are entirely dependent 
on the local-authority and ESF monies in order to run their 
particular training schemes. Indeed, some groups, such as 
those training women only, were set up entirely on the 
assumption that both sources would provide aid (interview 
with NCVO). In fact, the ESF provides aid to women's groups 
which is not otherwise available from central government 
sources. As one women's group project co-ordinator 
commented: 
the ESF appears to be the only source of funding 
which takes women's needs for training in areas in 
which they are under-represented seriously, whilst 
also understanding the need to provide facilities for 
child-care (questionnaire source). 
Voluntary and charitable groups also face 
difficulties convincing local authorities to provide the 
necessary matching funding. In particular, groups training 
women find it difficult to secure local-authority support. 
The vagaries of the ESF's decision-making system create a 
variety of financial difficulties which serve to dissuade 
local authorities from guaranteeing the full cost of a 
scheme should the ESF grant be unsuccessful (interview with 
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NCVO) . 
One local authority which has become disillusioned 
with providing the public contribution to ESF projects is 
Avon County Council. This authority had previously been 
involved over a number of years with four organisations 
providing training funded by the ESF. However, in 1987 the 
Council decided that it would no longer assist with the cost 
of these schemes, unless the grant is to an organisation 
which is able to generate an income from its own activities, 
rather than rely entirely on local-authority and ESF 
finance. The County does not believe that grants to 
voluntary organisations result in "the creation or 
preservation of jobs" (interview with Economic Development 
Treasurer, Avon County Council). Again we see the importance 
of local political decisions and policies in the 
implementation of a Community Fund. 
c) Other financial difficulties. 
Apart from the problems associated with securing 
public finance voluntary and charitable organisations which 
successfully secure ESF aid face similar fianarreial problems 
to local authorities and private firms. Moreover, because 
these organisations may have no other sources of finance 
these difficulties are greatly exaggerated. 
The first problem is caused by the timing of the 
final decision taken by the Commission to award ESF aid. 
Unless many voluntary organisations can secure a 
local-authority guarantee to provide 100% of the cost of the 
scheme should the ESF application fail, then the scheme 
cannot really commence until after the decision is made at 
the end of April. If the voluntary organisation concerned 
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has devised a project which lasts the full calendQr year 
then it must start training before it is told of the success 
of its application. 
A second problem relates to system of payments which 
the ESF operates. As one voluntary organisation co-ordinator 
points out: 
The main feature of the ESF which has always 
astonished me is the extraordinary budgetary system 
which only releases money in July of the year that 
the grant is for. This makes it very hard for both 
the organisation and the local authority providing 
matching funding to budget sensibly (questionnaire 
source). 
This "advance" payment accounts for 50% of the value of the 
scheme. The remaining half must then be claimed after the 
completion of the training. As a result the final 
payment, which may be 25% of the year's budget, may not 
arrive in the organisation's bank account until up to 
eighteen months after the scheme has finished. One 
questionnaire respondent pointed out that: 
these requirements are causing us constant financial 
crises and causing our local authorities to lose 
faith in this source of funding (questionnaire 
source). 
Therefore, it is necessary to persuade the local authority 
to guarantee the cost of the scheme, or to convince a bank 
to provide overdraft facilities until the money arrives 
(interview with NCVO and questionnaire sources). The NCVO is 
often asked to write explanatory letters to bank managers 
who are unable to believe that any grant-making 
organisations could possibly operate in such a fashion 
(interview with NCVO). These problems often cause voluntary 
organisations to give up applying for ESF aid for particular 
schemes after about three years. By this time, the 
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accumulated debt caused by delays in payment may have 
produced more problems than the initial commitment of grant 
may have solved (interview with NCVO). 
A final problem, which first became an issue for the 
voluntary and charitable sectors in 1987, is the 
application of the linear reduction. Before 1987 the 
government had always exempted voluntary organisations from 
this reduction in the level of grant awarded to voluntary 
and charitable organisations. However, in that year a 
ministerial decision was taken to reduce grants for the over 
25s by 20%, compared with 50% for other types of recipient 
(see Chapter 7). From the voluntary sector point of view, 
this break with tradition caused many problems. As has 
already been explained, these organisations may have no 
other sources of funds for the training schemes they are 
carrying out. Therefore, the organisation in question is 
faced by the choice of either reducing the scope of the 
training scheme or the number of trainees, often at short 
notice and after the scheme has already commenced, or it can 
attempt to secure increased finance from an often 
unsympathetic local authority. The importance of national 
policy decisions in the implementation of a Community policy 
is once again apparent. 
8.4. CONCLUSIONS, 
This chapter has shown that the ESF has developed 
into an important resource for training policies operating 
at the local level. The Fund has given local authorities 
and other organisations a source of assistance which serves 
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to increase the repertoire of local responses to problems of 
unemployment and inadequate levels of training, 
particularly in regions with the highest rates of 
unemployment and problems of industrial restructuring. 
Moreover, the Fund enables local authorities to complement 
the activities of the MSC - the major provider of vocational 
training - by operating schemes which are more geared to 
particular local needs. The current conditions of 
financial austerity faced by local government increase 
further the significance of the resources provided by the 
ESF. 
One area in which the Fund has been particularly 
beneficial is in enabling organisations in the public and 
voluntary sectors to increase the scope of training 
provided for groups such as women and the disabled, who may 
otherwise be excluded from the mainstream vocational 
training measures. Indeed, there is evidence that, 
despite the particular difficulties they face, many women's 
organisations have been set up entirely on the basis of 
the availability of funding from the ESF. However, the 
problems associated with applying for ESF aid outlined 
earlier have been compounded by the difficulty of obtaining 
matching funding from local authorities and of convincing 
central government (unsuccessfully in 1987) not to apply 
linear reductions to schemes operated by voluntary 
organisations. 
It is apparent that there is less concern about the 
"additionality" of ESF aid than the case of the ERDF. In 
general terms ESF assistance does secure public expenditure 
which adds to that which local authorities and others are 
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able to undertake in any case. Nevertheless, a variety of 
other factors constrain local authorities from taking full 
advantage of this additional assistance. Firstly, because 
the ESF provides a maximum of half of the cost of 
vocational training schemes, authorities must be prepared 
to fund at least 50% of these costs. The oversubscription 
of the Fund and the resulting linear reductions mean the 
local contribution is invariably far more than 50%. 
Consequently, authorities must be financially and 
politically committed to an active vocational training and 
employment policy. However, here again the spectre of 
central government controls on revenue expenditure serves to 
constrain the ability of local government to participate in 
these kinds of measures. 
Local political factors also play an important role 
in determining involvement with the ESF. Authorities such as 
Bristol City Council and Cornwall County Council play an 
active role in encouraging and participating in vocational 
training measures. On the other hand, Avon County Council 
and Plymouth City Council are not involved to the same 
extent in the provision of training and have therefore made 
very little use of the ESF. There is no evidence that 
varying attitudes of local politicians to the ESF are 
polarised on party political grounds. In Avon, for example, 
a County which is unwilling to commit resources to 
vocational training, the largest party on the Council at the 
time of this research was Labour. In Devon, on the other 
hand, which has been relatively active, the dominant party 
was Conservative. In all cases, the initiative for 
involvement with the Fund has been at officer rather than 
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elected member level. 
Apart from the political will of local authorities to 
provide financial resources towards training and employment 
policies, we have also seen that a variety of other factors 
help to explain the extent to which local organisations in a 
variety of sectors are able to generate applications 
(Figure 8.3). Firstly, the availability of information is an 
important factor determining involvement with the ESF. 
Secondly, organisational factors play a part in determining 
local-authority response to the availability of ESF aid. On 
this point, it is worth pointing out that best practice 
appears to involve the designation of responsibility for 
ESF applications to a particular department within the 
authority and particular personnel within that department 
who can provide the initiative to identify the wide variety 
of potential ESF schemes within the authority. Moreover, it 
is desirable to award responsibility to a department, such 
as the Chief Executive's, which has an overview of all 
local-authority activity. Whichever department is involved, 
it is crucial to develop a degree of inter-departmental 
collaboration on ESF and EC matters in general. 
The ESF has the potential to play an important part 
in the Community's regional development efforts. Equipping 
people in problem regions with the skills necessary to find 
employment, particularly related to the introduction of new 
technologies, is an important aspect of regional policy. 
Moreover, this is related to the current emphasis in both 
Community and national regional policies on encouraging 
"indigenous development" within problem regions. 
Improvements in skill levels, to which the ES can 
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contribute, are likely to enable local firms to expand and 
react more quickly to new market opportunities. 
However, we have seen that the problems faced by ESF 
applicants can be particularly disadvantageous to 
organisations in problem regions, especially the 
difficulties related to relatively small applicants and 
less-wealthy local authorities. Changes to the 
decision-making system, such as the notification of an award 
of a grant prior to the actual start-date of a training 
scheme, can only benefit the problem regions which could 
obtain the greatest benefits from the ESF. 
The non-regional aspects of the ESF, on the other 
hand, should continue to be prominent. The Fund is a source 
of aid which helps to diversify the range of vocational 
training measures in all areas of the Community. Moreover, 
the spatial flexibiltiy of the Fund means it is able to 
target problems of unemployment in areas such as Bristol, 
which are otherwise relatively affluent. 
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CHAPTER 9: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
REGIONAL POLICY: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
9.1. INTRODUCTION. 
The processes by which European Community policies 
are formulated have been extensively researched by many 
authors from a variety of disciplines. By contrast, the 
means by which these policies are subsequently put into 
effect have received very little attention. However, it is 
clear that the implementation stage is crucial to the 
successful delivery of policy objectives. 
At the beginning of this study, four inter-related 
objectives of the research were outlined. The two primary 
aims were: 
1. to unravel the processes by which the ERDF and ESF 
are implemented in the UK (partly by means of a 
case-study of South West England); 
2. to examine whether the implementation process 
facilitates the delivery of the Funds' 
.. operational" objectives; 
The secondary aims were: 
3. to provide a critique of the EC's participation 
in regional policy and assess the role of the 
Community as an agent of regional development in 
the light of the findings of this research; 
4. to relate the findings of this study to the wider 
debate about the relationships between the 
institutions of the EC. 
In the light of these aims, this final Chapter opens 
with a summary of the principal empirical findings of the 
research and a critique of the way in which two Community 
Funds with regional objectives (the ERDF and ESF) have been 
implemented in the UK. It then proceeds to consider some 
conceptual implications of this research related to the 
literature outlined in Chapter One on policy 
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implementation. Following this, an attempt is made, on 
the basis of both the empirical findings and these 
conceptual issues, to examine the degree to which the EC 
functions as a "supranational" or an "intergovernmental" 
body and the relevance of this to the achievement of policy 
objectives. Furthermore, recommendations are made in the 
light of the findings of this study and the reforms to the 
three Community Structural Funds which are currently (August 
1988) taking place, for a Community regional policy which 
could be put into practice more effectively. The final part 
of the Chapter highlights aspects of both Community regional 
policy and the EC's capacity for effective policy 
implementation which would seem to merit further study. 
9.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS. 
This section reviews the principal empirical findings 
of this research and provides a critique of how Community 
regional policy has been implemented. The study has focusced 
on the operation of two instruments of the European 
Community's regional policy: namely the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). 
The former makes the Community's major financial 
contribution to regional policy, while the latter, although 
primarily an instrument of employment and 'vocational 
training policy, is also intended to contribute towards 
explicitly regional objectives. 
Because this study has concentrated on the 
implementation of Community Funds in the UK, the findings 
outlined below cannot necessarily be extrapolated to other 
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member states. Community policies are implemented in 
different ways in different national systems. 
Nevertheless, these findings provide a basis for comparative 
studies of implementation in other member states and 
thus are relevant to studies taking place elsewhere. 
The research was conducted over the period from 
September 1985 until mid-1988 and therefore the emphasis has 
unavoidably been on the activities of various actors 
involved in implementing the Funds during this period. 
However, where necessary, a more historical perspective has 
been included. The research has, however, been undertaken at 
what has proved to be a particularly appropriate time in 
both the development of the Community's regional policy and 
in the life of the EC itself. The adoption of the Single 
European Act in July 1987 has given a new emphasis to the 
Community's regional development objectives in the context 
of the need to promote "economic and social cohesion" in the 
unified internal market which is due to be completed by the 
end of 1992. The three Community Structural Funds (ERDF, 
ESF and the Guidance section of the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund) are being allocated 
substantially increased resources and their objectives 
are being more specifically defined. As a result, this 
thesis represents a timely contribution to the continuing 
debate on how the Funds will best be able to serve the 
Community's new regional policy goals. 
9.2.1. Unravelling the implementation process. 
The unravelling of the mechanisms by which Community 
grants are allocated was a major aim of this study. The 
research focussed on the roles of three groups of actors: 
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the national government in the UK; the European Commission; 
and applicants for and recipients of EC grants at the South 
West England regional level. 
The dominance of national government in the implementation 
process. 
The dominance of the member states in the European 
Community's political system is well-established. The 
pre-eminence in decision-making of the Council of Ministers 
and the bi-annual European Council, together with the 
survival of unanimous voting on issues of "vital national 
interest" was illustrated by the discussion of the 
development of Community regional policy in Chapter 
Two. Despite the efforts of the Commission to develop a 
Regional Fund which would operate on the basis of perceived 
"Community criteria" rather than national considerations, 
the member states have retained a degree of influence over 
the activities of the ERDF by means of national quotas 
(latterly indicative ranges), the designation of assisted 
areas and a pivotal role in the procedures by which 
applications for aid are made. 
This study has repeatedly shown that national 
government involvement does not stop once a policy has 
been formulated. On the contrary, in the UK, government 
continues to dominate the means by which policies are 
implemented. The strong influence of national policies, 
considerations and civil servants is found at all stages of 
the implementation process and moulds the way in which 
Community policy is actually applied. 
National government control is exercised through both 
formal and informal mechanisms. The main formal procedures 
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are the committees established to advise the Commission on 
the allocation of aid from both the ERDF and the ESF. The 
ERDF Committee has the clearest formal powers but can only 
reject schemes which the Commission wishes to finance if it 
is able to muster a qualified majority when voting takes 
place. However, this should not imply that the 
Committee's influence is minimal. Rather its 
existence ensures that the Commission does not recommend to 
the Committee projects or programmes which might find a 
significant degree of disfavour among a majority of the 
member governments (Chapter 3). 
The formal powers of the ESF Advisory Committee are 
fewer than those of the ERDF Committee. It does not have the 
authority to overturn the provisional decisions of the 
Commission. In fact, the ESF Committee's major role relates 
to overall management matters rather than the consideration 
of individual applications. But it is consulted extensively 
when the Commission is devising its annual guidelines and in 
this respect the expertise of the various national 
delegations is an important aspect of the way in which the 
Fund's priorities are set (Chapter 6). 
The formal representation of member states in the 
implementation of these two Community Funds is thus far from 
negligible. But the most important mechanisms by which 
national governments influence the operation of the ERDF and 
ESF are arguably those which operate away from the formal 
decision-making forums. The more informal contacts between 
the Commission and national government ministries play a 
pivotal role in the implementation of both the ERDF and 
ESF. This research has pointed to many examples where such 
exchanges influence the decisions taken by the Commission. 
In the case of the ERDF, national interests are of course 
protected to a certain extent by the formal rules governing 
the operation of the Fund (indicative ranges, the use of 
national assisted areas, participation on the ERDF 
Committee). Nevertheless, the discussions between the 
Commission and the UK government concerning the submission 
of very large projects and programmes (which make the most 
important contributions to the UK's share of the Fund) are 
an important part of the decision-making process. 
National influences are not built into the 
formal rules controlling the ESF to the same 
extent. However, some evidence (albeit less than 
conclusive) was uncovered that the Commission allocates 
resources according to informal quotas which satisfy the 
various governments. Moreover, the Commission is careful to 
allow governments to examine DG V's provisional decisions 
on the award of ESF grants and to question any 
decisions, particularly regarding large, nationally-funded 
schemes, to which they may object. Thus national influence 
over the ESF is felt in less formal and more subtle ways. 
The Commission's powers both to set the Fund's priorities 
and control the allocation of grants appear at first glance 
to be substantial. However, because these powers have been 
delegated by the member states in the Council, Commission 
civil servants must be careful not to operate against the 
wishes of a majority of member states. 
Extensive member-state participation in the 
implementation process means that purely national goals are 
able to take precedence over the "Community" aims expressed 
63 2 
by the Commission. The UK Government, for example, can use 
Community funds to fulfill a variety of its own policy 
goals. The Government's policy towards both the ERDF and 
ESF is related to the periodic debates concerning 
Britain's contribution to and receipts from the overall 
Community budget. Indeed, as Chapter Two showed, the driving 
force behind the British desire to create an ERDF in the 
first place was the need to recoup a share of an overall 
budget which was perceived as being disadvantageous to the 
UK. Britain's budgetary disputes, which were continued under 
both Labour and Conservative governments, culminated in an 
agreement signed at Fontainebleau in 1985 which awarded the 
UK a large rebate on its contribution to the Community 
budget. The Government's policy towards Community assistance 
is designed primarily to maximise receipts in order to 
reduce Britain's overall budgetary imbalance. 
Apart from its role in administering the two Funds, 
the UK government also plays a major role as an applicant 
for assistance on behalf of schemes run by its own 
departments. The Department of Transport in England and 
the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish offices have all been 
allocated substantial ERDF grants. Furthermore, the Manpower 
Services Commission and to a lesser extent the Department of 
Employment, Northern Ireland Office and the Industrial 
Training Boards continue to take up more than 60% of ESF 
assistance to the UK. These grants to national government 
raise the most serious questions concerning the 
additionality of Community assistance. Moreover, they 
contribute towards- national budgets in a very general, 
spatially unspecific way and hence there is particular 
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concern whether the assistance is really being used for 
regional development purposes (Chapters 4 and 7). 
In conclusion, the influence of national government 
interests filters through to all aspects of implementation. 
The member governments not only participate fully in the 
decision-making process but also receive a significant 
proportion of available finance. However, national 
government involvement in itself is arguably both inevitable 
and desirable, given the unelected status of the European 
Commission.. What is less acceptable is that national 
government goals can negate and overwhelm the "Community" 
objectives of EC policies. In the UK, government control 
over the financial aspects of all Community grants means 
that assistance is absorbed into overall levels of public 
expenditure and strictly monitored by the national Treasury, 
leaving grave doubts whether Community resources are serving 
to increase and diversify spending on regional and 
employment policies. 
The role of the European Commission. 
The pervasive influence of national government on the 
ways in which the two Community Funds are allocated should 
not lead us to assume that the European Commission is of no 
significance in the implementation process. In fact, the 
powers of the Commission are important and have been 
increasing over time. 
When Community policy is being formulated, the 
Commission has the unique ability to submit proposals to the 
Council of Ministers, albeit these proposals are developed 
following full consultation with the member states. The 
development of Community regional policy shows that the 
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Commission is in a favourable position to re-evaluate 
policies following periods of implementation and to propose 
changes in how Community Funds operate (Chapter 2). The 
activities of the Commission and the obligation of national 
governments to operate within the Council of Ministers and 
work towards compromise solutions has produced a Regional 
Fund which is not entirely devoid of a "Community" content. 
There has been an increase in the flexibility of the ERDF, 
the co-ordinated nature of its expenditure and the ability 
of DG XVI to influence grant allocation according to 
perceived Community rather than national considerations. 
(Chapter 3). 
In relation to the ESF, the Commission's role is 
again very complex. Certainly it does possess a variety of 
powers which are of importance. For example, DG V makes the 
final decisions on the allocation of grants and the ESF 
Advisory Committee does not have the formal power to block 
these decisions. On the other hand, governments are able to 
influence overall allocations and the levels of assistance 
granted to larger projects. However, more modest applicants, 
such as local authorities and private organisations, 
generally regard the Commission as the most important hurdle 
to overcome before being awarded an ESF grant. The 
definition of the annual ESF Guidelines, moreover, is an 
important responsibility delegated to the Commission by the 
Council, enabling it to play a crucial role in setting the 
detailed sectoral and spatial priorities of the Fund. 
Nevertheless, as we have already seen, national political 
realities serve to restrict the independence of the 
Commission in these respects and member governments have 
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significant inputs into the decision-makinc! system. 
The role of local initiative. 
Despite the high levels of EC assistance to schemes 
operated by national government, applicants for ERDF and ESF 
grants at local and regional levels also play a distinctive 
part in implementing the two Funds. Indeed, the applicant 
organisations, whether at national or regional level, are in 
one sense of fundamental importance since grants can only be 
allocated if bids for aid are forthcoming. It has been shown 
by our case-studies of South West England that there are 
variations in the ability of the many potentially eligible 
organisations to generate applications and that this has 
ramifications for the achievement of policy objectives 
(Chapter 5). Furthermore, it has been shown that small 
applicants are particularly disadvantaged by the ESF's 
application system and that this may have a particular 
effect in peripheral areas where apart from local 
authorities there are few large applicants (Chapter 8). 
The case studies of South West England have shown 
that the initiative to apply for ERDF and ESF grants is the 
product of a variety of factors. Among the most important 
are the financial constraints imposed on local authorities 
by central government. Again this illustrates how national 
government influences all aspects of the implementation 
process. The volume of applications is dependent on 
whether authorities are committed, in a time of financial 
stringency, to the type of scheme which the ERDF and ESF 
will fund. However, other factors are important in 
determining local responses to the two funds. These include 
local political interests, the initiative of particular 
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individuals and the availability of information and 
expertise (Chapters 5 and 8). Thus, local political and 
administrational processes also effect the detailed 
outcomes of Community policies. 
9.2.2. The delivery of the objectives of the ERDF and ESF. 
This thesis has identified the major mechanisms used 
by the ERDF and ESF to tackle the wider regional policy goal 
of reducing regional disparities. These " operational" 
objectives include: additionality; the concentration of 
spending on the poorest areas; the programme approach; and 
assisting small and medium-sized enterprises. The study has 
assessed the extent to which these operational" 
objectives are being achieved in the UK. 
Additionality. 
The vexed question of "additionality" is never far 
from the surface of any discussion about the efficacy of 
Community assistance. In the UK and elsewhere there is, at 
the very least, widespread doubt whether Community funds are 
really providing resources which serve to increase the 
volume of spending on regional and employment policies. As 
far as the ERDF is concerned, local authorities are unable 
to use receipts to increase the volumes of capital spending 
they are carrying out (Chapters 4 and 5). Instead, grants 
permit local governments to diminish the burden on 
rate-payers of ERDF-funded schemes by reducing the amount of 
money authorities need to borrow. The savings made in this 
way are significant and make the task of applying for aid 
worthwhile. Nevertheless, this research recorded many 
complaints that the government's interpretation of the 
additionality principle is unnecessarily restrictive. The 
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government argues that likely ERDF receipts are taken into 
account when overall annual limits on local-authority 
spending are set, enabling them to be higher than would 
otherwise be possible. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
prove this contention since one cannot judge what 
local-authority spending limits would have been if the ERDF 
did not exist. However, by taking the UK's overall ERDF 
receipts into account when setting national levels of 
local-government spending, the government effectively 
dilutes many of the benefits of ERDF receipts among all 
local authorities throughout the UK. In other words, ERDF 
receipts are in a sense shared by Sussex and Surrey as well 
as Cornwall and Cleveland. 
Less criticism is expressed about additionality in 
the context of the ESF. However, the very large amounts of 
aid directed to MSC programmes such as YTS and other 
national schemes do give cause for concern. The Government 
argues that, in an era of public-spending restraint, 
Community aid enables more money to be spent on vocational 
training than would otherwise be possible. This contention 
is again impossible to prove. At the local level, however, 
additionality of a sort does seem to exist. Certainly, many 
voluntary organisations, private companies and local 
authorities are able to carry out training schemes which 
would not otherwise take place because of a lack of 
finance. However, local authorities and other 
organisations are restricted in their ability to participate 
in vocational training measures by the need to provide 50% 
of project costs and by government restrictions on local 
governmentts ability to raise additional finance from 
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ratepayers. The ability to attract ESF aid depends, 
therefore, on the commitment of particular authorities to 
vocational training and employment creation measures of the 
type favoured by the ESF. Consequently, larger authorities 
in relatively rich areas with bigger budgets, such as 
Bristol City Council, are relatively favoured. 
The geographical concentration of spending, 
Overall, it is*difficult to be conclusive whether 
Community spending has been concentrated on the neediest 
areas. As far as the ERDF is concerned, national quotas and 
more lately indicative ranges, have guaranteed the richer 
states shares of the Fund, albeit the bulk of assistance has 
been directed towards the less affluent member states. The 
system of indicative ranges introduced by the 1984 ERDF 
Regulation has increased the scope of the Commission to 
strengthen further this spatial concentration (Chapters 2 
and 3). 
At the UK level the very fact that spending is 
restricted to designated assisted areas arguably means that 
it is being concentrated where it is most required. However, 
it has been shown that ERDF assistance has been spread 
relatively thinly among all the assisted parts of the 
country. The most successful areas have been the major 
metropolitan counties such as the West Midlands, Merseyside, 
Tyne and Wear and Strathclyde. However, other 
predominantly rural areas such as Cornwall, the Scottish 
Highlands and Islands and parts of Wales have also 
obtained substantial benefit from the Fund, particularly 
when receipts are measured in per capita terms. 
The analysis revealed that the area of the UK which 
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has the highest unemployment rates, the lowest GDP and the 
highest priority in Community regional policy terms, namely 
Northern Ireland, has not apparently secured the largest 
share of ERDF aid. However, because the assistance 
allocated to Northern Ireland is absorbed into the overall 
levels of public spending in the province, it is impossible 
to determine with any precision whether Northern Ireland is 
receiving a share of the Fund commensurate with its needs. 
The ERDF aid available is only one of a number of factors 
which the British Government takes into account when setting 
overall levels of expenditure. Thus it is impossible to 
measure the efficacy of the Community contribution to 
economic development in Northern Ireland. 
At the South West regional level there are again 
doubts whether spending has been directed to the places 
which need it most. The areas of highest unemployment rates 
in West Cornwall have received less ERDF assistance in both 
actual and per capita terms than Intermediate Areas in east 
Cornwall and Devon. 
The regional objectives of the ESF are secondary to 
its general employment and vocational training 
priorities. Consequently, geographical concentration is a 
less explicit objective. In fact, any part of the Community 
is eligible to receive ESF assistance. Nevertheless, as 
Chapters Six and Seven showed, the Fund rules do set out 
some regional priorities which aim to concentrate spending 
in certain absolute priority areas (Greece, Southern Italy, 
Portugal, much of Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland and the 
French Overseas Departments) and other areas of high 
unemployment and low per capita GDP. These rules ensure 
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that a large proportion of assistance goes to the least 
developed and declining regions of the Community (Chapter 
6). 
Within the UK, all regions have benefitted from ESF 
aid. Of the smaller proportion of Fund aid which can be 
identified at regional level, the most successful regions 
have been Northern Ireland, North West England, Scotland, 
Yorkshire and Humberside and the West Midlands. On per 
capita and per unemployed person bases, a similar picture 
emerges, with the North of England joining the list of most 
successful regions. This pattern of spending broadly 
coincides with the distribution of unemployed people in the 
UK and with the regions with the highest overall 
unemployment rates (Chapter 7). 
Within South West England, the largest proportions of 
assistance in both actual and per capita terms have been 
directed to the City of Bristol where publir, private and 
voluntary sectors have all been active in securing ESF aid. 
In contrast, Cornwall, which is the only priority area in 
the region, has relied almost entirely on the County Council 
to generate ESF applications. This criticism should, of 
course, not be pushed too far because the more general 
employment related aims which the ESF pursues have priority 
over its regional objectives. Moreover, the increased 
flexibility produced by not being tied to rigid geographical 
areas can be defended as a positive feature of the ESF, in 
that it enables problems in relatively rich regions to be 
targetted. (Chapter 8). 
The Programme approach. 
The Community's emphasis on a programme approach is 
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still in its infancy and at present is largely restricted to 
the ERDF. The 1984 Council Regulation reforming the 
Regional Fund placed an emphasis on "National Programmes of 
Community Interest" and "Community Programmes" as ways of 
increasing the effectiveness of Community regional 
assistance. These multi-annual schemes have been greeted 
with enthusiasm by local authorities in the UK. As a result, 
the UK appears to be giving other member states a lead in 
putting programmes into effect. The government initially 
appeared unenthusiastic about the benefits of such long-term 
schemes but recently has shown signs of becoming more 
willing to embrace the new approach. (Chapter 4). 
However, the authorities responsible for the 
development and implementation of programmes face a variety 
of problems which may serve to reduce the likely benefits. 
Both the difficulty of planning expenditure more than a year 
in advance and the recurring problem of "additionality" 
(because of continuing national control over the purse 
strings of both the ERDF and other local and national 
government expenditure) are points of contention. 
Furthermore, there are also bureaucratic problems for 
smaller organisations and local authorities who may wish to 
participate in these programmes. Nevertheless, many more 
local authorities are submitting NPCIs, including those in 
South West England. 
Helpinja the small and medium-sized enterprise sector. 
Providing assistance to the small and medium-sized 
enterprise sector is an objective of both the ERDF and ESF. 
Article 15 of the 1984 ERDF Regulation aims to help 
stimulate indigenous development within regions and fa%-ours 
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the small-firm sector. Despite the clear interest shown by 
local authorities in schemes of this kind, almost no Article 
15 aid has been awarded in the United Kingdom. Until the 
middle of 1988 the UK Treasury had blocked all applications 
while it considered the public expenditure implications of 
these grants, which support the revenue rather than capital 
side of local-authority expenditure (Chapter 6). This is 
somewhat paradoxical given the commitment of the 
Conservative Government to promoting the small-firm sector. 
Moreover, it illustrates how different national government 
objectives may conflict when both are applied to the 
implementation of a Community policy. 
One objective of the ESF is also to assist small and 
medium-sized firms. However, it is clear that this sector is 
greatly disadvantaged by a number of aspects of the way in 
which the Fund operates. The timing of decisions, payment 
delays, the linear reduction and the adminstrative capacity 
required all serve to hinder the small companies whinh the 
Commission is particularly concerned to assist (Chapter 7). 
Moreover, this has clear regional implications. In a 
predominantly rural county such as Cornwall, the economy is 
very dependent on the small-firm sector. The difficulties in 
applying for aid experienced by small firms are thus more 
keenly felt in Cornwall than in other counties such as Avon 
where there are more large companies (Chapter 8). 
Consequently, in this instance, the mechanisms by which 
the Fund is operated are unable to concentrate spending on 
small firms or on the neediest areas. 
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Other objectives. 
This thesis has also considered a number of other 
aims of the ESF. The concentration of assistance on young 
people has been facilitated by the Council decision which 
allocates 75% of all resources to schemes aimed at the under 
25s. In the UK, the very high levels of aid allocated to the 
Youth Training Scheme (YTS) ensure that the proportion of 
the Country's receipts allocated to this age group is 
particularly high. Another aim of the ESF is to encourage 
schemes which are innovatory in terms of either their method 
or content. In both the Community as a whole and in the UK, 
the 5% of the ESF's budget allocated to schemes of this kind 
remains underspent. Moreover, it is apparent that sufficient 
information on innovatory schemes has not been disseminated 
to those involved in vocational training. 
9.3. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES. 
Having summarised the main empirical findings of the 
research, this section seeks to place these findings within 
a conceptual framework. The introduction to this study 
argued that an explanation of the outcomes of European 
Community policies must take account of the processes by 
which these policies are implemented. By focussing attention 
on the ways in which Community grants are allocated, for 
example, we may be able to reveal the reasons why there may 
be an "implementation gap" between policy objectives and 
outcomes. In returning to this theme, this section 
concentrates on two key issues: 
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1. the appropriateness of "top-down" and "bottom-up" 
approaches and models for studying the 
implementation of these particular Community 
policies; 
2. the nature of the EC's political system within 
which these policies are implemented. 
9.3.1. "Top-down" versus "bottom-up" perspectives. 
The opening chapter outlined two contrasting 
approaches to the study of policy implementation. The 
"top-down" approach is concerned with examining whether or 
not objectives decided by policy makers at the "top" are 
achieved. This perspective tends to emphasise the ability 
of these policy makers to structure and control what happens 
during implementation. In contrast, the "bottom-up" 
approach maintains that legislation cannot be initially 
formulated to overcome all problems encountered in 
practice, but is likely to undergo changes of interpretation 
whilst being implemented. This approach stresses the 
interactions between the many actors and organisations 
involved and emphasises that policy objectives can be 
changed during implementation to suit both local conditions 
and the different goals of the organisations involved. The 
bottom-up approach carries with it a value judgement that 
extols the virtues of "grass-roots" participation in policy 
formulation and implementation. 
It was argued in Chapter One that the applicability 
of these contrasting approaches depends to a great extent 
on the nature of the particular policy under scrutiny. 
Moreover, both perspectives may be useful in that they 
generate different but complementary insights into how 
policy is put into effect. 
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This study began by adopting an essentially top-down 
approach. The operational objectives of the ERDF and ESF as 
defined by policy makers were identified and the extent to 
which they have been delivered in the UK was assessed. It 
was shown that there is indeed an "implementation gap" 
between a number of stated Community objectives and 
actual policy outcomes. Furthermore, the means by which the 
two Funds are put into effect have been examined, with an 
emphasis on how policy makers (the European Commission and 
national governments) can attempt to control the operation 
of the Fund in order to achieve their objectives 
There are a number of reasons why this top-down 
perspective was considered appropriate in the initial 
analysis. Firstly, as Hill (1981) suggested, the use such an 
approach depends on being able to identify the "decision 
point" at which a policy is clearly ready for 
implementation. In this study, the Council Regulations and 
Decisions governing the ERDF and ESF were regarded as 
examples of clear "decision points". Consequently, the 
processes leading to the creation of this formal legislation 
was regarded as "policy-making" and what follows as 
f. policy-implementation". Furthermore, Community re. gional 
policy is itself a "top-down" policy in that. the initiative 
for the creation of the ERDF and other policy instruments 
originated at Community and national levels; there has been 
only modest "bottom-up" input into the policy formulation 
process. 
The opening Chapter identified the work of Mazmanian 
and Sabatier (1983) as a potentially useful frameworlt within 
which to describe and explain the operation of Community 
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policies and to assess whether the implementation process 
I-Jill succeed in delivering policy objectives. Their 
"top-down" model identified three sets of interdependent 
variables which influence implementation and these are 
examined in turn below: 
1. the complexity and manageability of the problem; 
2. the ways in which the policy can structure and 
constrain the implementation process; 
3. the external variables which influence what 
happens during implementation. 
There can be no doubt that regional economic 
disparities and the measures required to promote regional 
development are complex problems. The difficulties faced by 
various declining, underdeveloped and peripheral regions 
throughout the Community are extremely diverse. Moreover, 
there is no consensus as to the role of regional policy in 
encouraging economic development in these sorts of 
regions. In a number of European countries, particularly the 
UK, spending on regional policy is being reduced and 
attempts are being made to target it more effectively on 
both the neediest areas and the most deserving schemes. 
Moreover, the levels of ideological support for regional 
policy in particular and government intervention in general, 
varies considerably from one member state to another. In 
the UK it is low (Armstrong and Taylor, 1987), whereas in 
countries such as Greece, Italy and 9pain this commitment is 
much higher (Yuill and Allen, 1987). At the same time, 
the role of the European Community in regional development 
is being expanded. Furthermore, the number and variety of 
agencies participating in economic development in general 
and the types of activity supported by the ERDF and ESF in 
particular are extremely varied. In the UK, the policy 
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target group or "pool of organisations" Hijern and Porter, 
1981) includes national government, local authorities, 
public utilities, nationalised industries, private 
companies, and voluntary and charitable groups. All these 
organisations are involved to greater or lesser extents in 
the provision of schemes which contribute towards regional 
development. In other words, EC regional policy is operated 
within a broad policy environment which is complex and 
difficult to manage. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian also emphasised the importance 
of the ways in which policy legislation can structure and 
constrain the implementation process. They pointed to a 
variety of constraints. The first of these was how clearly 
policy objectives are stated. It is argued that vague 
objectives cause uncertainty and confusion among 
implementing officials. The overall goal of Community 
regional policy is to reduce regional disparities but it is 
unclear to what degree inequalities should be reduced and 
which particular disparities should be addressed. 
The more specific operational objectives were almost 
universally recognised by participants in the 
implementation process, but only at the regional and 
Community levels were they generally accepted as desirable. 
In UK government circles there was considerably more doubt. 
about the utility of such objectives and less acceptance of 
the need for either EC involvement in regional policy in 
particular or large scale government involvement in regional 
development in general. In other words, the "causal theory" 
behind Community regional development efforts is not 
universally accepted. Moreover, the aovernment's own 
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objectives seemingly conflict with those of Community 
regional policy. For example, the major aim expressed at 
national government level is to maximise receipts from 
Community Funds and less concern is shown for reducing 
regional disparities. 
Other factors identified by Mazmanian and Sabatier 
which influence how implementation proceeds include the 
presence of committed implementing officials and local level 
structuring of the implementation process. There is 
considerable doubt as to whether these factors are present 
in the case of the ERDF and ESF. Officials at the level of 
the Commission, appear to be committed to fulfilling policy 
aims. However, at the national level officials give 
preference to national objectives which, as we have seen, 
may conflict with those of the Commission. The relevant 
legislation pays no attention to local level structuring and 
mentions only that national governments will submit schemes 
to be examined by the Commission and the ERDF and ESF 
Committees. Instead, local organisation has developed over 
time in a haphazard fashion according to a variety of local 
factors such as individual initiative and perceived 
opportunities. This supports the view of Hiern and Porter 
(1981) that "implementation structures" develop by a process 
of "self selection" in which the individual initiative of 
actors at local level determines which particular 
organisations participate in a particular policy arena. 
The third set of variables identified in Mazmanian 
and Sabatier's framework for explaining implementation are a 
variety of external factors. These incl*ude the support of 
sovereign groups, the attitudes and resources of 
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participants, media attention and the degree of public 
support. The latter can be virtually dismissed in the case 
of these two Community Funds. Public awareness of the 
allocation of grants remains minimal despite efforts to 
publicise the activities of the ERDF in particular by means 
of signboards and reports in the local press. The support of 
sovereign bodies such as national and local government, on 
the other hand is more relevant. At the national level 
there is arguably little more than token support in te UK 
for the regional objectives of the two Funds. In the more 
general vocational training arena, however, the aims of the 
ESF correspond more closely with the priorities of the 
Government. There is considerable overlap between the 
operation of the ESF and the activities of Government 
agencies such as the MSC. 
Within regions, locally-elected bodies vary in their 
support for Community regional and employment policy 
activities. In South West England some authorities 
participate extensively in the types of measure supported 
by the ERDF and ESF and are very active in attempting to 
secure Community assistance. Others lack the political will 
or the available finance to participate to the same extent. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that the ERDF and ESF 
satisfy only a limited number of Mazmanian and Sabatier's 
variables which contribute to the success of the 
implementation process. Their top-down perspective, which 
seeks to explain why policy objctives may or may not be 
achieved, helps us to explain why there is an 
implementation gap in the UK between the operationaL 
objectives of the ERDF and ESF and the actual policy 
S 
15 
0 
outcomes: objectives are not universally accepted, Community 
legislation is unable adequately to structure implementation 
and there is a lack of support from national government. 
This study has shown that the "bottom-up" view can 
also generate insights into how Community regional policy 
and Community funds are put into practice. By elucidating 
the choices facing potential participants at this "outcome" 
end of the policy process, this study has shown that 
government controls on local authority spending, political 
and organisational commitment at local level, as well as 
individual initiative and the availability of information 
and expertise will all influence the degree of local 
involvement with Community funds. 
This bottom-up perspective has also demonstrated that 
the operation of the ERDF and ESF has much in common with 
the ideas of those researchers who stress the flexibility of 
implementation and the lack of hierarchical control among 
participating organisations. The European Commission has 
only a certain degree of control over the allocation process 
(including the ability to make the final formal decisions on 
the award of grants, to set the annual ESF Guidelines and to 
choose between competing projects). However, its decisions 
are taken following consultation with member governments and 
it can exert only limited control over many of the 
financial aspects of the Funds, responsibility for 
which remains firmly in the hands of national government. 
Moreover, the controls which the Commission does possess 
have previously been delegated by the Council, on whose good 
will the Commission depends. Hence, "political" control, 
often felt in very subtle ways, is exercised by the member 
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states. Many of the decisions which the Commission is 
empowered to make are therefore the product of negotiations 
and compromise (Barratt and Fudge, 1981) between the 
Commission and the national ministries. Community 
legislation which at first might appear to be inflexible is 
in fact open to varying interpretations during discussions 
between the Commission and national government. Moreover, 
member states attempt to ensure that the Commission's 
interpretation accords with what they perceive are their own 
particular interests. 
The relationships between the various participants in 
the policy implementation process are clearly highly 
complex. No single hierarchical chain of command exists. 
Consequently, it is necessary to examine in more detail the 
political structure of the EC within which Community 
policies are put into practice and how these institutional 
relationships affect the achievement of policy objecti,,. -es. 
9.3-2. The Nature of the European Community's political 
and institutional system. 
The review of the literature on policy implementation 
in Chapter One demonstrated that the framework of 
institutions underlying the implementation of a particular 
policy will have an important impact on how that policy is 
put into effect. Toonen (1985), for example, focussed on the 
differences between federal and unitary systems in this 
regard. He concluded that the various levels of itovernment 
in federal systems produced the most complex and least 
effective implementation structures. It was also arqued at 
the outset that the institutional structure of the EC has 
some aspects in common with a federal system but in fact is 
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unique. The opening chapter went on to highlioht the debate 
concerning the "supranational" or "intergovernmental" nature 
of the EC. We can now re-examine these ideas in the light 
of the findings of this research. The emphasis is on the 
implications of the institutional relationships for the 
process of policy implementation and the delivery of the 
Community's regional policy objectives. 
It has often been argued that "intergovernmental" 
decision-making has dominated the way in which the Community 
formulates its policies (Taylor, 1983; Webb, 1983). 
Developments such as the "Luxembourg Compromise" of 1966, 
the emergence of COREPER and the creation of the European 
Council are said to reflect the fact that national 
governments control Community decision-making in order to 
maintain sovereignty over economic and political matters. 
The evidence from our study of the development of Community 
regional policy in many ways supports this idea. The 
development of the ERDF has seen national realities dominate 
Community ideals; assistance is tied to 
nationally-designated assisted areas; funds are allocated 
according to national quotas; governments are closely 
involved in the management of the Fund and have regarded 
grants as subsidies for expenditure already undertaken at 
the national level. 
However, to conclude that the emergence of regional 
policy in the EC was therefore the result of 
"intergovernmental" decision-making processes, would be a 
substantial oversimplification of the highly complex 
relationship between the various national interests and thp 
"Community" ideals expressed by the Commission. National 
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interests are certainly defended within the Council of 
Ministers: indeed this is inevitable given the position of 
member states at the heart of the Community's institutional 
structure. However, many of the decisions which emerge from 
the Council are not "national", but supranational in nature; 
they are compromise solutions based on the different 
viewpoints of the member states and the "Community" 
considerations put forward in the Commission's proposals. 
In relation to regional policy, this process has 
produced a Regional Fund which does have an 
identifiable (albeit limited) "Community" content. 
The crucial question is whether this supranational 
policy adopts a valid "Community" perspective which treats 
the EC as a single entity with common problems requiring 
common solutions. The criticisms outlined above mean that, 
arguably, it has not. "Community" ideals remain 
subordinate to a collection of national considerations. 
Moreover, during implementation various 
"intergovernmental" factors become increasingly dominant. 
When policy is put into effect, national governments are 
able to operate more individually and are no longer obliged 
to seek compromise solutions in supranational institutions 
such as the Council of Ministers. The detailed rase studies 
of the ERDF and ESF have shown that national government can 
control the operation of Community policy in order to 
fulfill its own domestic objectives. 
Supranational institutions such as the Commission 
and the Fund management committees play an important part in 
implementation but are isolated from and unable to control 
many of the crucial decisions and processes operating 
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entirely within the member states. These conclusions 
clearly offer support for the view that the Community is 
largely a framework for intergovernmental action. Although 
initial policy decisions are created by supranational 
compromises, largely independent national concerns dominate 
the subseqent implementation of these policies. 
There are, on the other hand, a number of problems 
with the intergovernmental view which have become apparent 
during this research. Firstly, as we have already seen, the 
Commission does have a degree of authority over the 
allocation of grants and "supranational" decision-making by 
the Commission, and the ERDF and ESF Committees is to a 
certain extent a feature of the implementation process. 
Secondly, the view inherent in intergovernmentalism that 
national governments are coherent structures which represent 
a single identifiable " national interest" should be 
rejected. UK government policy towards projects submitted 
under Article 15 of the 1984 ERDF Regulation is a 
particularly apposite example of how there can be conflict 
between different interests within government. Despite a 
Conservative Government policy which aims to assist and 
promote the small-business sector, Article 15 measures, 
which concentrate on this sector, have been blocked by the 
UK Treasury because of their public, expenditure 
implications. A second example con cerns UK polic3, towards 
the financing of National Programmes of Community Tnterest. 
Although the Department of Environment submits NPCTs on 
behalf of local organisations in the name of the UX 
'clovernment, there are complaints that the government 
subsequently fails to provide adequate finance to meet the 
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costs of these programmes in future years. These examples 
lead us to reject the notion inherent in the 
intergovernmental view that national government is 
monolithic. 
The findings of this study on implementation thus 
provide some insight into both supranational and 
intergovernmental perspectives. However, neither view fully 
explains the relationship in implementation between the 
European Commission, national governments and local 
organisations. Chapter One outlined a number of other views 
of the Community's policy process. However, these appear to 
be even less useful in aiding our understanding of how 
Community policy is implemented. The idea of 
"interdependence" neglects the important role of the 
European Commission. The "transgovernmental" perspective 
also has little general relevance to a study of the 
implementation process since links between governments away 
from the formal decision-making forums are not in 
evidence during implementation. On the other hand, 
discussions over the creation and reform of the ERDF have 
involved the building of coalitions between member states 
which share common interests. The pressure exerted by the 
states of southern Europe in support of the Commission's 
proposal to concentrate a large proportion of the Structural 
Funds on these less-developed areas is one example of the 
appropriateness of the "transgovernmental" view of policy 
formulation. The suggestion that the Community institutions 
can best be defined as "extra-national" (Pinder, 1981) can 
also be questioned, given the high level of inter-linka9p 
between national and Community institutions. 
356 
These concepts leave us with an incomplete 
view of the Community's complex institutional structure 
within which policies are implemented. Governments maintain 
a firm grip but the authority of the Commission in 
implementation has slowly increased. Supranational 
decision-making has created a policy with common 
"Community" elements, but it is dominated by national 
decisions, policies and considerations which are maintained 
and even strengthened when the policy is put into effect. 
Implementation therefore reflects the complexity of the 
Community's political structure. Although some aspects of 
supranational authority are apparento national government 
has hitherto maintained its place at the heart of the 
decision-making system. 
9.4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, THE CURRENT REFORMS AND THE ROLE 
OF THE COMMUNITY IN IMPLEMENTING REGIONAL POLICY. 
Until this point the main concern of this study has 
been the implementation process and how policy is operated 
within the framework of the EC's political structure. The 
research findings have revealed the many difficulties 
encountered when Community Policy is put into effect. 
Consequently, it is pertinent to question what form 
Community regional policy should take. Moreover, such an 
assessment should be made in the context of the reforms of 
the three Community Structural Funds and of EC regional 
Policy in general which are taking place during 1988 (see 
Chapter 2). 
This section begins by listing the major problems of 
existing Community regional policy which have been uncovered 
in this research. It then assesses how far t-he changes 
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heralded by the current reforms are likely to overcome these 
implementation problems. The discussion also makes some 
recommendations based on the findings of this research for 
the future development of Community regional policy. 
As shown above, the major failings of the current 
regional policy, and of the ERDF and ESF in particular, 
can be listed as follows: 
a. the relatively modest financial resources 
available to tackle the stated goals; 
b. the vagueness of the overall goals of Community 
regional policy; 
C. the lack of a clear geographical concentration of 
resources on the neediest areas; 
d. the perceived lack of "additionality"; 
e. the problems encountered in implementing the 
programme approach; 
the heavily "nationalised" implementation 
structure; 
9. the various problems of the decision-malting 
systems; 
h. the difficulties encountered by the ERDF and ESF 
in assisting small firms; 
Dh-I-ein deauacv of available resources. 
As was argued in Chapter 2, a major failing of 
current Community regional policy efforts is the relative 
paucity of available resources. The February 1988 European 
Council meeting agreed with the Commission proposal to 
double the resources available to the Structural Funds by 
1993. In fact, by 1992 the Funds will account for about 
one-third of the Community budget as opposed to 
approximately 18% at present (European Information Service 
No 90). This increase is clearly to be welcomed by those 
,.: hO believe that the Community has an important. role to 
Play in developing the regions of Europe. 
However, the twin issues of doubling the size and 
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increasing the geographical concentration of the Funds raise 
doubts about whether some regions have the capacity to 
absorb large increases in assistance. Howells (1988), for 
example, argues that this may be a particular problem in 
Southern European regions which "lack a large industrial 
base and where the number of potential, worthwhile, 
indigenously-based schemes can often be small". Howells goes 
on to suggest that this may lead to resources being spent on 
highly visible, large-scale infrastructure projects with 
little thought of how to stimulate the industrial activity 
which could benefit from the improved infrastructure. The 
findings of this study offer some support for Howells' 
arguments. The Development Areas of South West England, 
which nominally have priority for ERDF funding, have been 
unable to generate as many applications as the relatively 
less needy Intermediate Areas. This emphasises the 
importance of looking at the capacity of particular areas to 
generate applications for Community aid. In South West 
England, for example, a large proportion of assistance to 
the region is won by public utilities such as South West 
Water Authority. The privatisation of these organisations 
could have serious repurcussions for the continuing flow of 
ERDF aid into the region. 
Vague overall goals. 
Although this research has shown that the 
participants in implementation were aware of the broad aims 
of EC regional policy, the fact is that aims such as 
reducing regional inequalities" and concentrating on the 
most needy areas" are in practice very vaizue. Pnorly 
defined goals mean that Community policy is spread thinly 
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over a wide range of sectoral and geographical targets. In 
response to such criticisms, the Commission identified five 
specific objectives for all three Community structural 
Funds at the beginning of the current reform process 
(Commission, 1987a) and these were accepted by the European 
Council meeting held in Brussels in February 1988. The five 
agreed objectives are: 
1. developing less-developed regions (Objective No 
1); 
2. converting regions and smaller areas seriously 
affected by industrial decline (Objective No 2); 
3. combatting long-term unemployment (Objective No 
3); 
4. combatting youth unemployment (Objective No 4); 
5. a) modernising agricultural structures and 
b) developing rural areas (Objective No 5 a. and 
b. ) (Council Regulation (EEC) 2052/88). 
A concentration on these specific objectives is to be 
welcomed from the point of view of increasing the 
effectiveness of regional policy. However, there remain 
doubts over just how exclusive the stated objectives will 
be. These doubts concern, firstly, the extent to which the 
reformed Funds (particularly the ERDF) will be 
c-'reo. d. raphically concentrated and, secondly, whether the 
reformed ESF will really focus more explicitly on youth and 
long-term unemployment. 
The Commission's aim when formulating its proposats 
was to concentrate spending on a limited number of 
underdeveloped areas and certain declining industrial areas. 
Thus it represents a strengthening of the "operational" 
objective of concentrating spending in the neediest areas 
(Chapter- 3). However, the subsequent negotiations have 
raised doubts whether this concentration will actually 
36C 
materialise. One criterion in the original Commission 
proposal for defining regions suffering from industrial 
decline was that eligible areas should have unemployment 
15% above the Community average. However, the Council 
negotiations resulted in this variable being changed to 
simply unemployment above the Community average. 
Consequently, many areas will be included which would 
otherwise have been ineligible. Secondly, it seems likely 
that other regions which do not fall into the less-developed 
or declining industrial categories will be eligible for ERDF 
aid under Objective 5 concerned with rural areas. For 
example, the UK Government has successfully negotiated for 
the inclusion of Devon and Cornwall, Mid Wales and the 
Highlands and Islands of Scotland in this category 
(European Information Service, No 92). As Chapter Four 
showed, these areas are among the largest per capita 
beneficiaries of ERDF aid. Therefore, their continued 
eligibility is to be welcomed by both local aUthorities 
seeking grants in these areas and the UK Government as it 
attempts to maximise receipts from the Fund. It is probable 
that other member states, particularly France, will have 
comparable areas which will also be included. llowever, f rom 
the point of view of concentrating spending in the neediest 
areas, the retention of these areas can be critipised. 
The concentration of the ESF on youth and long-term 
unemployment has raised concern, particularly among 
voluntary organisations in the UK (intprview sourre and 
Memorandum from National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations, House of Lords, 1988), that groups such as 
women, the disabled and ethnic minorities will no longf-r be 
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able to receive assistance. However, the UK Government 
maintains that there will be scope for these groups to 
continue to receive aid within the framework of the five 
objectives. For example, these groups may continue to 
receive grants for schemes aimed at young disabled people or 
long-term unemployed women. From one point of view this 
development is welcome since, as Chapter Seven showed, many 
of these groups are particularly reliant on ESF aid. Again, 
however, there seems little point in outlining specific 
objectives which turn out to be vague enough to allow 
everybody who was previously receiving aid to continue to do 
SO. 
The lack of additionalit 
The perceived lack of "additionality" in the 
provision of Community funding seems likely to continue as a 
problem. National government, in the UK at least, will 
persevere in its policy of limiting public spending from all 
sources. Furthermore, the British Government will continue 
to view Community financial assistance as a mechanism for 
11 winning back" a share of the UK's overall contribution to 
the Community's budget. 
However, it is appropriate to question whether 
It additionality" should be a desirable objective of 
Community aid in the more affluent member states such as 
Britain. If we assume, as Armstrong (1985) argues, that 
local and national decision-makers are best ahle to decide 
which particular projects are most appropriate for the 
development of certain regions, then it could be ar. gLIF-d 
that the most worthwhile schemes are those given priority 
and already funded from national sources. There is therpfore 
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a danger that truly additional Community assistance may lead 
to the funding of schemes which have only marginal benefit 
for the areas in which thay are located. Community aid may 
then become associated with projects which have only limited 
value. 
Arguably, it is not "additionality" which the 
Community should seek but "complementarity". In other 
words, Community aid should aspire to a qualitative 
improvement in regional development efforts. The increased 
emphasis in the current reforms on a programme approach 
would seem to be an ideal mechanism for strengthening the 
complementary nature of Community funding anti thereby 
increasing its effectiveness. The evidence from this study 
is that programmes may provide a catalyst for increasing 
co-ordination of organisations participating in regional 
development activities, whether at local, national or 
Community levels. For example, local-authority officers 
in-volved in the Plymouth submission for a National Programme 
of Community Interest stated that District and County 
Councils and public utilities such as South West Water 
Authority were co-operating more effectively because of the 
need to produce a co-ordinated programme for the development 
of the area in order to secure ERDF assistance (Chapter 7). 
Moreover, the process of devising programmes leads to a more 
rigorous, co-ordinated assessment of the economic 
development needs of particular are-as. It. is thiq 
qualitative improvement in regional development measurpq 
which Community financial assistance should sepk, rather 
than a spurious quest for "more of the same" additionality. 
In the poorer member countries, howevpr, where very 
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important schemes may not go ahead because of inadequate 
resources, additionality in itself is a much more 
appropriate objective. 
There is, of course, no reason why these sorts of 
programme- should not be precipitated by entirely national 
assistance and initiatives. However, in the absence of such 
nationally organised schemes, the involvement. of the 
Community is welcome. 
Problems of the programme approach. 
Of course, the programme approach has been shown to 
have problems. For example, interviewees in this research 
pointed to the difficulty of planning in advance when 
local-authority finance is guaranteed only on an annual 
basis (Chapter 4). Moreover, the proposed extension of the 
programme approach to the ESF is also problematic. One 
question concerns whether ESF programmes will be based on 
limited geographical areas or will be sectorally and perhaps 
nationally based. There would seem to be many difficulties 
associated with devising areal ESF programmes when 
applicants from a particular area may be very diverse. 
Chapter Eight showed, for example, that a large variety 
of organisations with very different needs and objectives 
are involved in applying for ESF grants in South West 
England. However, it would seem possible for a single larlre 
applicant, such as Cornwall County Council, to group 
together its own schemes into a single multi-annUal 
programme. 
National sectoral programmes may be easipr to dP%'iSP 
but would require national or e%, F-n Community hnsed 
organisations to prepare them. These could inrýlude srhemes 
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such as a national programme aimed at training long-term 
unemployed women prepared by the National Council of 
Voluntary Organisations. A second example could be a 
programme aimed at training young people to use new 
technologies organised by the nationally based Association 
of County Councils. Other national organisations which could 
perform this task include the new Training Commission (which 
has superseded the Manpower Services Commission) and the 
Industrial Training Boards. It is possible that the 
Department of Employment may need to become more involved in 
divising programme applications and there would certainly 
need to be much greater co-ordination between both 
national and local organisations than at present. Moreover, 
an increased number of nationally-run programmes would make 
it more difficult for the ESF to contribute in a meaningful 
way to regional objectives. 
Problems of decision-making. 
This study has identified a number of aspects of the 
decision-making system which allocates the ERDF and ESF 
which require improvement. One of the major elements of 
the new reforms designed to make such improvements is the 
notion of a "partnership" between local, national and 
Community institutions (Commission, 1987d). The aim is to 
increase consultation between all participants from the very 
early stages of programme design. This is intended, firstly, 
to allow a decentralisation of decision-making from the 
Commission to the national government and down to those 
involved at the regional level and, secondly, to permit the 
Commission to participate at an earlier stage in the design 
of local programmes and strategies. In other words, the 
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Commission's intention is to reduce the dominating role of 
national government and simultaneously to increase both the 
authority of the Commission and the input of "bottom-up" 
local initiative into the policy formulation and 
implementation process. We have seen that, hitherto, EC 
regional policy has been predominantly "top-down" in nature. 
Any attempt to increase the participation of those closest 
to the n6eds and conditions of particular regions is 
welcome. How the system will work in practice remains to 
be seen, but this study suggests that it will be 
difficult to weaken the grip of national government. 
In any case, the continuing involvement of national 
'covernment in the implementation process is welcome from the 
point of view of controlling the activities of the unelected 
Commission. There is no reason why the Commission should be 
given a completely free rein to allocate Community funds as 
it pleases within the member states, nor is it in the best 
position to do so. On the other hand, it is not justifiable 
for national governments to subvert the Community objectives 
of the Funds during the implementation process in order to 
fulfill entirely national aims. Community objectives such 
as additionality (or "complementarity"), the programme 
approach and encouraging internally generated development 
are seen as laudable objectives by the "consumers" of 
regional aid based in the regions and the ability of 
governments to hinder them should be reduced. In any case, 
as Chapters Four and Seven demonstrated, national interests 
are already well-represented in the supranational managpment 
committees and the informal negotiations oarried out 
while the Commission deliberates on whether to fund 
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submitted schemes. 
As far as the ESF is concerned, it is clear that 
certain reforms in grant allocation procedures are required 
in the Fund Regulation. The main requirement is for a 
change in the timing of decisions. It is important that 
recipient organisations are informed of the decision to 
award aid before the scheme actually commences. In other 
words, because ESF aid is awarded for schemes which start in 
January, decisions should be announced in December rather 
than in March or April. This would allow all beneficiaries 
to plan spending with greater confidence. Small 
organisations would particularly benefit from a change such 
as this; no bad thing given the problems faced by such 
organisations unveiled in this research. 
In conclusion, despite the difficulties encountered 
during implementation and the seeming lack of national 
covernment enthusiasm in the UK for a "complementary" 
Community regional policy, this research does not 
contradict the belief that the EC has an important role to 
play in the attack on regional disparities. The Community, 
in co-operation with national and local authorities, is able 
to strengthen and diversify existing regional policy 
efforts. Moreover, the current reforms offer some hope that 
the effectiveness of Community policy in this respeet can be 
increased. The Community's regional policy has reached a 
crossroads and its future progress will reqiiire careful 
monitoring. By examing the implementation of these 
particular policy instruments this research has drawn 
attention to an area of study which will he a rewarding 
subject for future enquiry. 
367 
9.5. SOME DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH. 
This thesis has focussed on two themes, both of which 
are avenues for interesting further research. These were, 
firstly, the means through which EC Funds are implemented 
and, secondly, whether or not policy objectives are 
fulfilled. 
As far as the allocation of Community Funds is 
concerned, a number of issues merit subsequent 
enquiry. Firstly, the emphasis on a programme approach to 
Community funding, highlighted by the 1984 ERDF Regulation 
and being continued by the current Structural Fund reforms, 
requires detailed research. This study has identified a 
number of problems which are arising as programmes are 
formulated and implemented. Consequently, other studies 
need to focus on the efficacy of these schemes, assessing 
whether they are in fact producing changes in the quality 
and quantity of regional development measures in areas with 
severe economic problems. it would be particularly 
interesting to examine in detail the operation of a single 
programme (such as that submitted by Cornwall in 1988) in 
order to assess its impact on local economic de%-elopment. 
Secondly, research is also required to assess the 
impact of the integrated approach to Communitý' regional 
development activities. These schemes, which utilise two or 
more Community funds as well as national financing 
programmes, are being given increased priority by the 
current Structural Fund reforms. In particular, attention 
should be focussed on how individual Tntegrated Development 
Operations and Integrated Mediterranean Programmes are 
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implemented 
In view of the "implementation gap" between aims and 
objectives revealed in this research, careful analysis is 
needed of how EC funds contribute towards the achievement 
of the five Objectives set out in the framework Regulation 
(Council Regulation (EEC) 2052/88). Clearly there is a 
general need for more explicit concern in the future with 
how the Community's increasingly prominent regional 
development objectives are put into practice. 
Furthermore, future research should also focus on 
comparisons between the findings of this study and the 
patterns of implementation in other member states. 
Community policies are formulated by a process involving all 
member states, yet the ways in which they are subsequently 
put into practice may differ greatly from one country to 
another. In this respect, future studies should 
concentrate, firstly, on how other national governments 
influence the implementation process (Do other member 
governments show a greater commitment to the goals of 
Community regional policy or do they exert equally tight 
controls on the grant-allocation process? ) and, secondly, on 
the role of regional and local organisations ill putting 
Community policies into effect. 
The use of concepts and models derived from the 
literature on policy implementation could also be profitably 
applied to the study of other EC policies. rn other policy 
areas, the ability of the Commission and other supranational 
institutions to exercise "top-down" control may he 
greater. Member governments may bp less, able to subvert 
Community objectives in favour of their own national goals 
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and interests. Whatever other studies may reveal, it is 
clear that studying how Community policies operate can help 
to shed more light on the nature of the EC's evolving 
political system. Moreover, the changes in decision-making 
and the commitment to completing the common internal market 
by the end of 1992 give such studies added importance. The 
Community is changing, yet the extent to which supranational 
institutions will replace or supersede nationally-dominated 
implementation structures and interests remains unclear. 
By examining the operation of a policy with 
explicit spatial objectives, this study has shown that 
geographical outcomes are heavily influenced by the process 
of policy implementation. Consequently, political 
geographers could shed more light on the spatial outcomes of 
public policies by focussing, as political scientists and 
others have done, on how these policies are put into effect. 
This thesis has thus taken some steps along a number of 
research pathways which geographers and others may wish to 
follow furtber. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
LIST AND DATES OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED AND ORGANISATIONS 
REPLYING TO QUESTIONNAIRES. 
1. Interviews in South West England. 
Cornwall County Council - Mr D. Pattison. Planning Department 
15.10.85; 4.11.86; 22.6.87 
- Mr J. Connolly. Planning Department 
4.11.87; 22.6.87 
Devon County Council - Mr J. Mitchell- Chief Executive's 
Department. 11.11.86; 9.7.87 
- Mr S. Smith. Chief Executives 
Department. 11.11.86; 9.7.87 
Plymouth City Council - Mr P. Smith. Chief Executivds 
Department. 16.2-87; 18.7.87 
- Mr D. Howes. Principal Accountant 
17.6.87 
Somerset County Council - Mr T. Hart. Planning Department 
25.6.87 
- Ms A. L. Taylor. Economic 
Development Unit. 25.6.87 
Avon County Council - Mr R. Jones. Economic Development 
Treasurer. 24.6.87 
Dorset County Counci; - Mr J. Thomas. Education Department 
3.4.87 
Gloucestershire C. C. - Mr M'. Harris. Education Department 
8.4.87 
Bristol City Council - Mr R. Coles. Employment Initiatives 
Division. 24.6.87 
Kerrier D. C. - Mr A. Bruce. Economic Development 
Unit. 23.11.86 
Carrick D. C. - Mr R. Dodge. Planning and 
Development Department. 22.1.87 
South Hams D. C. - Mr P. Gould. Finance Officer. 
12.3.87 
Restormel D. C. - Mr J. Marshall. Industrial 
Development officer. 21.6.87 
North Cornwall D. C. Mr N. Pendleton. Planning and 
Development Department. 23.1-87 
Penwith D. C. Mr J. Lindfield. Industrial 
Development Officer. 23.3.87 
Torridge D. C. Mr N. Jackson. Treasurer. 10.2-87 
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Teignbridge D. C. - Ms A. Mandler. Chief ExecutivE? s 
Department. 16.7.87 
South West Water - Mr A. Norris. Finance Officer. 
Authority 23.1.87. 
South Western Electricity - Mr R. James. Finance Department. 
Board 1.2.87. 
UK Government DeDartments. 
Department of the - Mr R-Vaughan- Bristol Regional 
Environment office. 25.3.87. 
- Mr J. Zetter. Regional Policy 
Division. 7.7.87. 
- Mr S. Town. Regional Policy 
Division. 7.7.87. 
- Mr P. Morgan. Regional Policy 
Division. 24.2.87. 
Department of Trade - Mr J. Cumming. Regional Policy. 
and Industry 8.7.87. 
Department of Employment- Mr S. Barber. Head of ESF Unit. 
15.6.87. 
Mr G. Arnold. Chief Adviser, ESF 
Unit. 23.2.87; 28.7.87. 
Mr M. Kennedy. ESF Unit. 23.2.87; 
28.7.87. 
Mr P. Grant. Policy Section. 
28.7.87. 
Ms. L. Jackson. Policy Section. 
27.2.87. 
3. Other UK Interviews. 
Manpower Services - Mr F. Crane. Higher Executive 
Commission officer. 12.1.88. 
Engineering Industry - Mr D. Turner. Finance Section. 
Training Board 5.3.87. 
National Council for - Mr B. Seary. Head of International 
Voluntary Organisations Section. 29.7.87 
J. & A. B. Associates - Mr J. Boylin. Principal Consultant. 
9.1.88 
Binder Hamlyn Ltd. - Mr T. Hart. Consultant. 11.1.88. 
4. Interviews at the European Commission. 
DG XVI (Regional Policy) Mr H-Christensen. Projects 
Division, Directorate B. 4.5.87. 
Mr R. McKenna. Projects Division, 
Directorate B. 5.5.87. 
Mr S-Penny. Projects Division, 
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Directorate B. 28.4.86. 
- Mr H. Hochgrassel. ERDF Committee. 
28.4.86. 
DG V (Employment and - Mr S-Weston. Under 25s. 28.4.87. 
Social Affairs) - Mr R. Royce. Innovatory. 28.4.87. 
- Mr R. Betts. Adults. 30.4.87. 
DG XXII (Co-ordination - Mr P. Redfern. 2.5.87. 
The European Parliament. 
DG for Research - Mr A. Comfort. Regional Policy. 
15.5.87. 
Committee for Regional - Mr N. Turner. Permanent Staff. P-All-f QIIJ RQS10A. Al F loAntAg 15.5.87 
Committee for Employment - Mr N. Deeks. Permanent Staff. 
and Social Affairs 16.5.87. 
MEPS - Mr C. Beazley. Plymouth and 
Cornwall. 3.5.88. 
- Lord O'Hagan. Devon. 12.2.87. 
- Mr R. Cottrell. Bristol and Bath. 
15.6.87. 
6. Questionnaire Respondents. 
Private Firms. 
Helipebs Ltd. 
Emerson Electric Ltd. 
Lydmet Ltd. 
Severn Transport Training Ltd. 
Blick Communications Ltd. 
Strachan and Henshaw Ltd. 
Mitchell Cotts Precision Engineering Ltd. 
Dowty Mining Equipment Ltd. 
PCL Packaging Ltd. 
Newman Electrics Motors Ltd. 
Westland Helicopters Ltd. 
Westwood Engineering Ltd. 
Lister-Petter Ltd. 
Davy McKee Ltd. 
Voluntary/Charitable Organisations. 
Cutting Edge Workshops. 
Dartington Information Technology Training Centre 
Hartcliffe and Withywood Ventures 
North Bristol Itec 
Central Bristol Adult Education Centre 
National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux (Devon and 
Cornwall Area) 
Bristol Folk House 
Ilfracombe Training Centre 
Bristol Women's Workshop 
Airspace Charity Workshop 
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APPENDIX 2. 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR LOCAL AUTHORITY RECIPIENTS OF EC 
GRANTS. 
1) Oroanisation. 
Departments/personnel: Which Departments have responsibility 
for EC grants? Are other departments involved? 
How many officers are involved? Are they involved 
full-time-or part-time? 
How has organisation changed since 1975? 
Who has formal responsibility for applications 
made? 
Do different people deal with different Funds? 
Selection of projec 
Are projects 
What changes 
ESF. How are 
Are projects 
What changes 
ts: ERDF. How are projects selected? 
in particular locations given priority? 
have their been? 
ESF projects selected? 
designed with ESF assistance in mind? 
have their been in these procedures? 
Applications: ERDF. How many applications are normally 
made? What proportion are accepted? 
What arguments are used to support applications? 
ESF. How many applications are usually made? 
What proportion are accepted? 
What arguments are used to support these 
applications? 
What changes have their been? Are more or less 
applications being made now or in the past? 
Has the 1984 ERDF Regulation made any differences? 
2) Co-ordination.. 
Other applicants: How much contact is there with other 
applicants in the area? 
What is relationship between County and Districts? 
Do you know how much other local applicants receive? 
Programmes: Are you involved in preparing programmes? 
If so, how did this come about? Who provided the 
initiative? What does programme preparation involve? 
Is it worth while? 
Regional Development Programmes: Do local author ities/ 
public utilities contribute to RDPs? Could RDPs be 
improved? 
Are they of any practical use? 
3) Information. 
General EC issues: What are sources of information 
available on EC matters? 
What publications/ information 
the organisation? 
Are there seminars/ conferences 
many have been attended in the 
Are reports written within the 
sources are read in 
on EC issues? How 
last two years? 
organisation about 
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effects of EC legislation? 
What changes have their been in the amounts of 
information received? 
ERDF/ESF: What information is available on the ERDF and ESF 
in particular? 
How are applicants advised on ERDF/ESF applications? 
Who provides assistance? 
Do local authorities provide advice to other 
potential applicants? 
Are consultancy companies involved? 
Is information adequate? How could it be improved? 
What changes have therebeen? 
4) Relations with national government. 
ERDF: How much contact is there with DoE? 
Does DoE approach applicants concerning ERDF grants 
or vice versa? 
What help is provided with applications by the DoE? 
Is there contact after an application has been 
submitted? 
Are applicants encouraged to submit unusual or 
borderline applications? 
What is the role of the DoE Regional Office? 
Information? Advice? 
What changes have there been? Since 1984? 
What inprovements could be made? Are there any major 
problems? 
ESF: How much contact is there with the DE? 
(Other questions as above) 
What differences between the Funds? 
What' changes have there been over time? 
Improvements? Problems? 
5) Relations with Community institutions. 
Commission: General. What contact is there with the 
Commission? 
Are there approaches from the Commission on EC 
matters? 
Are Commission officials helpful? 
ERDF/ESF. How much contact is there with the 
Commission before applications are submitted? 
Is there contact with the Commission after 
applications are submitted? 
Are there visits to Brussels to lobby on 
applications? 
How many recently? Who takes part in these visits? 
Is lobbying effective? 
Does Commission monitor ERDF/ESF-funded schemes? 
Have there been any changes? Since 1984 Regulation? 
Could there be any improvements which might be of 
benefit? 
European Parliament: What is role of MEPs? 
Do they participate in lobbying? 
Is MEP well-informed? 
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6) General issues/ policy/ motives. 
Policy towards EC Funds: What are the objectives of EC 
regional policy? 
Are there any attempts to concentrate spending on 
the neediest areas? 
Are any projects given priority at the local level? 
Have there been any policy changes? 
Does organisation apply for all available grants? 
Is the authority getting a "fair" share? 
Costs: Is there a budget set aside to pay for 
administrational costs of applying? How much does it 
cost to win EC grants? 
Additionality: Are grants additional at local level? 
Are there differences in this respect between ERDF 
and ESF? 
Do financial benefits outweigh administrative 
costs? 
What benefits do EC grants provide? 
If there is no additionality, why apply? 
Are projects planned with EC grants in mind? 
Have there been any changes in this regard? Since 
1984? 
Role of EC grants: Are projects going ahead which would not 
otherwise be possible? 
What would happen without ERDF/ESF grants? 
Are there any differences between ERDF and ESF? 
Are projects planned with grant availability in mind? 
Political interests: Are elected members involved? 
Are they kept informed? 
Are they involved in lobbying? 
Are local MPs involved? 
Evaluation: How is the system working? 
Any general comments? 
Improvements? Problems? 
Any other issues of importance? 
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APPENDIX 3. 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF UK GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS. 
1) Organisation. 
Departments: Which Departments/sections are involved with EC 
grants? 
Which Department is responsible for the final 
selection of projects? 
Personnel: Who are people are involved with EC grants? Which 
persons are involved in examining projects? 
Are the same people involved in advice and 
consultation with applicants? 
Who makes final decisions on which projects are to be 
forwarded to the Commission? 
Who examines Programme and Article 15 applications? 
Trends and Evaluation: What changes have there been 
in organisation? 
Are more people involved now than in the past? 
Could the organisation be improved? Does it work 
efficiently? 
2) Project Examination Procedures. 
Processes: What is the process through which applications 
go? Who examines applications first? 
What happens after the initial examination? 
Who takes the final decisions? 
Assessment: How are project applications assessed? 
What criteria are used to determine the projects 
which are forwarded to the Commission? 
Is there any attempt to favour particular types 
of projects? e. g. particularly large projects or 
projects in particular locations? Is it just the 
Commission Regulations and Guidelines? 
What proportion of projects are rejected outright? 
What proportion of projects require further 
discussions with the applicants? 
What proportion of projects are forwarded to Brussels 
without any discussion or am endment? 
Are projects put in order of priority for EC funding? 
Are all eligible applications sent to Brussels? 
What is the timescale for decisions on which projects 
are to be sent to Brussels? 
(n. b. 3 categories of project: (i) Eligible projects 
forwarded to Brussels without further a mendment or 
discussion (ii) Projects forwarded to Brussels 
following significant am-endment (iii) Projects rejected 
outright by the Department? 
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Regional Office (ERDF only): What is the role of the 
Regional Office? 
What proportion of projects are rejected by Bristol? 
How autonomous is the Regional Office? 
Does the Regional office lobby for South West 
projects? 
Trends and Evaluation: Are there more applications now than 
in the past? What is impact of revised ERDF 
regulation? Why does the DoE submit more applications 
to Brussels? 
Have changes lead to many more applications from 
authorities in the regions? 
What are the implications of the changes for the 
potential recipients of grants? e. g. Reliability of 
grants; increased competition? More effort required? 
In what way has the role of the regional office 
changed? 
What other changes have there been to the project 
selection procedures? What are implications of the 
new Programme approach? 
3) Co-Ordination. 
Programmes: Are applicants encouraged to submit Programme 
applications? What is DoE view of these Programmes? 
Are they unnecessary complications or are they useful 
mechanisms for promoting regional development? 
Are potential programmes discussed with applicants? 
What are views of IDP's involving more than one 
Community fund? Are they unnecessary complications or 
are they useful mechanisms for promoting regional 
development? 
What are views on Article 15 schemes? Is the DoE 
involved with these? Why are they being held up by 
the Treasury? 
How are programme applications examined? 
Are they given priority by the DoE? 
Regional Development Programmes: Does the DoE contribute to 
the writing of the RDP? Do local and public 
authorities? 
What is the role of the RDP in the examination of 
projects? 
4) UK Regional Allocation. 
Informal Quotas: Are there mechanisms for allocating shares 
of the ERDF to the regions of the UK? e. g. Informal 
quotas? 
Who decides these? On what basis are they calculated? 
How are they applied? 
Are there quotas applied to the ESF? 
Is the allocation on a purely competitive basis? 
Regional Applications: What proportions of the applications 
come from the various regions? Do some regions submit 
more applications than others? Why might this be so? 
How important is the number of applications in 
determining the regional allocation? 
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Are some regions and areas better organised than 
others? 
What other factors affect the regional allocation of 
the funds? Scottish and Welsh Development agencies? 
Lobbying? 
Are there any data on the numbers of applications 
(succesful or otherwise) from the various regions? 
South West: Is there any policy to concentrate on 
particular parts of the region (or any other region)? 
Is the South West getting a 'fair' share? 
What factors influence the Region's allocation? 
Trends and Evaluation: Has the informal quota always 
existed? 
What is the impact of the 
the informal quota? 
Will it be more difficult 
Are the regions receiving 
ERDF/ESF? 
revised Regulation on 
to apply? 
'fair' shares of the 
4) Information and Guidance Provided. 
Information: What literature does the Department provide for 
applicants? 
Is information provided in response to enquiries or 
sent automatically to potential recipients? 
Does Department organise or attend conferences on EC 
affairs? Does the Department give Guidance 
before applications are received by the DoE? 
General Issues and Policy. 
Size of Budget: Is the budget significant compared with 
comparable National spending? 
Additionality: What is the the DoE view on additionality? 
What benefits do L. A. 's get from grants if they are 
not additional? 
How will the question of additionality be affected by 
the emphasis on the programme approach? What about 
Article 15? 
Is the ESF the same as the ERDF as far as 
additionality rule is concerned? 
Regional Policy: What are the objectives of the ERDF/ESF/? 
What are the objectives of EC Regional Policy? 
How important are the EC funds for regional 
development? 
How important are they for obtaining a share of the 
EC budget for the UK? 
Are the objectives of the funds being achieved? (How 
are they being achieved or why are they not being 
achieved? ) 
'What is the role of EC financing for recipients? For 
the UK Government? 
What is the role of the Commis5ion in Regional 
Policy? 
What is the role of the recipient authorities? 
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Evaluation: Is there any attempt to monitor the effects of 
EC spending and evaluate whether objectives are being 
acheived? 
Does the UK review the policy/funds at all? Is there 
any kind of annual report? 
What is the view on the whole question of getting 
grants from Europe? Would it be easier and more 
effective to simply obtain a block grant from Europe 
and distribute it according to national priorities? 
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APPENDIX 4. 
QUESTIONS ASKED IN SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE TO VOLUNTARY, 
CHARITABLE AND PRIVATE SECTOR RECIPIENTS OF ESF GRANTS IN 
SOUTH WEST ENGLAND. 
Name: 
1) Where did the idea of applying for an ESF grant come 
from? 
2) What assistance did you receive in making the application 
and from whom ? 
3) Who provided the public authority contribution to the 
cost of the training? Please specify 
A Training Board 
A Local Authority 
Manpower Services Commission 
Other 
4) Would the training scheme have been carried out without 
the ESF grant ? 
5) Did the possibility of an ESF grant change the nature of 
the training ? 
6) What proportion of the money applied for did you 
receive ? 
7) Were there any specific problems associated with applyina 
for the grant 
8) Will you be making any future applications for ESF 
grants? If so, why/ why not ' 
9) Have you ever made any unsuccessful applications for FSF 
assistance ? If so, what implications did this hn,. -P 
for the training scemes you were carryiniX out "' 
10) Any other comments ? Importance of FSF iZrant, prohlems 
etc. 
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APPENDIX 5. 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS ARISING FROM THIS RESEARCH. 
CROXFORD, G. (1987) The European Regional Development Fund 
and the European Social Fund: a case-study of Local 
Authorities in South West England. Paper presented to 
a conference on The South West Economy held at 
Plymouth Polytechnic, November 1987 (Plymouth 
Business School and the Regional Studies 
Association). 
CROXFORD, G., WISE, M. AND CHALKLEY, B. S. (1987) The Reform 
of the European Regional Development Fund: a 
preliminary assessment. Journal of Common Market 
Studies. 26,1,25-38. 
CROXFORD, G. AND WISE, M. (1988) The European Social Fund: 
retrospect and prospect. Regional Studies. 22,1, 
65-68. 
WISE, M. AND CROXFORD, G. (1988) The European Regional 
Development Fund: Community ideals and national 
realities. Political Geography Quyterly, 7,2, 
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